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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RATIONALE AND MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE REPORT
This report analyses the financial position of 
non-financial enterprises in the euro area, in 
particular the amount of external financing, the 
choice between debt and equity and the 
composition and maturity structure of debt. It 
aims at identifying the main features of the 
euro area, as well as the peculiarities that 
depend on the country of origin and the sector 
of activity. Attention is also devoted to assessing 
whether a country’s institutional features are 
correlated with different financial structures by 
firms. In light of the particular interest in the 
access of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) to financing, the report also analyses 
how financing patterns differ across large, 
medium-sized and small enterprises. Finally, 
the report discusses the recent trends observed 
in the corporate finance landscape of the euro 
area over the past few years. Although it is still 
too early to pass final judgement, vast structural 
changes are underway that could have already 
influenced in a positive way in the availability 
of external funds for firms. 
All in all, a comprehensive understanding of 
corporate finance in the euro area is important 
from a monetary policy perspective, given its 
impact on the transmission mechanism and for 
productivity and economic growth. Moreover, 
such an understanding is also relevant from a 
financial stability perspective. A first assessment 
is now possible eight years into the third stage 
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
given that sufficient data have been accumulated 
during this period. This assessment is 
particularly important as the introduction of 
the single currency has had significant structural 
effects on the working of financial markets, 
increasing their size and liquidity, and fostering 
cross-border competition. 
The data available for this report generally 
cover the period 1995-2005, and the cut-off 
date for the statistics included is 10 March 
2007.
MAIN FINDINGS
STYLISED FACTS ON COUNTRIES AND SECTORS:  
–  The financial position of corporations in the 
euro area has to a certain degree evolved 
over the last ten years. On the liabilities 
side, shares and other equity remain the 
most important item, followed by loans. 
While debt in relation to GDP has increased 
in all countries, the ratio of debt-to-total 
liabilities (assets) has decreased in most 
countries. On the asset side, the most 
remarkable development has been the rise 
in the share of financial instruments, mostly 
equity, in total assets owned by firms.
–  Firms’ financial structures are relatively 
homogeneous across euro area countries. 
Still, even after taking into account the 
average firm size and sectoral composition 
across countries, some cross-country 
differences remain, particularly in terms of 
leverage ratios and in the intensity of 
recourse to the bond market as opposed to 
bank lending. Legal and institutional 
frameworks may help explain these 
differences: although the level of investor 
protection and financial development is 
generally high and relatively homogeneous 
among euro area countries, firms in countries 
with better creditor protection tend to have 
a higher ratio of debt over equity. Moreover, 
a more widespread recourse to bond 
financing also seems associated with an 
institutional set-up which provides more 
transparency and wider dissemination of 
information about firms.
–  Differences in financial structure across 
sectors are to some extent the natural 
reflection of differences in the degree of 
capital intensity which are inherent in their 
activity. The construction and trade sectors, 
for example, which are less capital-intensive, 
have a financial structure mainly 
characterised by short-term liabilities; by 
contrast, the energy or transport and 
communications sectors, which are more 
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liabilities. Levels of indebtedness also vary 
considerably across sectors, even though 
some convergence has taken place over the 
period considered, with debt reduction most 
pronounced in the more indebted sectors. 
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED FIRMS: 
–  An assessment of the differences between 
the financial position of SMEs and larger 
firms requires sectoral composition and 
country effects to be controlled for. Once 
this has been done, some of the differences 
detected in previous studies tend to 
disappear, although others then emerge 
more clearly. Differences remain regarding 
the degree of reliance on bonds and the 
share of financial to total assets (all of which 
are positively related to the size of the firm), 
and in terms of the degree of reliance on 
cash and bank loans (all of which are 
negatively related to the size of the firm). 
SMEs also tend to be in a somewhat weaker 
financial situation, as indicated, for example, 
by their higher level of indebtedness or their 
lower gross operating profit-to-value added 
ratio.
–  An econometric analysis based on firm-
level data confirms that investment decisions 
are affected by the financial position of 
firms. In particular, firms facing a higher 
degree of financial pressure are found to 
have on average lower investment rates. 
The empirical results also show that the role 
of financial variables does not seem to differ 
across size classes. However, as SMEs tend 
to be in a weaker financial situation than 
larger firms, their investment decisions 
might be more affected.
Concerning the existence of financing 
constraints for SMEs, i.e. their inability to 
obtain sufficient financing to fund their 
investment needs at current, or even higher, 
interest rates, the empirical evidence is mixed:
–  Several surveys conducted at the European 
level by the European Commission signal 
that around 10% of firms believe that 
financing constraints exist, although these 
results vary across countries. These findings 
are similarly reflected in some national 
surveys.
–  A review of econometric studies shows that 
the evidence is mixed, with some studies 
pointing to the existence of financing 
constraints for small firms, while others 
identify other factors as being more relevant 
in influencing the access to finance. It needs 
to be stressed that these results, along with 
those derived from surveys, should be 
interpreted with caution due to the lack of 
homogeneity in the definition of SMEs and 
in the formulation of the questions; the lack 
of control for other variables such as the age 
of the firm; and finally sample bias, whereby 
the firms covered tend to be those in a better 
financial situation.
CHANGES IN THE CORPORATE FINANCE 
LANDSCAPE: 
–  During the first few years of the third stage 
of EMU, non-financial corporations have 
benefited from increased availability of 
market-based financing in the context of 
booming stock markets, with a strong surge 
in the net issuance of corporate bonds and 
shares. The robust recourse to these 
instruments has been used to finance higher 
levels of real investment as well as to fund 
the very large increases in merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity. More recently, 
innovations in credit markets have had a 
significant impact on corporate financing, 
and have also modified the role of financial 
intermediaries. In this respect, a two-tier 
process can be identified. Firstly, bank 
lending has become even more prominent in 
the last two or three years. Secondly, the 
link between the banking sector and the 
markets has been strengthened significantly, 
with commercial banks shifting from acting 
as traditional financial intermediaries to 
functioning as credit risk originators and 
sellers, as a result of securitisation processes 
and the increasing use of credit 
derivatives.9
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–  At the same time, the relevance of non-bank 
intermediaries has increased across the 
board, from insurance companies and 
pension funds to hedge funds. The role of 
private equity funds in providing finance 
and management services to non-financial 
corporations has also substantially expanded 
in the last few years. The increased 
importance of hedge funds and private 
equity funds has affected the governance of 
euro area corporations. The importance of 
venture capital funds, by contrast, remains 
overall limited.
–  All in all, it is important to bear in mind that 
recent developments in corporate finance in 
the euro area have also been driven by more 
conjunctural factors such as ample liquidity, 
low levels of interest rates, low credit risk 
spreads and the demand for leveraged 
transactions. It is still too early to disentangle 
to what extent these recent dynamics are of 
a structural nature, and to what extent they 
could be reversed in the future.
CONCLUSIONS
From the point of view of monetary policy, 
three main conclusions can be drawn. 
First, the new role of banks in originating, 
pooling and distributing credit risk outside the 
banking system in the context of increased 
competition among banks and between banks 
and other financial intermediaries may provide 
corporations, under most economic scenarios, 
with easier and cheaper access to external 
finance. 
Second, as credit granted is evaluated on a 
more mark-to-market basis and the banking 
sector becomes more competitive, the speed of 
transmission of monetary impulses to bank 
interest rates across the whole maturity is 
expected, ceteris paribus, to quicken. 
Third, the report indicates that it is likely that 
credit risk will be less concentrated on banks, 
thereby making them less vulnerable in the 
event of shocks. However, it cannot be ruled 
out that episodes of mispricing of credit risk 
may be followed by abrupt adjustments that 
could pose new challenges for the stability of 
the financial system as a whole. Such patterns 
may be relevant for monetary policy and 
financial stability considerations alike, noting 
that even in normal circumstances, a different 
distribution of credit risk in the economy may 
affect the way the transmission mechanism 
operates.
It can additionally be concluded that the recent 
trends in financial innovation have contributed 
to the overall financial development of the euro 
area and can thus be expected to foster 
productivity and long-term economic growth. 
While differences across countries that could 
be partly related to institutional features still 
remain, these trends may well accelerate the 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this report is to review the structural 
factors that are likely to have a direct influence 
on the financial position of non-financial 
enterprises in the euro area.2 Indeed, the ability 
of non-financial enterprises to obtain external 
financing has an impact on their investment 
and employment decisions as well as on their 
growth prospects. Monetary policy influences 
the investment demand of enterprises via 
various channels (i.e. the interest rate, credit 
and balance sheet channels). As these 
transmission mechanisms depend to a certain 
degree on the financing behaviour and balance 
sheet structures of firms, a detailed 
understanding of corporate financing decisions 
is important for monetary policy in the context 
of an assessment of financial and economic 
development.
The availability of finance can be influenced by 
a number of factors, such as the size of the firm 
and the sector it chiefly operates in, and the 
country it operates from (in particular, that 
country’s institutions). The level of economic 
and financial development might also play a 
relevant role in determining firms’ financing 
decisions and their access to finance. As the 
access of SMEs to financing is of particular 
interest to policymakers, this report analyses in 
depth how financing patterns differ across 
dimensional classes, and reviews the available 
evidence on the existence of financing 
constraints.
Another important aspect is related to the 
changing corporate finance landscape of the 
euro area. Significant changes have occurred in 
the financial sector since the start of Monetary 
Union that have increased the choice of financial 
products available to non-financial enterprises. 
The remainder of the report contains three 
chapters that reflect the main factors which 
have been identified. Chapter 2 analyses cross-
country and cross-sectoral differences in 
enterprises’ financial positions. It also 
investigates the degree to which differences in 
institutions across euro area Member States 
coincide with differences in firms’ financial 
choices. Institutional features that have been 
identified in the literature to be important for 
corporate finance are related to various financial 
variables such as leverage, the use of debt 
or equity, or the maturity structure of debt. 
Chapter 3 then examines the degree to which 
SMEs exhibit different financial positions from 
large-scale enterprises. It is commonly believed 
that small firms pay a higher price for finance, 
or may even be financially constrained. Hence, 
the chapter analyses SMEs’ financial positions 
to establish whether there are any systematic 
differences in their financing patterns with 
respect to large firms, as this might point 
to potential financing constraints. Finally, 
Chapter 4 describes the development of the 
various sources of external financing available 
to non-financial corporations in the euro area, 
and provides an overview of some of the most 
recent and important changes in the corporate 
finance landscape.
1.2 MAIN  CONCEPTS 
The various dimensions of the financial 
positions of firms include, first of all, the 
degree of choice regarding the proportion of 
their activities which is financed from internally 
generated cash flows. However, firms may not 
have sufficient funds to finance projects they 
expect to be profitable, and in such cases will 
seek external funding, typically in the form of 
debt or equity.
Firms’ financial structures vary greatly owing 
to differences in their financing and investment 
decisions. Against this background, Chapter 2 
analyses differences in firms’ financial positions 
across countries and sectors, leading in 
particular to different financial structures. In 
this respect, the degree to which asymmetries 
1  Prepared by Peter McGoldrick.
2  This report refers to the financial position of a firm as the status 
of a firm’s assets, liabilities and equity accounts as of a certain 
time; and to the financial structure as the liability side of a 
company balance sheet, which includes all the ways its assets 
are financed. Financial structure is distinguished from capital 
structure, which includes only long-term debt and equity.
1 MOTIVATION  AND  MAIN  CONCEPTS111
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of information affect financial decisions, such 
as how much and which type of debt to choose, 
may depend on institutional features. The 
findings in the general literature suggest that 
country-specific effects have a direct and 
significant impact on leverage, but also magnify 
the impact of firm-specific characteristics on 
the choice of financial structure. 
Furthermore, firm size and age may affect the 
quality and quantity of information available 
on a firm’s projects and its collateral, or its 
relationship with the markets and banks. As a 
consequence, small firms are often believed to 
face more severe financing problems than large 
firms, and it would therefore be reasonable to 
expect the financing patterns of SMEs to differ 
from those of large firms. Some of these a priori 
behaviours will be reviewed in Chapter 3, 
which focuses on euro area firms by using 
balance sheet information. The existence of 
differences in the financing patterns between 
small and large firms and of financial constraints 
(which is an extreme case of market 
imperfection) may suggest that monetary policy 
has a different impact on firms of a different 
size and on the transmission mechanism itself. 
The issue of identifying whether a financing 
constraint actually exists has not yet been 
satisfactorily addressed, either econometrically 
or by use of surveys. There is however a large 
literature on this which this chapter reviews. 
As mentioned in the introduction, major 
changes have occurred in the corporate finance 
landscape of the euro area over the past few 
years that have affected the flow of external 
financing to non-financial corporations. In 
particular, Chapter 4 distinguishes between two 
phases. During a first phase, which lasted 
approximately until 2001, access to market 
financing in the euro area increased significantly, 
with corporations benefiting from the 
development of corporate bond and equity 
markets. The removal of currency risk in 1999 
and the trend toward financial market integration 
also acted as catalysts for the development of 
market-based financing sources. 
In a second, more recent phase, after the decline 
in stock prices following the bursting of the so-
called high-tech bubble, innovation in financial 
and credit markets contributed to new patterns of 
financing for enterprises, where banks again 
gained ground and gradually changed their role. 
These innovations represent major structural 
changes, and include the development and 
diffusion of securitisation, credit derivatives, 
structured finance and the syndicated loans 
markets. Contributing factors to these structural 
developments include the very low interest rate 
environment, the further international integration 
of financial markets, regulatory developments 
such as the Basel II accords, and technological 
developments, all of which have greatly enhanced 
the quality and timeliness of information. 
In both phases, the enhanced role of institutional 
investors and other new players (such as private 
equity and hedge funds) in the financial markets 
played a role in the development of the markets. 
Changes in the funding patterns of firms may 
affect the transmission of monetary policy. The 
increased importance of market-based finance in 
the first few years of Monetary Union and, more 
recently, the decision by commercial banks to 
shift from acting as balance sheet intermediaries 
to becoming credit risk originators and sellers 
could have an impact on the channels of the 
transmission of monetary policy.
Recent trends in financial innovation in the 
euro area have modified the role of 
intermediaries and broadened the set of 
financial instruments that are used in corporate 
finance, thereby contributing to the overall 
efficiency of the financial system (i.e. 
improving the set of institutions and markets 
through which firms, households and other 
economic agents obtain financing for their 
projects and invest their savings). This can be 
expected to foster productivity growth, as well-
developed financial markets are likely to 
accelerate the reallocation of capital from 
declining industries to industries with better 
growth prospects.3
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This chapter provides some stylised facts 
on the financial position of non-financial 
corporations in the euro area and in the euro 
area countries, including an analysis of the 
main economic sectors in the period 1995-
2005. It also analyses the degree to which 
cross-country differences in firms’ financial 
choices and financial positions are related to 
institutional and market features. In addition, 
the chapter also compares the financial situation 
of euro area enterprises with that of firms in the 
major industrialised countries, and in the ten 
new Member States (NMS-10).
The analysis is based on two main data sources: 
the national financial accounts for the non-
financial corporate sector, and the BACH 
database of the European Commission.5 The 
former covers the whole corporate sector, while 
the latter provides data on a sample of company 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of 
non-financial corporations, which have been 
aggregated into countries and sectors. It should 
be noted that differences in the compilation of 
the two sources, mainly due to their coverage 
and valuation principles, mean that it is not 
always possible to compare statistics. For 
instance, BACH data are based on accounting 
figures which mainly rely on book-value, 
although some assets are valued at market 
prices, following national accounting rules 
and/or international financial reporting 
standards. National financial accounts, on the 
other hand, tend to privilege market values, 
but sometimes estimate values for missing 
information, such as non-marketable securities. 
The report will take into consideration these 
discrepancies wherever necessary.
With respect to coverage, the balance sheet 
analysis examines data from ten of the 12 euro 
area countries (excluding Ireland and 
Luxembourg).6 However, Greek data have not 
been included in the euro area aggregates based 
on BACH data since they were taken from a 
different database.7 For the sectoral analysis, 
six main industry groupings have been 
considered.8
The indicators in this chapter9 are first presented 
at euro area level, and then the sectoral and 
country-specific dimensions are investigated. 
This chapter focuses on the financial position, 
with an emphasis on the existing structural 
differences across sectors and countries. In 
order to assess cross-country differences in the 
financial position of firms and to make best use 
of the information contained in the BACH 
database, sub-section 2.1 aggregates a subset 
of indicators at the country level, correcting as 
much as possible for differences in size and 
sectoral composition. Sub-section 2.2 briefly 
reviews the theory and empirical evidence on 
country differences that affect firms’ financing 
structures, while some stylised facts on financial 
and institutional features in the euro area are 
presented in a box. This chapter also contains 
two other boxes, the first comparing the 
financial position of non-financial corporations 
in the euro area and in the major industrialised 
countries and their evolution, and the second 
considering the financial position of non-
financial corporations in the NMS-10. Sub-
section 2.3 briefly concludes.
2.1 FINANCIAL  POSITION
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: EURO AREA 
As a result of financing and investment 
decisions by euro area non-financial 
corporations, there have been some remarkable 
shifts in the shares of assets and liabilities 
over the last decade (see Table 1 and Box 1). 
According to the financial accounts (i.e. based 
on market valuation), the boom in stock markets 
4  Prepared by Vanessa Baugnet, Annalisa Ferrando, Petra 
Köhler-Ulbrich, Elmar Stoess and Katia Tombois.
5  BACH stands for the Bank for the Accounts of Companies 
Harmonised. For a detailed description of the two data sources, 
see Annex 1.
6   Slovenia is not considered because it joined the euro area after 
the period under consideration in this report.
7  Data on Greek corporations are taken from ICAP, see Annex 1.
8  The sectors are: “manufacturing”, “electricity, gas and water 
supply”, “construction”, “wholesale and retail trade”, “transport, 
storage and communication” as well as “other services” 
(including hotels and restaurants, real estate, renting and 
business activities). 
9  Annex 1 contains a list of all indicators constructed from the 
BACH database.
2  THE FINANCIAL POSITION OF NON-FINANCIAL 
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Table 1 Financial liability composition of non-financial corporations’ balance sheets
























































































































































































































































Sources: ECB annual national and financial accounts. Euro area data for 2005 are preliminary estimates.
Notes: Unconsolidated financial accounts include inter-company loans. Total debt is defined as the sum of loans, debt securities 
(excluding financial derivatives) and insurance technical reserves.
led to an increase in the share of equity in total 
liabilities (own funds ratio) from 43% in 1995 
to 54% in 2005, with this category representing 
by far the largest means of financing. Although 
loans remain the second most important source 
of corporate liabilities, their share has 
diminished, dropping from around 35% in 1995 
to 29% in 2005. The share of debt securities by 
contrast has not changed in the meantime, 
remaining at less than 4% of total liabilities. 
While the item “other accounts payable and 
financial derivatives”, which includes trade 
credit, plays some role in corporate liabilities, 
it is of minor importance when netted against 
the corresponding item on the asset side of the 
balance sheet. It is interesting to note that while 
total debt (defined as the sum of loans, debt 
securities and insurance technical reserves) in 
relation to GDP has increased in all countries, 
the total debt-to-total liabilities ratio has 
decreased in most countries, implying that 
corporate liabilities (assets) have increased at a 
far faster rate than nominal GDP.
Regarding corporate financial assets, equity 
accounts for the largest share, rising from 41% 
in 1995 to 52% in 2005, and indicating the 
degree of financial linkages between euro area 
corporations. The relevant role of trade credit 
and loans in the financial assets of euro area 
non-financial corporations is another indicator 
of the strong financial linkages within the 
corporate sector. Again, debt securities are of 
minor importance in the financial assets held 
by euro area non-financial corporations. 
Finally, very liquid assets, such as currency 
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Table 2 Financial asset composition of non-financial corporations’ balance sheets

























































































































































































































Sources: ECB annual national and financial accounts. Euro area data for 2005 are preliminary estimates.
Note: Unconsolidated financial accounts include inter-company loans.
and deposits, represent about 12% of all 
corporate assets in 2005, down slightly from 
15% in 1995.
Several indicators can be used to assess the 
overall level of corporate indebtedness. As 
shown in Table 1 and Chart C in Box 1, based 
on national and financial accounts, the total 
debt-to-GDP ratio of euro area corporations 
has stabilised or moderated since 2001, after 
recording a sharp increase at the end of the 
1990s, to stand at 78% in 2005, up from 48% in 
1995. However, the ratio of debt to equity, as 
well as the ratio of debt to assets, increased 
only moderately from 2000 to 2002, and shows 
an overall decline over the period 
considered.10
10  Based on company accounts using the BACH database, the debt-
to-equity ratio also shows an overall decline from 1995 to 2005 
(see Table 3). This ratio is defined as the sum of loans from 
credit institutions, payments received on accounts of orders, 
trade creditors, loans from other creditors and other financial 
and non-financial creditors, bonds and provisions for pensions 
and similar obligations.15
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Box 1
THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN THE EURO AREA, THE UNITED 
STATES, JAPAN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 1
Saving, fixed capital formation and the financing need of non-financial corporations2
Starting from a position of relatively low saving ratios in 2000 and 2001, enterprises in the 
euro area, the US and the UK have considerably increased their gross saving, including net 
capital transfers, as a percentage of GDP between 2002 and 2004 [2005] (see Chart A). This 
mainly reflects the strong increase in corporate profitability in recent years. In Japan, 
corporations have increased their saving as a percentage of GDP continuously over the last 
decade.3 In parallel with low levels of saving, non-financial corporations in the euro area, the 
US and the UK strongly increased their fixed capital formation from the late-1990s until 2000, 
leading to a high need for external financing as indicated by the significant widening of the 
financing deficit in this period (see Chart B).
Chart A Saving and capital transfers of
non-financial corporations
(in percentages of GDP)
Sources: ECB, US Federal Reserve Board, Japan Economic and 
Social Research Institute Cabinet Office and the UK Office for 
National Statistics.
Notes: Euro area figures in 1995 have been corrected for the 
assumption of the Treuhand agency’s debt by the Redemption 
Fund for Inherited Liabilities in Germany. 2005 data for the 
euro area are preliminary estimates.
gross saving and net capital transfers, euro area 
(left-hand scale)
gross saving and net capital transfers, US 
(left-hand scale)
gross saving and net capital transfers, UK 
(left-hand scale)
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Chart B Financing surplus/deficit of 
non-financial corporations 
(in percentages of GDP)



















Sources: ECB, US Federal Reserve Board, Japan Economic and 
Social Research Institute Cabinet Office and the UK Office for 
National Statistics.
Notes: The financing surplus/deficit is defined as net lending/net 
borrowing as a percentage of GDP. Euro area figures in 1995 have 
been corrected for the assumption of the Treuhand agency’s debt 
by the Redemption Fund for Inherited Liabilities in Germany. 
2005 data for the euro area are preliminary estimates.
1  Prepared by Petra Köhler-Ulbrich and Elmar Stoess.
2  The data applied in Box 1 are based on national and financial accounts. The euro area, the UK and Japan follow the System of 
National Accounts 1993 (SNA 1993), whereas the US statistical accounting system uses in part different definitions. With respect 
to the delineation of the sectors, the US non-financial business sector broadly corresponds to the non-financial corporations defined 
according to SNA 1993, including both incorporated and unincorporated businesses. By contrast, the US non-financial business 
sector also includes sole proprietorships.
3  The peak in 1998 resulted from net capital transfers received by Japanese non-financial corporations. This was probably related to 
the domestic banking crisis and the Asian crisis.
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At the beginning of 2000, the financing deficit started to narrow in the three economies. In the 
euro area, this continued until 2002, mainly owing to a decline in fixed investment. This was 
even more pronounced in the US during this period. By contrast, in the UK the movement from 
a financing deficit to a financing surplus was relatively evenly spread between a rise in saving 
and a decline in fixed investment. Japanese corporations enjoyed a financing surplus from 1998 
to 2004, mainly related to an increase in gross saving (with the exception of the large financing 
surplus in 1998 that resulted from high net capital transfers), and only to a smaller extent to a 
decline in gross capital formation.    
Financing of non-financial corporations 
Between 1995 and 2005, loans were on average by far the most important source of debt 
financing of non-financial corporations in the euro area (96%), compared to the issuance of 
debt securities, which accounted for only a fraction (4%) (see Table A). Only in the period 
1999-2001 did debt securities start to play a larger role in the debt financing of euro area 
enterprises, a trend that was to a large extent related to the high level of M&As at that time. 
By contrast, in the more recent past, high levels of financial investment have been financed 
mainly by loans, while the issuance of debt securities has remained relatively modest. 
Accordingly, the importance of debt securities in the amount outstanding of debt liabilities of 
corporations is relatively low in the euro area (9.5% on average from 1995 to 2005), compared 
with a share of loans of 91%. In the UK and in particular in the US, the share of loans in the 
debt liabilities of corporations has been less important, accounting for 75% in the UK and 59% 
in the US on average in the period 1995-2005. In these two countries, market-based debt 
financing of enterprises has played a much larger role than in the euro area. At the same time, 
however, the share of loans in annual debt financing transactions increased markedly in the UK 
in 2004 and in the US in 2004 and 2005. Compared to the strong annual growth rate of loans 
to non-financial corporations, the annual growth rate of debt securities issued by this sector 
has remained rather modest over the past few years in all four economic areas. In Japan, 
enterprises reduced their debt liabilities during most of the period under review (from 1996 
to 2005), implying negative debt financing transactions related to substantial corporate 
reorganisation and balance sheet restructuring. Most of this reduction resulted from a reduction 
in loans, which accounted for 80% of outstanding debt liabilities on average between 1995 and 
2005.
Compared with the relatively strong level of debt financing, the issuance of quoted and unquoted 
equity by non-financial corporations accounted for a lower share in the annual debt and equity 
financing transactions in the euro area, and even more so in the US and the UK. Moreover, the 
composition of equity is quite different. For instance, in the US the vast majority of medium-
size and nearly all large US corporations have publicly traded shares, with unquoted shares at 
the end of 2003 estimated at around 12% of the total market value of equity of domestic 
corporations. In the euro area, by contrast, this share stood at than 60%, well above the average 
from 1995 to 2005 of 42% (compared to an average of 31% in the UK). In both economic areas, 
the annual growth rate of equity issued by corporations was relatively strong in 1999 and 2000, 
related to the New Economy boom, but dropped considerably thereafter and remained relatively 
weak until 2005. By contrast, the net issuance of equity by US corporations remained negative 
throughout the entire period under review, owing to share buybacks and equity retirements 
following mergers. The situation in Japan differs from that of the other three economies: net 
equity issuance remained positive throughout the entire period and higher than the (negative) 17
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debt financing transactions, dropping considerably from the peak reached in 1999, similar to 
the euro area and the UK, but recovering somewhat in 2004 and 2005.  
The financial position of non-financial corporations 
From relatively similar levels in 1997, the total debt-to-GDP ratios of corporations in the euro 
area, the US and the UK have all increased to a different extent during the past decade (see 
Chart C). For the euro area, this ratio is most comparable with that of the US, although it 
excludes inter-company loans, which are consolidated in the US data. Both the euro area and 
the US ratios have developed broadly in line at similar levels since the mid-1990s. After 
increasing between the second half of the 1990s and 2001, debt ratios stabilised or moderated 
slightly thereafter, standing at 70% in the euro area in 2005 and at 67% in the US in 2005. When 
Debt and equity liabilities of non-financial corporations
(amounts outstanding, in percentages)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Euro area
in percentages of debt liabilities
 Loans 91.3 91.2 91.4 91.5 91.3 91.1 89.9 90.3 89.5 89.5 89.2
 Debt  securities 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.7 8.9 10.1 9.7 10.5 10.5 10.8
in percentages of debt and equity liabilities 
 Debt  47.4 43.0 39.9 35.7 30.8 33.7 38.1 42.9 41.1 39.9 37.7
 Equity 52.6 57.0 60.1 64.3 69.2 66.3 61.9 57.1 58.9 60.1 62.3
Debt to equity 90.3 75.3 66.4 55.5 44.4 50.8 61.6 75.1 69.9 66.4 60.6
United States
in percentages of debt liabilities
 Loans 60.3 59.9 59.7 59.1 58.9 59.1 57.8 57.8 57.3 58.4 60.7
 Debt  securities 39.7 40.1 40.3 40.9 41.1 40.9 42.2 42.2 42.7 41.6 39.3
in percentages of debt and equity liabilities 
 Debt  39.1 36.4 32.8 31.6 28.2 33.9 39.0 47.5 42.1 41.6 43.4
 Equity 60.9 63.6 67.2 68.4 71.8 66.1 61.0 52.5 57.9 58.4 56.6
Debt to equity 64.3 57.2 48.8 46.2 39.3 51.4 63.8 90.4 72.7 71.2 76.6
Japan
in percentages of debt liabilities
 Loans 81.4 80.0 80.5 80.9 81.3 80.3 80.9 80.0 79.9 79.4 79.5
 Debt  securities 18.6 20.0 19.5 19.1 18.7 19.7 19.1 20.0 20.1 20.6 20.5
in percentages of debt and equity liabilities 
 Debt  62.0 64.5 64.2 63.9 53.1 57.2 60.0 64.6 54.9 53.4 44.5
 Equity 38.0 35.5 35.8 36.1 46.9 42.8 40.0 35.4 45.1 46.6 55.5
Debt to equity 163.3 182.1 179.3 176.8 113.3 133.5 150.0 182.2 121.9 114.8 80.3
United Kingdom
in percentages of debt liabilities
 Loans 78.7 78.8 77.9 76.4 74.7 72.9 74.1 74.0 73.8 74.6 73.5
 Debt  securities 21.3 21.2 22.1 23.6 25.3 27.1 25.9 26.0 26.2 25.4 26.5
in percentages of debt and equity liabilities 
 Debt  31.9 30.9 29.4 29.7 27.5 30.5 36.1 44.9 42.8 42.6 41.3
 Equity 68.1 69.1 70.6 70.3 72.5 69.5 63.9 55.1 57.2 57.4 58.7
Debt to equity 46.9 44.8 41.6 42.3 37.9 43.8 56.5 81.6 74.9 74.3 70.3
Sources: ECB, US Federal Reserve Board, Bank of Japan and the UK Office for National Statistics.
Notes: Debt liabilities are defined as the sum of loans and debt securities (excluding financial derivatives). 2005 data for the euro area 
are preliminary estimates.
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looking at the total debt-to-GDP ratio of euro area corporations based on unconsolidated data, 
however, the picture differs in two main ways. First, the increase in the debt ratio in the second 
half of the 1990s was more pronounced, and second, the ratio continued to increase slightly 
until 2003, before rising to 80% in 2005. The ratio including inter-company loans can be 
compared to the total debt-to-GDP ratio of UK corporations, as both refer to unconsolidated 
accounts. Non-financial corporations in the UK markedly increased their total debt-to-GDP 
ratios from 64% in 1997 to 102% in 2005. This development deviated from that in the euro area 
and the US in particular between 2002 and 2005, linked to a slightly less marked decline in the 
annual rate of change of debt in the UK during that period. In contrast with the other three 
economies, Japanese corporations significantly reduced their total debt-to-GDP ratios in the 
period under review, in line with their reduction of outstanding debt liabilities. 
The development of the ratio of debt to debt plus equity was influenced by large swings in the 
valuation of equity at market prices in all four economies, which declined considerably from 
1995 to 1999 and rose strongly from 2000 to 2002, two trends that are related to the rise and 
subsequent fall in stock market prices (see table). From 2003 to 2005, the ratio declined 
moderately in the euro area, the US and the UK, and more strongly in Japan, in parallel with 
the recovery in stock market prices. Overall, over the period 1995-2004/2005, the ratio declined 
somewhat for the euro area and to a larger extent for Japan, while it increased in the US and 
rose significantly in the UK. The repurchases of equity by US corporations and the stronger 
Chart C Total debt-to-GDP ratios of 
non-financial corporations 
(in percentages)
Chart D Net interest burden of 
non-financial corporations
 
(in percentages of GDP)
debt ratio (incl. inter-comp. loans), euro area 
(left-hand scale)
debt ratio (excl. inter-comp. loans), euro area 
(left-hand scale)
debt ratio, US (left-hand scale)
debt ratio, UK (left-hand scale)
debt ratio, Japan (right-hand scale)
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Sources: ECB, US Federal Reserve Board, Bank of Japan and 
the UK Office for National Statistics.
Notes: Total debt is defined as the sum of the amount outstanding 
of loans and debt securities and, for the euro area, pension fund 
reserves. The ratio for the euro area including inter-company 
loans is based on unconsolidated annual financial accounts 
data. The ratio for the euro area is based on the quarterly 
financial accounts, which do not include inter-company loans, 
and an estimate of loans granted by non-euro area banks. 2005 
data for the euro area are preliminary estimates
Sources: ECB, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Japan 
Economic and Social Research Institute Cabinet Office and the 
UK Office for National Statistics.
Notes: The net interest burden is defined as the amount of 
interest paid minus the amount of interest received. 2005 data 
for the euro area are preliminary estimates.  19
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increase in the debt of corporations in the UK over this period have all contributed to the 
increasing ratios in these two economies. Overall, while there were considerable differences in 
the level of this ratio over the period under review, the level was relatively similar in all four 
economies in 2005, even though the composition of equity is rather different, with non-quoted 
shares more important in the euro area than in the US and the UK.
The development of the net interest burden of corporations has been driven partly by the 
developments in money market interest rates, which explain the considerable differences 
between the four economic areas (see Chart D).4 In the euro area, the net interest burden 
declined in the second half of the 1990s, related to the interest rate convergence before the start 
of EMU in 1999. After a temporary rise in 2000, it dropped to historically low levels in 2004, 
in the context of low market interest rates. The higher US and UK market interest rates from 
1996 to early 2001 contributed to explaining the higher level of the US and UK net interest 
burden compared with the euro area from 1998 onwards. From 2001 to 2004, the net interest 
burden of US corporations approached the net interest burden of euro area corporations, owing 
to the significant easing of US monetary policy. Finally, extremely low money market rates in 
Japan starting in the mid-1990s led to a steep decline in the net interest burden of Japanese 
corporations over the period under review.   
4  In addition, the exclusion of financial institutions’ implicit service charges (FISIM) from the euro area interest data from 1999 
onwards partly contributed to the difference between the interest burden of euro area corporations compared with that of corporations 
in the US and the UK.
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS: COUNTRY DIMENSIONS
Between 1995 and 2005, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
increased in all euro area countries, particularly 
in Belgium, Portugal and Spain. However, the 
own funds ratio also increased in most cases, 
reflecting the increase in share prices, and 
stood at between 40% and 60% of total liabilities 
(see Table 1).
Analysing the structure of debt in more detail, 
bank loans remained the largest item in most 
countries, although loans by other financial 
intermediaries (OFIs) have gained in 
importance. The share of debt securities issued 
remained relatively small in most countries. 
Only in Austria, France and Portugal did the 
stock of debt securities reach a significant level 
of about 5-8% of total liabilities. Other positions 
within the capital structure (such as insurance 
technical reserves) were either limited to 
certain countries or of minor importance. The 
outstanding amount of other accounts and 
financial derivatives was very important in a 
few countries (e.g. accounting for 22% of total 
liabilities in Spain in 2005), but on a net basis, 
the corresponding figures were small or 
negative, and thus so far cannot be considered 
a relevant additional financing source.11
Turning to the structure of financial assets, the 
holding of shares and other equity was ranked first 
in most countries, underlying the high degree of 
connections between enterprises. Dutch and Irish 
enterprises constituted an exception, however, 
where loans granted (either to other firms or other 
sectors) exceeded shares and other equities in 
2005. For a few countries (e.g. the Netherlands, 
Austria, Germany and above all Greece) the 
holdings of deposits were relatively high, but 
nevertheless lower than shares and other equity as 
a percentage of total financial assets.
In most countries, the interest burden12 of non-
financial enterprises declined between 1995 
and 2005, in line with euro area market interest 
11  At the same time, a short-term mismatch was reported for Austria, 
Greece, Italy and Portugal. Here the ratio of short-term financial 
assets to short-term debt was less than 100%, meaning that liquid 
assets were not sufficiently high to cover short-term liabilities. 
There was one positive outlier in Finland which had a value of 
nearly 200%.
12  Measured by net interest expenditure as a percentage of gross 
operating profit. 
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rates. However, significant differences in the 
level of this burden remained: the indicator was 
higher than the 2005 euro area average in 
France and Italy, and much lower in the 
Netherlands and Greece. This can be explained 
by the fact that in the latter two countries the 
holding of deposits and the amount of interest 
receipts reducing the net burden were relatively 
high. 
BALANCE SHEET DATA: COUNTRY AND SECTORAL 
DIMENSIONS
This section analyses the cross-country and 
sectoral features of the financial position of 
non-financial corporations in the euro area 
based on the BACH database. The format of the 
analysis is slightly different from the previous 
section, given the differences in the compilation 
methods used in the BACH database and in the 
annual financial accounts. The advantage of 
using balance sheet data, however, is that such 
data enable differences in sectoral and size 
composition to be taken into account. This 
section aims to answer the following four 
questions. (1) What are the main stylised facts 
on individual countries’ financial position, and 
(2) how do they compare with the evidence 
from financial accounts? (3) Are the main 
stylised facts identified above really country-
specific, or do they depend on different size 
and sectoral characteristics of firms? (4) To the 
extent that they are country-specific, what can 
explain the differences, and what might these 
differences imply? 
To start with, this section considers the sectoral 
characteristics of non-financial corporations in 
the euro area, before focusing on cross-country 
differences. The dimension of size will be dealt 
with in detail in the next chapter.
SECTORAL DIMENSION
Balance sheet structures differ across sectors, 
mainly due to the nature of firms’ activities. When 
debt is compared to equity or to total assets, two 
sectors show a much higher level of indebtedness: 
“construction” and “wholesale and retail trade” 
(see Table 3). On the other hand, the “electricity, 
Table 3 Asset composition, maturity matches and debt structure of non-financial corporations 
across sectors in the euro area













































































































































































Sources: ECCBSO, BACH database and own calculations.
Note: For the definition of debt, see footnote 10.21
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gas and water supply” and “manufacturing” 
sectors feature comparatively low debt ratios over 
the period considered.13 One should however be 
cautious when interpreting these figures, as 
relating debt to turnover yields contradictory 
results: the “electricity, gas and water supply” 
sector then appears highly indebted (as would 
“other services” and “transport, storage and 
communication”), while the indebtedness of the 
“wholesale and retail trade” sector appears much 
lower. This reflects large differences across sectors 
regarding the size of their balance sheet assets.
In terms of the maturity structure, two main 
groups can be distinguished. The first comprises 
the “construction”, “wholesale and retail trade” 
and, to a lesser extent, also “manufacturing” 
sectors. These all have financial structures 
mainly biased towards short-term liabilities, as 
indicated by a large percentage of current assets 
in relation to total assets. This can be attributed 
to specific characteristics in the financing of 
these sectors: in the construction sector, 
customers typically pay part of the contract 
upfront, thus providing “free” external finance 
to match the borrowing requirement. In the 
trade sector, financing needs are to a very large 
extent covered by trade credit. In the 
manufacturing sector, long-term finance is 
usually needed, but high profitability levels 
have enabled firms to cover investment costs 
and moreover to repay remaining long-term 
debt. Therefore the existing financing pattern 
can largely be characterised as reflecting a 
transitory phenomenon. 
The second group comprises “electricity, gas 
and water supply”, “transport, storage and 
communication” and “other services”, and 
displays a financial structure that has been 
influenced by high long-term borrowing 
requirements in recent years. These sectors 
have a financing deficit but considerable 
tangible fixed assets, so that short-term assets 
are small in relation to total assets. At the same 
time, their share of short-term debt in total debt 
is also below the average.
Despite differences in the composition of debt 
and assets, the ratio which compares short-term 
assets to short-term debt, i.e. liquidity in the 
broad sense, has exceeded 100% in every sector 
throughout the last decade. Broadly in line 
with the rise in debt, the interest burden14 has 
remained above the overall sectoral average of 
all sectors in the “other services” and “transport, 
storage and communication” sectors for most 
of the period.
COUNTRY DIMENSION AND INDICATORS ADJUSTED 
FOR SIZE AND SECTORAL DIMENSIONS15
This section first considers the country-level 
variables that describe the financial structure 
as derived directly from the BACH database 
(see Table 4). Since the main focus is on 
recent structural aspects rather than their 
evolution over time, averages were computed 
over the period 1999-2005. Then the same 
indicators were recalculated by aggregating 
the size/sector-level variables using a common 
weighting scheme (see Table 5). A comparison 
on the basis of adjusted indicators is made to 
assess whether the differences reflect country 
effects, or whether they are due to the different 
characteristics of the corporate sector, in 
particular in terms of size of firms and sectoral 
composition. 
Table 4 reports average values for selected 
unadjusted balance sheet indicators, grouped 
into three main categories: the amount of 
external finance, the choice of debt versus 
equity, and the choice of the type of debt. The 
amount of external finance collected by firms 
is proxied by the amount of debt and external 
equity, the latter taking into consideration 
subscribed capital and share premium accounts. 
While the amount of debt to turnover is quite 
similar for non-financial corporations across 
the euro area, the dispersion is higher in the 
case of the recourse to external equity. For 
instance, firms in Austria make much smaller 
13 The debt-to-cash flow ratio provides a similar picture of 
indebtedness, indicating a possible lack of reimbursement 
capacity of these sectors.
14 Measured as the ratio of gross interest payments to gross 
operating profit.
15  Prepared by Annalisa Ferrando, Carmelo Salleo and Thomas 
Vlassopoulos.





Occasional Paper No 63
June 2007
use of equity relative to their turnover (less 
than 6%) than firms in Portugal and Spain 
(more than 27%) or in Belgium (more than 
50%).
For a given amount of external financing, the 
trade-off between debt and equity depends on 
firms’ specific needs and on the relative cost 
and availability of the two; this in turn varies 
across countries, depending on institutional 
and market factors. 
The measures of indebtedness based on BACH 
data may differ from those obtained by the 
national accounts because of two factors: i) in 
the former, equity is not valued at market 
prices; and ii) the BACH sample only includes 
a sample of firms, typically of larger size. 
Indeed, owing to the effect of changes in market 
valuation, the own funds ratio based on 
enterprise balance sheet data is typically lower 
than the ratios based on national accounts 
presented in Table 1 above. In Table 4, the 
debt-to-equity ratio varies considerably across 
countries, with France, Italy and Germany 
being the most leveraged. This ranking does 
not reflect the same ranking obtained from 
national accounts in Table 1.16
16  When calculating broadly corresponding ratios based on the 
financial accounts, different results can be obtained. The level 
(and volatility) of debt-to-equity ratios defined on the basis of 
market values is of course mainly influenced by the outstanding 
amounts of equity and only to a minor extent by debt. Huge 
country differences exist in terms of levels: in Austria, the 
indicator ranged between 130% and 220% over the period 
considered, while in Spain and other countries (Belgium, France 
and Portugal) it stood at between 40% and 90%.
Table 4 Selected indicators and size of capital markets across countries
 (averages 1999-2005)




turnover 69.9 80.0 50.0 69.6 52.8 56.1 71.9 67.9 59.0 73.2 60.4 0.15
External 
equity to 
turnover 5.4 55.3 16.4 27.5 21.8 16.5 17.9 18.2 28.3 21.1 0.60
Debt to 
equity 192.8 106.6 195.9 141.5 109.0 210.7 142.9 209.7 123.5 168.1 166.3 0.25
Short-
term debt  
to total 
debt 49.7 66.9 57.5 60.0 53.4 59.6 69.0 73.2 57.8 59.0 62.2 0.12
Long-
term debt  
to total 
debt 50.3 33.1 42.5 40.0 46.6 40.4 31.4 26.8 42.2 41.0 37.8 0.18
Bank 
loans to 
total debt  25.5 23.6 21.7 23.9 26.1 16.9 26.4 20.2 35.4 22.2 0.21
Bonds to 
total debt  9.6 6.9 2.8 2.1 7.2 7.7 3.2 9.5 3.7 4.7 0.50
Size of 
capital 
markets 157.1 196.2 225.5 201.9 273.2 217.3 146.9 161.1 302.0 192.0 210.6 0.24
Sources: ECCBSO, BACH database, ICAP, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Eurostat, International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
International Financial Statistics, World Federation of Exchanges, and own calculations.
Notes: For Belgium, data for the bond-to-total debt ratio are derived from annual financial accounts. Data for Greece are averages of 
the period 2001-2005. For the definition of debt, see footnote 9. External equity is defined as subscribed capital and share premium 
account divided by turnover.23
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Table 5 Selected adjusted indicators 
(averages 1999-2005)




turnover 111.0 92.2 66.0 78.8 66.1 76.4 85.5 80.2 66.6 91.2 76.3 0.2
External 
equity to 
turnover 9.5 61.7 18.9 31.6 29.3 22.2 23.5 19.5 41.4 29.6 0.5
Debt to 
equity 232.0 156.6 245.0 147.6 119.4 240.3 86.4 242.4 145.6 186.3 181.1 0.3
Short-
term debt  
to total 
debt 53.8 64.8 60.8 66.9 54.8 63.1 66.9 73.3 58.3 65.5 63.5 0.1
Long-
term debt  
to total 
debt 46.2 35.2 39.2 33.1 45.2 36.9 33.1 26.7 41.6 34.5 36.5 0.2
Bank 
loans to 
total debt  23.0 22.1 24.0 27.5 26.7 16.1 26.2 14.0 31.3 22.3 0.2
Bonds to 
total debt  8.1 2.4 0.9 6.9 6.0 2.7 7.6 3.1 4.2 0.6
Sources: ECCBSO, BACH database, ICAP and own calculations.
Notes: Data for Greece are averages of the period 2001-2005. For the definition of debt, see footnote 9. External equity is defined as 
subscribed capital and share premium account divided by turnover. Since the weighting scheme is the same for all variables and is based 
on value added, the values of the indicators for the euro area change as well. This is because the implicit weighting scheme for the 
unadjusted indicators is different for each variable and is based on the variable used as denominator for each ratio.
For a given amount of debt, firms can choose 
between loan and bond financing, and between 
short and long-term credit. The choice again 
depends on firms’ characteristics (for example, 
faced with high fixed issuing costs, bonds are 
better suited for larger firms) and on the relative 
cost and availability of specific financial 
products. In the euro area, the share of bank 
loans to total debt is on average around 22% of 
total debt, and bonds are fairly unimportant in 
all countries except in the Netherlands, Austria 
and France. This information broadly confirms 
the indications derived from the financial 
accounts on the heterogeneous use of sources 
of finance by non-financial corporations in the 
euro area. Some differences can be seen in the 
use of loans by German firms, which seems to 
be comparatively lower when balance sheet 
indicators are used, or in the recourse to bonds 
by Dutch firms, which is much higher according 
to BACH information.
The last line reports a measure of the degree of 
development of the financial markets, calculated 
as the sum of bank credit to the private sector, 
stock market capitalisation and the stock of 
domestic debt securities issued by the private 
sector as a percentage of GDP. The size of the 
financial markets has increased since the 
beginning of the 1990s in all euro area countries, 
although there is still considerable dispersion 
within the euro area.
Table 5 reports the adjusted values of the same 
variables illustrated in Table 4. The indicators 
are adjusted to control for the different size and 
sectoral specialisation of firms in each country, 
by imposing the same size/sectoral composition 
on each country (here, that of the euro area 
as derived from the BACH database).17 The 
indicators obtained in this way are a better 
17  See Annex 2 for an explanation of the weighting scheme. 
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measure of the cross-country differences that 
derive from institutional factors or other 
national peculiarities apart from differences in 
size or sectoral composition.18
After adjusting for size and sector, the overall 
picture does not greatly change. Cross-country 
differences remain relevant for the recourse to 
equity or to the bond market (the difference 
between the maximum and minimum value, as 
a percentage of the average value of the 
indicator, amounts to more than 100% for the 
ratio of equity over turnover and for the ratio of 
bonds to total debt), whereas they are minor for 
the share of short term over total debt or for the 
debt-to-turnover ratio. 
Nevertheless, there are some differences in 
certain variables and in the ordering of 
countries. For instance, firms in Belgium have 
an unadjusted level of leverage that is at the 
lower end of the sample, but after adjusting for 
size and sectoral composition, they are ranked 
somewhere in the middle. This means that 
taking into account the size and sectoral 
composition of the Belgian economy, Belgian 
firms have in fact a level of debt to equity that 
is close to the average. Another example is the 
ratio of bonds to total debt of Spanish firms, 
which is halved by the adjustment, indicating 
that this ratio is mainly affected by sectoral 
composition and size.
Reducing the distortions owing to differences 
in size and sectoral composition shows that 
there are significant cross-country differences 
in the financial structure of firms in the euro 
area, particularly with respect to the choice of 
debt vs. equity and the choice of bonds vs. 
loans. The next section therefore discusses the 
possible determinants according to the existing 
literature.
2.2  EXPLAINING COUNTRY DIFFERENCES 
IN FINANCING CHOICES: 
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE19
The discussion presented in the previous section 
indicates that even after controlling for 
heterogeneity in terms of sectoral composition 
and size, euro area countries continue to differ 
in terms of their financial structure. The 
literature on corporate finance has highlighted 
a few factors that could explain the most 
relevant of these differences: legal protection 
of investors (shareholders and creditors), the 
quality of enforcement regarding the legal 
framework, transparency and dissemination of 
information, the market structure of the 
financial industry (in particular the banking 
sector), and taxation.
This section reviews the influence that these 
factors may have on the level of external 
financing, the choice of debt vs. equity financing, 
the choice of bank or capital market-based debt 
financing and the maturity structure of debt, 
based on the conclusions of the theoretical and 
empirical literature. The conclusions that can be 
distilled from the literature regarding the 
expected signs in the relationships between 
financial structure indicators and institutional 
variables are summarised in Table 6.
Box 2 then presents some stylised facts on the 
relationship between institutional factors and 
the financial structure of firms in the euro area 
countries.
AMOUNT OF EXTERNAL FINANCING
The legal system’s ability to enforce the law 
and its efficiency and integrity in doing so are 
important factors that affect the availability of 
external financing for firms. There is evidence 
that the enforcement of creditor and shareholder 
18  This correction is far from perfect: in particular, the size classes 
in BACH do not differentiate between large and very large 
firms, and sectors are only roughly defined. However, the 
adjustment performed on the BACH data does correct at least 
for some distortions induced by differences in size and sectoral 
composition across countries.
19  Prepared by Annalisa Ferrando, Carmelo Salleo and Thomas 
Vlassopoulos.25
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rights is more important than the actual 
existence of these rights (Bhattacharya and 
Daouk, 2002). An efficient and reliable legal 
system ensures that financial contracts are 
enforced, thus supporting the development of 
markets for external finance and, as a result, 
increasing the level of external financing 
available to firms.
The  transparency of a financial system, in 
terms of availability of firm-level information 
as well as its dissemination and use, is expected 
to affect positively the amount of external 
financing used by firms. The quantity and 
quality of information on firms that is available 
reduces information asymmetries between 
insider and outsider firms and mitigates the 
agency problems between these two groups, 
thereby reducing the cost of capital (Holmström 
and Tirole, 1993) and increasing firms’ recourse 
to external funding.  
Competition within the financial (and banking) 
system is expected to be related to higher levels 
of external financing for firms (bank loans in 
particular). Lack of competition leads to 
inefficiencies, which means that less financing 
is supplied to firms at a higher cost (Berger 
and Hannan, 1989). Conversely, increased 
competition can encourage intermediaries to 
engage in financial innovation, introducing 
new products better tailored to fit firms’ 
financing requirements, and possibly at a lower 
cost. There are also some countervailing 
arguments, according to which increased 
competition may reduce the privileged access 
of banks to firms’ information, thereby raising 
the cost of capital and reducing the amount 
of loans available (Petersen and Rajan, 1994); 
however, empirical evidence suggests that the 
former arguments prevail (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004; Claessens and 
Laeven, 2005).
DEBT VS. EQUITY
The effect of both creditor rights and shareholder 
rights is not clear-cut from a theoretical 
standpoint.20, 21 The arguments outlined previously 
for the influence of competition in the banking 
system on the amount of external finance used 
also apply in the case of the debt vs. equity 
(financial leverage) question. More specifically, 
the lower financing costs associated with loans 
in a competitive banking system imply a positive 
relationship between the level of competition in 
the system and the debt-to-equity ratio.
The overall implications of the tax system on 
firms’ leverage are less clear-cut, as the impact 
is brought about through various channels, with 
possibly conflicting results.22 In principle, it 
has been argued (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) 
that the tax deductibility of interest creates an 
incentive for firms to favour debt over equity, 
and hence firms’ leverage should increase with 
the corporate marginal tax rate. However, the 
incentive for firms to issue debt is reduced 
by higher personal income taxes on interest 
(Miller, 1977). Moreover, the existence of a 
dividend imputation tax system23 or a dividend 
20  Increased creditor rights reduce the discretion afforded to firms 
in times of financial distress, forcing them into bankruptcy. As 
a result, firms may be reluctant to take on debt. However, 
improved creditor rights increase the supply of credit, thus 
lowering the cost of debt and rendering the overall effect of 
better creditor rights on leverage ambiguous (see, for example, 
de Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2006). Moreover, improved creditor 
rights may entail spillovers that compound this ambiguity. For 
example, the strengthening of creditor rights induces financial 
institutions to improve their overall monitoring of firms, thereby 
increasing the information they possess on them and rendering 
equity investments in these firms more attractive (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
21  In principle, strong shareholder rights are expected to be related 
to increased recourse to equity financing and, as a result, lower 
leverage. If investors are well protected, they can influence 
firms’ management, for example through the threat of dismissal, 
and are more likely to receive the stream of payments promised. 
This increases investors’ willingness to acquire equity and 
reduces the risk premium demanded on the investment. 
Nevertheless, it can be envisaged that under certain 
circumstances (e.g. family or management ownership), strong 
shareholder rights may act as a deterrent, making firms reluctant 
to issue equity for fear of losing control. Moreover, relatively 
stronger shareholder rights, compared to creditor rights, may 
suggest that firms can avoid bankruptcy for longer when in 
financial distress, thus inducing them to take on more debt and 
increasing leverage, although in this case creditors are likely to 
demand higher premia.
22  A comprehensive review of the literature regarding the influence 
of taxes on corporate finance is provided in Graham (2003).
23  Under a dividend imputation system, shareholders receive a tax 
credit for taxes paid at firm level. This tax credit may be as high 
as the entire amount of tax paid at the corporate level. In the 
euro area, a dividend imputation system exists in Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain (Fan, Titman and 
Twite, 2006).
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tax relief system24 (which make returns on 
equity investments partly tax deductible) 
further reduces firms’ preference for debt over 
equity (Graham, 2003).
BONDS VS. LOANS
Regarding the composition of debt, given that 
banks may enjoy privileged or less costly 
access to information on firms (see for example 
Diamond, 1984), improved transparency and 
information should in principle be related to 
increased recourse to market-based sources of 
funding (i.e. equity and corporate bonds). This 
notwithstanding, the availability of particular 
types of information, such as credit register 
coverage, is expected to facilitate firms’ access 
to bank lending. Moreover, to the extent that 
increased competition in the banking system 
leads to increased availability of bank loans at 
lower cost, it is expected to be related to 
increased preference on the part of firms for 
bank loans compared to bonds.





















Debt vs. equity 
(debt/equity) +/- +/- + + (?)
Bonds vs. loans  
(bank loans/total debt) -+
Debt maturity
(long-term debt/total debt) ++
DEBT MATURITY
When the legal system is efficient and reliable 
and contract enforcement is not costly, providers 
of funds are less inclined to employ alternative 
methods to ensure that their rights are not 
expropriated by opportunistic behaviour on the 
part of firms. Such methods include granting 
short-term debt so as to limit the period during 
which such behaviour can be exhibited, and to 
use the implicit threat of withdrawing credit as 
a disciplining device. As a result, the efficiency 
of a legal system is expected to be positively 
related to the use of long-term debt. Moreover, 
better creditor protection reduces the incentive 
of lenders to provide only short-term debt as a 
mechanism to control borrowers’ opportunistic 
24 Under a dividend tax relief system, dividends paid to 
shareholders are taxed at a reduced rate at the personal level 
(which can be as low as zero percent). Among the euro area 
countries, a dividend tax relief system exists in Austria, 
Belgium, Greece and Portugal (Fan, Titman and Twite, 2006).
Box 2
STYLISED FACTS ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES IN THE 
EURO AREA COUNTRIES 1
This Box presents some stylised facts on various institutional characteristics and the (size and 
sector-adjusted) financial structure variables examined in sub-section 2.3. It should be kept in 
mind, however, that the appropriate choice of the indicators of institutional characteristics is 
quite difficult and, to a large extent, arbitrary, not least because these characteristics may 
change through time, and the way the indicator is aggregated may make a difference.
1  Prepared by Annalisa Ferrando, Carmelo Salleo and Thomas Vlassopoulos.27
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For illustrative purposes, the following indicators are used (see Annex 2): protection of 
investors’ rights (shareholder and creditor rights protection, La Porta et al., 1997, 1998 and 
2000); enforcement of laws (rule of law: Kaufmann et al., 2006); transparency and the 
Table A Financial and institutional indicators
(averages 1999-2005) 
Sources: ECCBSO, BACH database and own calculations.
Note: Figures are the averages of the BACH adjusted indicators (see Table 5) in the period 1999-2005 for those countries which are 
below (above) the median value of each institutional indicator.
Shareholder over 


















turnover 82.1 78.7 83.7 78.7 83.8 77.4 79.7 82.5
External 
equity to 
turnover 25.9 34.1 24.9 31.6 36.1 19.3 22.3 36.6
Debt to 
equity 210.3 134.9 170.8 186.4 176.6 185.5 196.9 163.5
Short-term 
debt to 
total debt 62.3 63.5 58.1 66.0 66.8 56.9 59.9 65.8
Long-term 
debt to 
total debt 37.6 36.5 41.9 34.1 33.3 43.1 40.1 34.3
Bank loans 
to total 
debt 20.9 28.5 23.8 23.2 24.6 21.9 23.5 23.4
Bonds to 
total debt  5.4 3.7 6.4 3.0 3.2 6.3 4.9 4.5


















turnover 84.0 78.5 88.1 72.0 79.2 83.1 80.8 81.2
External 
equity to 
turnover 20.9 34.8 31.0 25.7 33.0 23.1 35.0 16.0
Debt to 
equity 190.7 169.7 191.5 163.2 177.1 184.8 168.4 207.6
Short-term 
debt to 
total debt 64.3 61.3 64.2 60.8 64.9 59.6 65.0 57.6
Long-term 
debt to 
total debt 35.7 38.7 35.9 39.2 35.1 40.4 35.0 42.3
Bank loans 
to total 
debt 25.2 22.1 25.3 21.1 23.5 23.3 25.0 20.4
Bonds to 
total debt  3.5 5.9 4.1 5.4 3.9 5.5 3.9 6.0
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dissemination of information (index of accounting transparency from CIFAR, analyst coverage: 
Hartmann et al. (2007b)); bank market structure (H-statistic: Hartmann et al., op. cit., 2007b); 
taxation (corporate income tax rates applicable to small business: OECD, 2005). These 
indicators are commonly used in the cross-country empirical literature, particularly in the field 
of finance and growth, although the reader should be aware that analysts and researchers 
disagree on the actual measures to be used.
A simple average of the financial structure indicators is calculated for the countries that, 
according to each institutional indicator, are respectively above or below the median. Given 
the limited number of observations, no statistical significance can be attributed to the differences 
in size; the sign of the difference is used as a stylised fact on the correlation of financial choices 
with investor protection, information dissemination, bank market structure and taxation in 
firms’ financial decisions.
The results are reported in the table above.
Amount of external financing
The relationship between external financing and investor rights, law enforcement, transparency 
and information is weak. All indicators are relatively favourable for the euro area countries, 
and deviations from the median are therefore likely to be less relevant. 
In contrast, above-median competition in the banking industry tends to be related to a higher 
use of both debt and equity financing by firms. The relationship with taxation shows that firms 
in countries with lower levels of taxation have more external financing in terms of debt, but 
less in terms of equity.
Debt vs. equity
Firms in countries with better creditor protection also have a higher ratio of debt over equity. 
However, in countries where the protection of shareholder rights is stronger than that of creditor 
rights, firms tend to have on average more equity relative to debt. There is also a negative 
relationship between leverage and the amount of available information.
In countries where competition in the banking market is higher, leverage is lower, i.e. firms 
have more equity relative to debt. As for taxation, the data show that the higher the level of 
taxation, the higher the level of the tax shield of debt and, as expected, the higher the level of 
firms’ leverage.
Choice of debt: bonds vs. loans
Firms in countries with better investor protection (either shareholders’ or creditors’ rights) 
make more use of bonds as opposed to loans; the quality of enforcement has the same effect. 
This fact is consistent with the idea that a “good” legal infrastructure helps enforce bondholders’ 
rights in case of default. More transparency and availability of information is associated with 
greater usage of market-based debt. Firms in countries with more competitive banking markets 
report on average slightly lower levels of bond finance.29
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Debt maturity
The share of long-term loans is higher in countries with better protection of creditor rights, 
where law enforcement is above the median and where there is more accounting transparency.
It should be noted that these stylised facts are too sketchy to warrant drawing any conclusions 
on causal links. Moreover, when comparing these findings to the existing literature, it should 
also be considered that existing studies cover a much larger range of countries, with much more 
variance in their institutional characteristics, ranging from poor institutions and much less 
developed financial systems, to well-designed and properly enforced legal frameworks and a 
large set of financial options. Compared to these studies, euro area countries’ institutional 
characteristics mostly fall within the range of “average” to “good”. Hence, the facts described 
in this Box may shed some light on the correlation of the differences between “good” and 
“better” institutions, but it remains open to question whether this is of first-order relevance.
behaviour, through the threat that credit will 
not be renewed (Giannetti, 2003).
When analysing the state of corporate finance 
in the euro area, it is also important to consider 
the situation of enterprises in the NMS-10 
owing to their interlinkages with euro area 
corporations. Box 3 describes the financing 
and the financial situation of non-financial 
corporations in the NMS-10, and compares this 
with the status quo in the euro area. Generally, 
it should be highlighted that the analysis is 
limited by the lack of data availability.25
25  On financial accounts – both stocks and transactions – of non-
financial corporations, 2005 data were used for Hungary and 
Slovenia, 2004 data for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and 
2003 data for the Czech Republic and Cyprus. No data were 
provided for Malta and Slovakia. Regarding the other sector 
national accounts of the non-financial corporations, 2005 data 
were not available for any of the NMS-10, but 2004 data were 
available for Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and 2003 data for the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovakia. No data were provided for 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta and Slovenia. Thus, both data sets were 
available for just five of the NMS-10 (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). Moreover, only a small 
number of indicators are common to both datasets. For the euro 
area countries (apart from Ireland and Luxembourg), financial 
accounts data were generally available for 2005, except for 
Germany, France and Finland (2004 data). Sector national 
accounts data were available for 2004, except for Portugal (2003 
data). As the data in this paper relate to the period prior to 1 
January 2007, the euro area does not include Slovenia. Moreover, 
as most data for the NMS-10 relate to 2004 (or 2003), euro area 
data for 2004 (instead of 2005) are shown as reference values.
Box 3
FINANCIAL POSITION OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN THE TEN NEW EU MEMBER STATES (NMS-10)1
Concerning the structure of non-financial corporations’ liabilities and financial assets at the 
most recent available year-end, the ratios in the NMS-10 were generally within the range of 
the ratios in the euro area countries. However, five main differences may be identified between 
the majority of NMS-10 countries and the euro area aggregate (or median) (see Tables A and 
B). First, the share of total loans in total liabilities tends to be lower in the NMS-10, indicating 
that there is room for relatively high further growth of (domestic) credit to non-financial 
corporations in these economies. Over the last three years,2 the share of other accounts payable 
1  Prepared by Thomas Reininger and Zoltan Walko.
2  For Latvia and Estonia, all the changes in stocks indicated in this box refer to a two-year and a one-year period, respectively, owing 
to the lack of available data.
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declined in most of the NMS-10, and the change in the structure of liabilities constituted a 
deepening of financial intermediation via an increase in the share of loans or in the share of 
equity. The relatively high share of cross-border loans (bank and inter-company loans) in total 
loans suggests an already significant degree of international financial integration of non-
financial corporations in the NMS-10 as a result of – inter alia – high levels of inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Second, the share of debt securities was considerably lower in all 
NMS-10 than in nearly all euro area countries, signalling that there is a largely untapped 
potential for the corporate bond market. Third, while total equity financing constituted a more 
important source of financing than total debt financing (both in the NMS-10 and in the euro 
area), quoted shares play a less important role in most NMS-10 than in all euro area countries. 
This again reflects, among other things, the more prominent role played by inward FDI in the 
NMS-10.
Fourth, on the financial assets side, non-financial corporations in the NMS-10 tend to have a 
higher share of deposits and hence a higher short-term liquidity ratio than those in the euro 
area. Over the last three years for which data were available, the decline in the share of other 
accounts receivable in most of the NMS-10 was accompanied by an increase in the share of 
equity financing or in the share of deposits.
Fifth, the ratio of liabilities and (net) financial assets to GDP in the NMS-10 also remained 
within the euro area range. However, while the ratios of liabilities and financial assets to GDP 
were typically below the euro area average, the ratio of financial net wealth to GDP was 
(somewhat) more negative than the corresponding ratio in the euro area aggregate in more than 
half of the NMS-10. Over the last three years for which data were available, both the financial 
assets ratio and the liabilities ratio increased in all the NMS-10 with the exception of the Czech 
Republic and Cyprus, where they declined somewhat. At the same time, the financial net wealth 
ratio became more negative in half of the NMS-10, remained stable in Estonia and Poland, and 
became less negative in the Czech Republic and Cyprus.
Table A Liabilities of non-financial corporations in the NMS-10
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations.
Country Year






















Czech Republic 2003 19.3 1.9 43.3 12.4 35.5 -0.2 180.0
Estonia 2004 29.8 1.4 47.8 15.4 21.1 3.3 264.5
Cyprus 2003 30.0 0.8 53.4 9.9 15.8 -1.9 277.4
Lithuania 2004 20.6 0.1 60.7 32.9 18.6 5.1 157.9
Latvia 2004 32.4 0.1 42.8 n/a 24.7 3.5 154.4
Hungary 2005 23.7 0.5 55.2 18.4 20.5 -0.2 210.5
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland 2004 19.5 2.4 47.3 16.8 30.8 4.8 154.6
Slovenia 2005 29.0 0.8 51.0 19.7 19.2 -0.4 228.8
Slovakia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Memorandum items:
EU-12 2004 30.4 3.6 51.2 33.1 12.9 -0.3 227.6
EU-12 median 32.6 3.7 50.2 30.4 10.3 -0.2 261.4
EU-12 minimum 21.6 0.4 42.3 17.4 3.1 -3.2 143.1
EU-12 maximum 47.0 7.6 59.2 63.9 22.2 4.9 387.731
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Evaluating the financial results of non-financial corporations from the most recent full year 
available,3 again the range in the euro area was sufficiently wide to embrace the NMS-10 range 
for most indicators. As expected for catching-up economies, most NMS-10 had profitability 
ratios above the euro area average, and these ratios were above the euro area minimum in all 
NMS-10 for which data were available (see Table C).
3  To provide a robustness check, the situation was evaluated based on a multi-year average (using the last four years available). The 
results confirm the main findings obtained on the basis of the most recent year available and presented here. Compared with the 
multi-year average, major changes only occurred in Poland, where in previous years the financial results of non-financial corporations 
were hit by the pronounced downturn of GDP growth in the Polish economy in 2001 and 2002.
Table B Financial assets of non-financial corporations in the NMS-10 and the short-term 
liquidity ratio
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations.
Country Year























Czech Republic 2003 17.5 2.6 5.4 12.0 61.7 104.3 -75.6 2.2
Estonia 2004 15.9 0.3 17.5 23.6 42.0 112.2 -152.3 1.9
Cyprus 2003 21.7 1.2 0.0 50.5 26.3 185.9 -91.5 n/a
Lithuania 2004 27.2 0.3 1.7 29.2 41.0 52.0 -105.9 2.9
Latvia 2004 18.8 0.6 8.8 24.6 46.5 70.3 -84.1 n/a
Hungary 2005 14.7 1.7 10.3 30.9 41.9 103.8 -106.7 1.6
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland 2004 13.2 5.0 1.7 32.1 46.9 85.6 -69.0 1.7
Slovenia 2005 9.3 1.5 9.1 43.7 35.5 126.7 -102.0 0.8
Slovakia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Memorandum items:
EU-12 2004 11.5 3.0 14.1 48.9 21.4 141.0 -86.6 1.2
EU-12 median 15.3 3.2 10.1 49.2 18.9 146.6 -93.4 1.1
EU-12 minimum 4.9 1.8 0.6 25.0 -2.2 56.9 -128.1 0.7
EU-12 maximum 37.6 6.5 41.7 58.5 35.2 291.1 -64.0 1.8
Table C Profitability of non-financial corporations in the NMS-10
Sources: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations.
Country Year
In % of GDP
In % of „shares and other equity“ 
(stock) In % of „total liabilities“ (stock)
Operating surplus Operating surplus Operating surplus
gross net gross net gross net
Czech Republic 2003 26.3 15.1 33.7 19.4 14.6 8.4
Estonia 2003 26.8 18.3 22.1 15.1 11.0 7.5
Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lithuania 2004 33.0 25.3 34.4 26.4 20.9 16.0
Latvia 2004 32.3 20.5 48.8 31.1 20.9 13.3
Hungary n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland 2004 19.1 10.3 26.1 14.1 12.4 6.7
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Slovakia 2003 21.0 8.6 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Memorandum items:
EU-12 2004 20.0 12.1 17.2 10.4 8.8 5.3
EU-12 median 20.9 12.4 18.9 12.3 9.4 6.2
EU-12 minimum 15.4 5.7 8.3 4.4 4.8 2.2
EU-12 maximum 25.3 17.1 42.8 24.8 16.7 9.7
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2.3 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The chapter has reviewed the main stylised 
facts on the financial position of non-financial 
corporations in the euro area over the period 
1995-2005. It can be concluded that differences 
still exist, even though developments over time 
look similar across countries. With respect to 
liabilities, there has been an overall modest 
increase in the share of market-based financing 
instruments; while on the asset side, the most 
remarkable development was the rise in the 
share of equity in total financial assets. Shares 
and other equity remain the most important 
financing channel, followed by loans.
Even after taking into account size and sectoral 
composition effects, there are still differences 
across countries with regard to firms’ financial 
structures, especially in terms of the choice of 
debt versus equity and of bonds versus loans. 
The literature usually relates cross-country 
differences in financial structure to differences 
in institutional arrangements and in the financial 
market structure. Although these differences 
were expected to be less relevant within the 
euro area, given the generally high level of 
investor protection and financial development 
already achieved, some relationships do still 
seem to hold. In particular, firms in countries 
with better creditor protection tend to have a 
higher ratio of debt over equity. However, in 
countries where the protection of shareholder 
rights is stronger than that of creditor rights, 
firms tend to have on average more equity 
relative to debt. More and better information is 
associated with a more widespread usage of 
bonds. Higher corporate income taxation, in 
turn, is associated with firms using more debt 
financing.
Differences in financial structure across sectors 
are mainly related to differences in capital 
intensity which are inherent to their activity. 
For example, the construction and trade sectors, 
which are less capital-intensive, have a financial 
structure that is mainly biased in favour of 
short-term liabilities, while the energy or 
transport and communication sectors, which 
are very asset-intensive, are accordingly rather 
biased towards long-term liabilities. Levels of 
indebtedness also differ considerably across 
sectors, although some convergence has taken 
place in recent years, with the debt consolidation 
process being most pronounced in the more 
indebted sectors.
By contrast, in all NMS-10 compensation of employees and employers’ social contributions 
were below the euro area median, and in some cases even below the euro area minimum (see 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 in Annex 1 for additional information). The interest burden was also typically 
lower in the NMS-10 than the euro area median (which is in line with the lower share of debt 
financing in total financing). 
Reflecting the great importance of inward FDI in the NMS-10, reinvested earnings on FDI in 
the reporting country play a far more important role in the NMS-10 than in the euro area, while 
non-financial corporations’ distributed income was close to the euro area minimum. This 
implies – ceteris paribus – that non-financial corporations’ internal financing in these countries 
and the overall catching-up process have both strengthened.
All in all, it is hard to find any evidence that the majority of NMS-10 are very different from 
the euro area countries in terms of many of the indicators of financing structure or the financial 
situation of non-financial corporations. Still, some differences do exist, primarily stemming 
from the ongoing catching-up process of the NMS-10 economies and from the more prominent 
role played by inward FDI, as well as the still minor role played by outward FDI in the economic 
structure of the NMS-10.33
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Despite significant differences in financing 
structures, some similar trends can be detected 
over the past decade in the current financing of 
enterprises in the euro area, the US and the UK. 
With respect to their financial situation, euro 
area and US non-financial corporations made 
some efforts to limit their indebtedness in the 
period 2002-2004, while UK corporations 
continued to expand their debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Developments in Japan, on the other hand, have 
been rather different, as debt financing 
transactions remained negative over most of 
the period under consideration, leading to a 
much more pronounced reduction in debt ratios. 
Differences between euro area and NMS-10 
countries stem primarily from the ongoing 
catching-up process of the NMS-10 economies, 
coupled with the more prominent role played 
by inward FDI, as well as the fact that outward 
FDI still only plays a minor role in the economic 
structure of the NMS-10.
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This chapter provides a comparison of financing 
decisions across size classes of firms, looking 
specifically at SMEs. SMEs have received 
particular attention from policymakers in 
Europe given their prominent economic role. In 
addition, small firms are often believed to face 
financing problems, mostly on the grounds of 
informational opacity (see, among others, 
Gertler (1988) and OECD (2006)). Unlike large 
firms, small firms often do not enter into 
contracts that are publicly visible (contracts 
with the labour force, suppliers and customers 
are generally kept private). In addition, small 
businesses normally do not issue traded 
securities that are continuously priced in public 
markets. Among publicly traded firms, smaller, 
newer firms are less likely to be tracked by 
analysts. As a result, small firms often cannot 
credibly convey their quality and may have 
difficulty building a reputation to signal that 
they are of high quality or low risk. The 
resulting asymmetry of information between 
the two sides of the market may even result in 
firms being completely unable to obtain 
external finance. For instance, on the supply 
(bank) side, the costs involved in assessing and 
setting appropriate premia for risk and the 
relatively high monitoring costs may hinder the 
flow of funds to smaller firms. 
One of the reasons for the existence of 
informational opacity is that small firms are 
often recently established and have not had the 
time to build up a reputation and provide the 
market with information. In addition, these 
new firms are usually riskier as they tend to be 
in higher risk sectors and may have new 
business models that have never been tested. 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish, for a 
given size, the age of the firm, as this might 
have a distinct impact in terms of financing 
constraints. 
Even aside from the possibility of financing 
constraints, there are other reasons to expect 
the financing pattern of SMEs to differ from 
that of large firms which are related to 
guarantees and the cost of financing. Smaller 
firms often have less collateral that could 
protect creditors from adverse selection or 
moral hazard effects. In addition, it is plausible 
that funding costs contain a significant fixed 
cost component. These fixed costs would make 
small loans more expensive than larger ones 
obtained from larger firms. Another reason for 
lower costs of financing may be the bargaining 
power of large enterprises vis-à-vis banks. 
Given the above reasons, it is reasonable to 
expect the financing patterns of SMEs to differ 
from those of large firms. For instance, one way 
of reducing asymmetric information is to build 
up a long-term relationship with finance 
providers (among the extensive literature on 
this issue see, for instance, Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) and, more recently, Berger et al. (2006)). 
This way, a firm can signal its quality by meeting 
its debt obligations. It could then be expected 
that small firms would have more stable bank 
relationships. Moreover, regarding external 
finance, small firms may not have access to 
capital markets and could rely more on credit 
markets. Anticipating financing difficulties, 
these firms could respond by holding more cash 
today, to avoid the risk of not realising valuable 
projects (Opler et al., 1999). Additionally, small 
firms may also resort to expensive trade debt 
when cheaper finance sources are exhausted 
(Nilsen, 2002). Finally, the cost of debt could 
be higher for smaller than larger firms as a 
result of higher monitoring costs and problems 
in assessing firms’ risk. Some of these a priori 
beliefs will be reviewed in this chapter, which 
analyses euro area firms using indicators 
computed from the BACH database.
Against this background, this chapter first 
focuses on the specific aspect of the existence 
of financing constraints for SMEs and assesses 
the available empirical evidence on this matter. 
In particular, this question is analysed using 
two types of information: surveys and empirical 
academic studies (sub-section 3.1). Then, how 
the financing of SMEs differs from that of 
large firms is analysed using balance sheet 
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information. This analysis is based on the 
indicators computed from the BACH database27  
(sub-section 3.2). The analysis of firms’ 
financial position is further motivated by the 
fact that it conditions their investment decisions. 
This is shown in Box 4 using balance sheet data 
at firm level. The main conclusions of the 
chapter are presented in sub-section 3.3.
3.1  SMEs AND FINANCING CONSTRAINTS
The importance of financing constraints for the 
operation and growth of a firm, notably for 
investment decisions, has been studied 
extensively. Their importance is an empirical 
question, and consensus on their factors – or 
even on the definition of financing constraints 
– has not yet been achieved. There are two main 
approaches used to detect financing constraints: 
the use of surveys, asking firms directly whether 
they feel that they are subject to financing 
constraints; and the econometric estimation of 
models in which the presence of financing 
constraints implies some implication for firms’ 
behaviour that can be tested. While firm-level 
(rather than aggregate) data are better suited to 
assess the relevance of financing constraints, 
such data are often lacking for SMEs, which 
hampers econometric analysis. Although balance 
sheet data provide highly useful information 
regarding the level of risk that can be faced by a 
firm in the future, these data structures might 
not reveal the presence of financial constraints, 
since they simply provide a picture of past 
choices made by firms and which can be reflected 
by “in-balance sheet items”. Other parameters 
also influence financial constraints, such as 
technology and marketing immaterial assets, 
managerial skills, shareholder’s structure and 
back-up liquidity facilities. Therefore, answers 
to questions directly posed to firms might yield 
more information. Thus, surveys are relevant for 
the detection and assessment of financing 
constraints, particularly of SMEs, as well as 
their determinants.
However, some important caveats should be 
kept in mind when using surveys for assessing 
financing constraints. First, surveys may be 
often biased and, therefore, not fully reliable in 
terms of assessing the existence of financing 
constraints. Second, depending on the way in 
which the question is posed, surveys might miss 
some of the firms facing financing constraints 
(for example, they might only capture firms 
which under current conditions feel financially 
constrained, but not those that would have 
borrowed more under more favourable 
conditions), while in other cases firms might 
claim to be financially constrained even if they 
are not. Given the difficulties of scrutinising 
firms, especially smaller ones, credit conditions 
may not reflect the true risk profile of each firm, 
and in such cases, survey results could fail to 
include all those firms that are wrongly priced 
and that, under better conditions, would seek to 
obtain more external finance. Given these 
considerations, the term “financing constraints” 
should be understood, in this section, as the 
inability of a company to obtain a sufficient 
amount of financing to fund its investment 
needs at current, or even higher, interest rates. 
This definition does not include those firms that 
decide not to seek additional financing due to 
their perceived “high” cost, which implies that, 
in what follows, financing constraints are not a 
matter of cost but rather a matter of availability 
of resources. In addition, assessing financing 
constraints using surveys might be distorted by 
existing subsidies to small enterprises.
3.2 SURVEYS
Several surveys have been recently conducted 
which allow a cross-country analysis to be 
made. Regarding Europe, the Directorate-
General Enterprise of the European Commission 
has been mandating surveys on SMEs about 
once every second year since 1993. Two of the 
most recent surveys led to the publication of 
specific reports on “SME Access to Finance”: 
by the Flash Eurobarometer in 2005 (on the 
basis of a survey conducted in 2005) and by 
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the Observatory of European SMEs in 200328 
(on the basis of a survey carried out in 
2002, hereafter called the “ENSR survey”).29 In 
addition, a survey conducted in 2003 also 
included some questions relating to business 
constraints, though unlike the 2002 survey this 
did not lead to any specific report on the issue 
of access to finance. In December 2005 the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) circulated a questionnaire 
to all its member countries, as well as to a large 
number of non-members, with the aim of 
developing an initial understanding on whether 
a gap exists in the financing of SMEs. In the 
questionnaire, a gap is defined as a situation in 
which firms would productively use more funds 
if they were available. This survey was directed 
to both government policy and central bank 
experts.30 More information on the setting 
of these surveys can be found in Table 24 in 
Annex 5.
Finally, some qualitative information on the 
change of SMEs’ credit standards from the 
perspective of euro area banks is available from 
the quarterly euro area Bank Lending Survey 
conducted by the Eurosystem. Ideally, the 
perspective of the banks could be used to 
complement the survey results obtained directly 
from the enterprises. 
In addition, several euro area countries conduct 
national surveys on enterprises. Their timeliness 
and frequency is in general higher than those of 
the cross-country surveys reviewed above. 
These surveys typically pay special attention to 
the investment position of enterprises in the 
manufacturing industry, but not to their 
financial situation. However, given the focus 
on investment decisions, these surveys still 
include questions related to constraints 
(financial or other). The available surveys are 
conducted by national statistical institutes 
(Portugal), national central banks (in France, 
Italy, Belgium and Finland) or other specific 
institutions (in the Netherlands, Spain and 
Germany). Although the main focus of national 
surveys rather aims at monitoring developments 
in investment and employment, alternative 
measures of financial constraints and access to 
finance are generally available, although 
according to ad hoc methodologies (in both the 
formulation of the questions and in the 
definition of the size categories). 
Charts 1 to 5 present the evolution of survey 
results in some euro area countries. Although 
the answers cannot be easily compared across 
countries, the charts indicate that access to 
finance was somewhat more problematic for 
smaller firms in Spain, and that there is no 
clear-cut conclusion for both Portuguese and 
Finnish firms. However, in all three countries 
large firms generally report fewer difficulties, 
whereas there were no marked differences in 
Belgium. In Italy, large firms seemed more 
credit-constrained; however, when controlling 
for all other conditions, such as sectoral 
composition, financial constraints do not appear 
to influence firms’ growth or to be significantly 
different across size classes. The surveys also 
indicate that the relationship between the size 
category and alleged financing constraints is 
neither necessarily monotone nor constant 
over time (see charts for Spain and Finland 
and to some extent also Portugal). However, 
this is expected, as other relevant factors – e.g. 
the age of the firm – are not controlled for. 
Complementary information based on national 
surveys is available in Table 25 in Annex 5.
SURVEY RESULTS ON THE CONSTRAINTS TO 
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
According to the 2003 ENSR survey,31 on 
average around 10% of SMEs in 19 European 
countries reported that “access to finance” was 
the major constraint weighing on their business 
performance over the past two years. However, 
more firms reported other constraints, such as 
“purchasing power of consumers”, which is 
28 The Observatory of European SMEs was established by the 
Commission in December 1992 to improve monitoring of the 
economic performance of SMEs (defined as having less than 
250 employees) in 19 European countries (the 18 Member 
States of the EEA plus Switzerland).  
29  ENSR stands for the European Network for SME Research.
30 OECD  (2006),  The SME Financing Gap, Volume 1, Theory and 
Evidence. 
31 European  Commission  (2003).37
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Chart 3 Spain – firms indicating financing 
difficulties as a factor that limits their 
activity
(in percentages) 
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Chart 4 Finland – firms indicating problems in 
getting external financing1)
(in percentages)
Source: Finnish Survey of Business Finances.
Notes: Manufacturing and service firms with a positive answer 
in percentage of total firms.
1) For the period 2000-2003: has the availability of external 
financing hampered the activities of the firm? For the period 
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Chart 1 Italy – firms wishing to borrow 
more at the same credit conditions
(in percentages)
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Chart 2 Portugal – firms indicating access 
to a bank loan as a constraint to investment
(in percentages)






















related to the unfavourable economic climate at 
that time, and a “lack of skilled labour”. The 
financial constraint was more relevant for firms 
in the transport/communication sector and for 
small firms (10-49 workers) rather than for 
micro (less than 10 employees) or medium-
sized firms (50-249 employees). Unfortunately, 
no comparison with large firms is possible as a 
reference sample of large firms is not included 
in the survey.
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More recently, the Flash Eurobarometer 
surveyed firms about the factors which would 
best ensure their development. “Easy access to 
means of financing” came out third after “social 
and fiscal regulations” more suited to the 
economic sector, and “better qualified people 
available on the market”. These results are 
consistent with the 2003 ENSR findings.
In the Flash Eurobarometer survey, firms were 
also asked whether their current financing was 
in general sufficient to see their projects 
through. In all euro area countries, the majority 
of SMEs replied positively, but the replies 
exhibit some disparities across countries. In 
Ireland and Finland, more than nine out of ten 
SMEs reported having sufficient financing, 
compared with just two-thirds of SMEs in 
Portugal and Italy.
The recent OECD survey recognises that there 
are still many countries which do not have 
extensive information on SME financing. 
Furthermore, as there is no unique definition of 
the financing gap, it is very difficult to aggregate 
data and proceed with international comparisons. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the survey 
tentatively concludes that in OECD countries, 
SMEs are able to obtain sufficient credit from 
banks and other credit institutions, and that 
therefore there is no significant SME financing 
gap in these countries. At the same time, most 
countries perceive that there are still problems 
in directing funds to innovative SMEs. These 
firms include start-ups and young high-risk 
firms with new business models.
SURVEY RESULTS ON ACCESS TO BANK FINANCING
According to the Flash Eurobarometer survey, 
banks are by far the first source of finance of 
SMEs, followed by leasing/renting companies 
and private investors (depending on the 
countries). The importance of access to bank 
finance is most strongly perceived in France, 
where 64% of the companies agree that without 
a bank loan their projects could not be successfully 
completed. Finland stands at the opposite 
extreme, with 78% of firms disagreeing with this 
statement. Views about the ease of access to bank 
loans are also mixed. For instance, in Finland, 
95% of firms reported that access was easy, while 
only 14% agreed in Germany. In general, the 
most important reason why respondents perceive 
increased difficulty in obtaining a bank loan 
compared to a few years ago is that banks now 
request too much information. 
Chart 5 Belgium – net percentage of firms with a favourable global appreciation of credit 
conditions  
(in percentages)
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The ENSR surveys also show that bank loans 
and overdrafts are the most widespread debt 
financing methods for SMEs, although 
alternative sources as leasing and factoring 
have been growing in importance. The ENSR 
2002 survey shows that during the three years 
previous to the survey year, only 37% of firms 
did not request an additional bank loan. Out of 
all firms surveyed, 50% asked for a loan and 
received the amount requested, 2% received 
part of the loan, while only 6% were denied a 
loan (which corresponds to 10% of the firms 
who applied for a bank loan) (see Table 7). The 
demand for loans was better served for medium-
sized firms, and least well served for micro-
firms (0-9 employees) or for firms in the 
services sector. According to the survey, the 
main reason for refusing an additional loan is 
the lack of sufficient collateral, especially for 
micro and small (10-29 employees) enterprises. 
Lending based on collateral becomes less 
important as the enterprise size increases, 
whereas good performance and the information 
flow gain in importance. Refusals were less 
frequent in euro area countries than in other 
(EEA) countries.
To sum up, there is some evidence that some 
euro area SMEs may face financing constraints 
(i.e. have no access to finance despite having 
Table 7 Access to finance: requested bank loans acquired?
(% of SMEs; by size, 2001)
Did you get all the loans you needed from your banks in the last 3 years?
Euro area countries Other countries
Number of employees, 2001 Total Number of employees, 2001 Total
0-9 10-49 50-249 0-9 10-49 50-249
Not applicable: 
no need for loans in 
the last three years 38 28 23 37 40 30 19 39
Y e s 4 95 55 35 04 04 85 24 1
Partly 2 2 1 2 2 4 1 2
No 6 6 5 6 12 10 11 12
Don’t know/no 
answer
59 1 8578 1 67
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Access to finance: requested bank loans acquired?
(% of SMEs; by sector of enterprise, 2001)
Did you get all the loans you needed from your banks in the last 3 years?
Euro area countries Other countries
Main activity Total Main activity Total
Industry Trade Services Industry Trade Services
Not applicable: 
no need for loans in 
the last three years 34 36 39 37 37 41 39 39
Y e s 5 45 24 65 04 73 14 04 1
Partly 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 2




Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ENSR Survey 2002. 
Note: The other countries included in the survey are Denmark, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United 
Kingdom.
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borrowing requirements), while the vast 
majority enjoy appropriate access to finance. In 
addition, the OECD survey results also show 
that in OECD countries the gap is larger in 
equity financing than debt financing. In fact, 
most OECD countries perceived a gap in the 
financing of innovative SMEs. This could 
imply that firms facing “financing constraints” 
can be classified into two categories: 
a) innovative firms, usually in riskier sectors, 
which request finance from credit institutions 
even though their investment would better be 
covered by equity; and b) those which are not 
able to create value and represent a high credit 
risk. All in all, the evidence of a gap in the 
financing of a minority of SMEs does not per se 
point to a lack of efficiency in the allocation of 
credit.
3.3 THE  ACADEMIC  LITERATURE
Many studies have investigated the role of 
financial factors in a company’s investment 
decisions (see Hubbard (1998) for a general 
survey of empirical academic studies on 
financing constraints and the tables in Annex 6 
for a selected review of studies with an emphasis 
on euro area countries32. Recently, the OECD 
(2006) report also includes an extensive review 
of theory and available evidence on SMEs. The 
overall conclusion is that the evidence is 
inconclusive, as there are conflicting results 
regarding the correlation between firm size and 
financing constraints. The lack of clear-cut 
results does not seem to depend on the 
methodology used (as both the investment 
equation estimation and other methodologies 
produce opposite results), nor on sampling 
choices or biases (there could be a sample bias 
as really small firms are not included, but again, 
the opposite conclusions are found in studies 
that equally suffer from this bias). In the 
following, a brief summary of the literature is 
provided (see Annex 6 for a tabular presentation 
of the main contributions). 
In an influential paper, Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988) suggest that the investment 
spending of firms facing financing constraints 
varies with the availability of internal funds, 
rather than just with the intrinsic characteristics 
of the projects available. Since with perfect 
capital markets this relationship should not 
exist, an “excess sensitivity” of investment to 
internal funds is interpreted as suggesting the 
importance of financing constraints. Following 
this work, many studies assessed the existence 
of financing constraints by testing the behaviour 
of constrained and unconstrained firms. This 
procedure implies an a priori assumption that 
some firms are financially constrained. It is 
then tested whether a measure of internal funds 
(usually cash flow) is of higher importance for 
the investment demand of the firms deemed to 
be especially constrained, compared with the 
rest of the sample. Thus, the effect of financial 
constraints is identified by the excess sensitivity 
of investment to current cash flow. 
The approach taken by Fazzari et al. (1988) 
basically implies that the investment of 
financially constrained firms is highly sensitive 
to cash flow. Subsequent research has addressed 
some problems with this approach, namely 
problems related to the a priori classification of 
firms and the extent to which Tobin’s Q is a good 
proxy for underlying investment opportunities. 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) showed that 
investment-cash flow sensitivity seems to be a 
decreasing function of the degree of financial 
constraints.33, 34 Regarding the interpretation of 
the sensitivity of investment to internal funds, 
several works have shown that cash flow 
sensitivity may be the consequence of 
measurement error in the usual proxy for 
investment opportunities, Tobin’s Q (see 
Erickson and Whited (2000), among others). 
32  Most studies analyse the relationship between investment and 
cash flow. Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal (2003), among 
others, consider several other financial indicators, such as 
indebtedness or the debt burden.
33  Recently, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) have questioned the 
findings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) by showing that their 
results are driven by a few influential observations in a small 
sample. 
34  The discussion between Fazzari et al. and Kaplan and Zingales 
is continued in Fazzari et al. (2000) and Kaplan and Zingales 
(2000). More recently, Moyen (2004) has proposed an 
explanation that reconciles the conflicting empirical evidence 
of Fazzari et al. and Kaplan and Zingales. 41
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Povel and Raith (2002) find a U-shaped 
relationship between cash flow and investment. 
Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) show that if 
cash flow is a good proxy for future investment 
opportunities, significant investment-cash flow 
sensitivities could arise even in the absence of 
financial frictions.35 More recently, Cummins et 
al. (2006) and Whited (2006) have contributed 
to this debate. Both conclude that the use of 
these types of regressions to test for the presence 
of financing constraints may not be appropriate. 
In this context, alternative empirical 
methodologies to identify financing constraints 
have been suggested. One such alternative, 
introduced by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998), consists in comparing the actual growth 
rates of firms with the maximum growth rate 
firms could attain without access to external 
finance. This comparison allows some inference 
on the degree to which firms are financially 
constrained. Another alternative combines the 
literature on financing constraints and the 
literature on investment uncertainty, thereby 
taking into account the irreversibility and the 
possibility of postponing the investment decision 
(see Bo et al. (2003) and Nilsen and Schiantarelli 
(2003), among others). Furthermore, two recent 
studies by von Kalckreuth (2006a, 2006b) 
explicitly take into account the adjustment 
process of capital formation with regard to 
detecting constraints. 
Moving to substantive results, several studies 
have assessed whether size is a relevant 
dimension of a firm in the determination of 
financial constraints, and tested the hypothesis 
that smaller firms are more financially 
constrained than larger ones. Results that 
confirm this hypothesis have been produced for 
virtually all euro area countries.36 Other studies, 
however, did not find a size effect for most 
euro area countries (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the 
Netherlands). Finally, some studies conclude 
that firm-size effects can actually be detected 
in the opposite direction (i.e. that larger or 
medium-sized firms are more financially 
constrained than smaller ones). This may be 
due to the fact that the ownership of small firms 
may be more concentrated, which helps to 
mitigate agency problems. This result was 
found for France, Germany and Greece. 
The existence of a credit rating is often 
hypothesised as a good indicator of access to 
finance, signalling that the firm has low-cost 
access to capital markets, as firms with serious 
adverse selection or moral hazard problems are 
forced to rely on intermediated finance such as 
bank debt and private placements. In general, 
the investment of non-rated firms was found to 
be more sensitive to cash flows. Another 
alternative is to use age as a criterion for 
grouping firms: several studies find that 
younger firms have higher investment cash 
flow sensitivity, suggesting these firms face 
higher financing constraints. In addition, some 
studies show that conglomerate firms face 
lower financing constraints. Regarding bank 
relationships, a stable relationship with a bank 
may prevent firms from encountering financing 
constraints. There is also some evidence that 
firms with higher leverage have greater 
investment cash flow sensitivity. Finally, 
smaller firms may have limited access to debt 
markets because they lack the collateral needed 
for borrowing and tend to rely more on internal 
funds for investment. 
In conclusion, these studies suggest that the 
size of a firm is just one dimension that may 
affect investment decisions in the presence of 
asymmetric information. As with size, there is 
no agreement regarding the results obtained 
when studying firm characteristics such as 
dividend payout or stock exchange listing. On 
the other hand, there are fewer controversies 
when credit rating or age, among others, are 
considered as means of grouping firms. That is 
younger and not-rated firms appear to be more 
financially constrained.
35  In Alti (2003) the sensitivity is proven to be higher for young, 
small firms with high growth rates and low dividend payout 
ratios. 
36  The only exception is Ireland, where no studies were found on 
this issue.
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3.4  HOW DIFFERENT IS THE FINANCING OF SMEs 
FROM THAT OF LARGE FIRMS?
As large firms are more diversified, offer more 
collateral and have more bargaining power due 
to their size, they may have easier access to 
market and bank liquidity. As a result, small 
firms are expected to face more problems than 
large firms. However, an in-depth analysis on 
how financing patterns of SMEs may differ 
from those of large firms in the euro area 
requires possible differences in firm 
characteristics other than size to be taken into 
account. For instance, the statement that SMEs 
are more financially constrained than large 
firms could possibly reflect their larger presence 
in sectors or economies with specific 
characteristics (e.g. asymmetric information 
problems, institutional factors) that result in 
more difficulties with regard to accessing 
finance. 
SMEs are seen to play a prominent role in some 
sectors such as construction, wholesale trade 
and retail trade. By contrast, large firms 
predominate in large-scale industries, such as 
extraction and transport and communication. In 
addition, there are large disparities in the SME 
landscape across countries. Compared with the 
euro area average, the share of SMEs in 
employment is much higher in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, and much lower in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. In terms 
of value added, the contribution from SMEs is 
much above the euro area average in Italy, 
Greece and Luxembourg, and much below in 
Ireland, Finland and France (see Annex 3).
This section analyses differences in firms’ 
financial position across firm sizes, and 
additionally attempts at controlling for the 
impact of sectoral and country effects. First, 
to understand better the impact of these 
differences, the financial position of SMEs is 
briefly described using the financial indicators 
as directly derived from the BACH database 
(without controlling for these two effects). The 
analysis is then extended, controlling for the 
impact of sectoral and country effects.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCING PATTERNS 
ACROSS FIRM SIZES BASED ON UNADJUSTED DATA
Over the period 1999-2005, small firms in the 
euro area were on average less profitable than 
large firms.37 This is particularly true of their 
operating profitability, as measured by the ratio 
of operating profit to value added, and also of 
indicators of return (such as return on assets 
(ROA), and especially return on equity (ROE)), 
albeit to a smaller extent (see Table 8, “not 
adjusted”).38
SMEs have reduced their debt-to-equity ratios 
in recent years, whereas this ratio has remained 
broadly stable for large firms; on average, over 
the period 1999-2005, the debt-to-equity ratio 
appears lower for smaller firms (Table 10, 
“not-adjusted”). Over the same period, the 
capacity of SMEs to repay their debt was lower, 
as indicated by their higher ratio of debt to 
cash flow compared to that of large firms. 
Furthermore, small firms had to bear a higher 
interest burden than large firms during the 
period under review. 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCING PATTERNS 
ACROSS FIRM SIZES: ACCOUNTING FOR SECTORAL 
AND COUNTRY FACTORS
A more in-depth assessment of the potential 
differences of financing patterns of SMEs from 
those of large firms can be obtained using 
adjusted indicators and a variance decomposition 
analysis.39 The use of adjusted indicators aims 
37 In this database, small companies are defined as those with 
turnover lower than EUR 10 million, medium-sized enterprises 
are those with turnover between EUR 10 and 50 million, and 
large ones are ones for which this variable stands above EUR 50 
million.
38 However, the positive relationship between profitability and 
size does not appear to be linear, as medium-sized firms 
generally show lower profitability than smaller firms over 
time.
39  A regression analysis was also performed with this data. The 
results of the regressions are broadly consistent with the main 
results presented in this section (see Annex 7).43
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Table 8 Profitability and investment indicators across size classes
(euro area, average over 1999-2005, in percentages) 1), 2)
Indicator
Gross operating profit to 
value added Return on assets Return on equity
Investment in tangible 










Averages by size class
Large 41 37 3.0 2.5 8.8 8.0 16.7 17.1
Medium 32 33 2.3 2.2 6.8 7.3 13.6 15.2
Small 27 28 2.7 2.3 6.6 8.0 12.2 15.0
Variance contribution of individual factors 
Size 6.6 11.4 0.6 0.5 1.5 0.4 3 0.5
Sector 58 57 12 12 17 21 13 20.7
Country 8.5 12 32 43 21 24 24 20
Table 9 External financing indicators across 
size classes
(euro area, average over 1999-2005, in percentages) 1), 2)
External financing
Indicator
Bank loans to 





Averages by size class
Large 18 23 6.2 3.7
Medium 33 34 1.5 1.1
Small 29 34 1.3 0.8
Variance contribution of individual factors 
Size 3.8 8.6 17 11
Sector 9.4 19 11 14
Country 34 37 12 13
at isolating the size effect from that of sectoral 
and country effects by imposing the same 
country and sectoral compositions across 
size classes. While this partly masks the 
heterogeneity across size classes that exists in 
reality, it does bring into sharper focus the 
differences that only depend on firm size and 
not on national concentration or sectoral 
composition. The adjustment of the indicators 
is similar to that applied in the previous chapter, 
where the role of the country there is replaced 
here by that of size in the weighting scheme. 
In turn, the variance decomposition40 helps in 
assessing the extent to which the size factor 
contributes to explaining differences in the 
financing patterns of firms. This contribution is 
also compared to that of the other factors – 
sector and country.41 A detailed explanation of 
the methodology is provided in Annex 4.
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40  The variance analysis can be combined with the use of adjusted 
indicators, which corresponds to using weighted variances.
41  It should be stressed that if size appears relevant in a variance 
analysis applied to observations at the size/time level, it may not 
be the case when adding a dimension (such as in the case of 
observations at the size/time/sector/country level), given that in 
this case the total variance is most likely larger, and hence the 
share of the variance that is explained by the sole size factor 
decreases.44
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For the main indicators of profitability, 
investment, amount of external financing 
and the balance sheet structure, the adjusted 
average values for the period 1999-2005 are 
reported for each size class (see the upper 
part of Tables 8-10). In addition, a variance 
decomposition has been carried out for each of 
the financial ratios considered. The results are 
shown in the lower panel of Tables 8-10, which 
report the percentage of the variance that is 
respectively explained by the size, sectoral or 
country dimensions (i.e. the three existing 
sources of variability in the analysis considered) 
for each financial ratio. The results are also 
reported for both adjusted and unadjusted 
data. 
The adjusted indicators differ sometimes 
markedly from the unadjusted ones. In some 
cases, the ordering of the size classes is even 
changed or the conclusion from the variance 
analysis on whether size matters or not is 
reversed. However, the presence or the lack of 
differences across size classes for a given 
Table 10 Balance sheet structure indicators across size classes
(euro area, average over 1999-2005, in percentages) 1), 2)
Indicator Debt to equity
Debt to cash 
flow





assets to total 
assets
 Financial fixed 














Averages by size class
Large 171 234 707 881 3.3 4.0 61 63 27 27 25 20
Medium 188 224 928 1,063 5.2 5.8 66 62 26 32 13 10
Small 137 256 925 1,186 6.5 7.9 64 63 19 29 26 11
Variance contribution of individual factors 
Size 2.4 1.7 0.6 4.8 25 31 0.1 0.1 1.8 1.3 16 19
Sector 18 31 12 22 11 13 62 66 63 63 14 10
Country 18 26 19 22 35 40 12 20 11 18 25 33
Source: Own calculations based on BACH database.
1) Adjusted indicators are calculated by imposing that the sector-country weights from the national accounts are the same across size 
classes. 
2) The variance of each indicator across firms has been decomposed separately (not jointly) for their size, sectoral and country 
dimensions. This variance decomposition has been computed for both unadjusted and adjusted indicators. Thus, regarding the size 
dimension, the figures report the contributions of size to the overall variance. For instance, in the case of the ratio of cash to total assets, 
25% of the variance across firms is explained by size classes on the basis of unadjusted data (31% on the basis of adjusted data), while 
75% (69% adjusted) is explained by the residual variance, i.e. the dispersion of firms within each size class. The same decomposition 
is performed for the sectoral and country dimensions. For instance, in the case of the ratio of cash to total assets, the country and size 
dimensions are the most relevant factors in explaining the degree of variance across firms.
indicator is broadly confirmed by the 
contribution of size to variance across firms, 
for both adjusted and unadjusted indicators.
RESULTS ON THE FINANCING PATTERNS OF SMEs 
VERSUS THOSE OF LARGE FIRMS
PROFITABILITY AND INVESTMENT: DOES SIZE 
PLAY A ROLE?
The lower return on equity observed for small 
firms (see Table 8, unadjusted data) turns 
out to be driven mainly by the relative weights 
of SMEs and large firms in the various 
sectors, and also to some extent by the relative 
weights of SMEs in the various countries. When 
controlling for sectoral and country distributions 
of firms, this ratio does not appear to be related 
to the size dimension. In similar fashion, no 
significant differences are observed for the 
ROA indicator. However, differences across 
size groups remain in the indicator of gross 
operating profit to value added. It also appears 
that smaller firms have a lower level of 
investment in tangible fixed assets (see averages 45
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for unadjusted data) that is partly driven 
by differences in the country and sectoral 
landscapes across size classes.
AMOUNT OF EXTERNAL FINANCING: DOES SIZE 
PLAY A ROLE?
Size appears to matter considerably for specific 
sources of financing, such as loans and bonds. 
In fact, small and medium-sized firms rely more 
on loans than large firms (with relatively low 
disparities across sectors). Moreover, the 
smaller the firm, the less it relies on bonds 
(although data on bonds are not available for all 
countries, which may distort the results).42  
Some of these results are not equally clear-cut 
when looking at unadjusted data, on the basis of 
which medium-sized firms seem to obtain more 
loans than small ones. 
Looking in more detail at the relevance of the 
country of origin for the external financing 
structure of a firm, it appears that this factor 
matters for the degree of reliance on loans, but 
not greatly for bonds. Regarding loans, there 
are large disparities across countries in the 
larger weight of loans for SMEs (particularly 
for small firms), while disparities are low 
across countries for large firms. Thus, this large 
variability in the weight of loans for SMEs 
probably reflects institutional disparities (see 
Chapter 2). These results are in line with the 
findings that the corporate bond market in the 
euro area has achieved a high degree of 
integration, whereas retail banking continues 
to be fragmented.43
BALANCE SHEET STRUCTURE: DOES SIZE 
PLAY A ROLE?
The lower debt-to-equity ratio observed for 
small firms (see Table 10, unadjusted data) 
turns out to be driven mainly by the relative 
weights of small firms in the various sectors 
and countries. When controlling for sectoral 
and country distributions of firms, small firms 
actually display the largest debt-to-equity ratio. 
Interestingly, differences between large and 
medium-sized firms are driven by their sectoral 
structure, rather than by their country structure, 
although this is not the case for small firms. 
Regarding differences between firms within a 
sector, the debt-to-equity ratio does not depend 
on the size class of the firm, while it generally 
differs across countries. This result could also 
be related on different accounting practices, 
which may have a particular impact on equity 
valuation across countries. Regarding differences 
between firms within a country, the debt-to-
equity ratio does not differ across size classes, 
while the differences are in general sectoral 
(these results are not reported in the table).
The debt to cash flow ratio, which provides a 
measure of the ability of a firm to repay its debt, 
turns out to depend somewhat more on its size 
than what is apparent on the basis of unadjusted 
indicators, as the variance contribution of size 
also points out. That is, when controlling for 
sectoral and country dimensions, the smaller the 
firm, the more it is indebted on the basis of this 
indicator. The country and sectoral dimensions 
are however more important factors, as the 
variance decomposition illustrates: this analysis 
shows that country – as well as sectoral – factors 
explain nearly 25% of the variability observed in 
the debt-to-cash flow ratio. With respect to the 
previous indicator, this may be less biased by 
accounting practices across countries.
Regarding the structure of assets, the ratios of 
cash and financial fixed assets to total assets 
differ considerably across size classes on the 
basis of adjusted data. The direction of the 
difference is in line with expectations, whereas 
this was not the case on the basis of unadjusted 
data for financial assets. In addition, these ratios 
differ widely across countries, possibly pointing 
to cross-country disparities in financial market 
developments, and to a lesser extent across 
sectors. However, differences across sectors are 
obviously considerable for the ratio of tangible 
fixed assets to total assets, which is in line with 
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42  A similar exercise based on the average rate of interest shows 
that while this indicator appears to be higher for small firms on 
the basis of unadjusted data, this is no longer the case when 
using adjusted indicators. In fact, the aggregate result is driven 
mostly by national factors (which explains around 50% of the 
– weighted – variance across firms) and, to a lesser extent, by 
the sectoral composition.
43 See  ECB  (2006).46
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the huge sectoral disparities in capital intensity. 
Since large firms play an important role in sectors 
such as electricity and transport, storage and 
communication, which are – together with “other 
services” – the most capital-intensive sectors, 
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets in large 
firms is the highest in all countries (on the basis 
of unadjusted data). Therefore, it does not come 
as a complete surprise that when controlling for 
sectoral and country factors, the ratio of tangible 
fixed assets to total assets no longer appears 
smaller for smaller firms. 
Regarding the maturity structure of liabilities, 
the ratio of short-term debt to total debt appears 
to be basically the same across firm classes on 
the basis of adjusted data. Correspondingly, 
size does not play a role in the variance 
decomposition analysis, which is instead 
dominated by the sectoral dimension. Indeed, 
the construction and (wholesale and) retail 
sectors, where small firms predominate, show 
the shortest maturity of assets. Therefore, when 
looking at the unadjusted data, it appears that 
the weight of short-term debt is larger for 
SMEs. 
To sum up, the analysis carried out in this 
section indicates that some of the different 
patterns observed between the financial position 
of SMEs and larger firms are driven by 
differences in their sectoral compositions and 
relative concentrations across countries, while 
other differences remain even after controlling 
for sectoral and country characteristics. 
However, there are some caveats to the 
conclusions reached here. Some possibly 
important determinants for access to finance, 
such as the age of the firm or the form of 
ownership (which are most likely correlated 
with the size of the firm), have not been taken 
into account. Another caveat relates to a 
selection bias of the BACH database, whereby 
the small firms covered tend to be those in a 
better financial situation. 
Box 4
THE IMPACT OF FIRMS’ FINANCIAL POSITION ON INVESTMENT DECISIONS: AN ANALYSIS WITH 
FIRM-LEVEL DATA 1
The financial performance of firms, as well as their responses to financial pressure, is important 
as it affects the operation of monetary policy through the corporate sector. A key channel in 
this regard is by altering borrowing costs, something that increases or alleviates financial 
pressure on firms. As a result, a potentially wide range of firms’ activities can be affected, 
investment or employment decisions being among the most prominent. 
The empirical studies that have analysed the impact of a firm’s financial position on investment 
have mostly used databases in which large companies have a predominant weight, even 
though these are in fact those expected to be less affected by credit constraints. To overcome 
this restriction, this Box analyses the impact that firms’ financial position has on investment, 
using a sample of non-financial corporations taken from AMADEUS with a much higher 
percentage of small firms than in most previous studies. The countries covered in this analysis 
are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain.
Charts A-C show the investment patterns of firms facing different degrees of financial pressure 
for the countries covered in the sample. Three financial ratios are used to capture the degree 
of financial tightness: the relative burden of debt (that is, the firms’ capacity to meet interest 
1  Prepared by Carmen Martínez-Carrascal.47
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payments),2 net indebtedness (the ratio between debt minus cash and its equivalents to assets)3 
and profitability (measured as the ratio of cash flow to total assets). 
Chart A compares the investment rates using the relative burden of debt. This variable, which is 
the net result of changes in interest rates, corporate profitability and corporate debt, is a relevant 
indicator of the financial pressure firms may be facing. More specifically, the chart shows the 
median investment rate for the 10% of firms with the lowest debt burden (the “low debt burden” 
line in the chart), for those for which this financial indicator stands between percentiles 45 and 55 
of the distribution (“med debt burden” in the chart) and, finally, the median investment rate for the 
10% of firms that face higher financial pressure according to this indicator (“high debt burden”). 
Firms with a higher financial burden in relation to their capacity to generate funds have substantially 
lower investment rates, a finding that is only less clear in Germany. This simple descriptive analysis 
2  Defined as the ratio of interest payments to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation plus financial revenue.
3  This indicator was included to test whether debt is important once adjusted for liquidity.
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also indicates that in some countries (especially Belgium and Spain) the relationship between 
financial pressure and investment might be non-linear, as no marked differences in investment rates 
are observed between those firms with the lowest financial pressure and those with average 
financial pressure. For those facing a higher financial burden, this rate is substantially lower.4
Similar evidence can be found when financial tightness is measured by the indebtedness ratio, 
as investment rates present a negative relationship with this indicator in all the countries 
analysed (see Chart B). Again, in many countries a non-linear relationship seems to exist. 
Finally, Chart C shows a clear link between investment and profitability, as firms with lower 
profitability display lower investment rates in all countries. Unlike what was observed with the 
two previous financial indicators, there is no evidence of a potentially non-linear relationship 
between investment and profitability.
4  This hypothesis has already been tested in Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal (2003) for Spanish firms, where evidence supporting 
a non-linear relationship between investment and financial position was found.
Chart B Net indebtedness and level of investment
(investment rate)
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The impact of financial position on investment: Some empirical results 
The estimation approach consists in relating for each firm its investment rate with the financial 
pressure proxied using the financial indicators considered above, using the GMM System 
estimator. This estimation controls for fixed effects, and uses lags of the dependent and 
explanatory variables as instruments to avoid the bias associated with the endogeneity problem 
of most current firm-specific variables.
The model estimated for fixed investment is an error-correction model which specifies a target 
level of the capital stock and allows for a flexible specification of the short-run investment 
dynamics, in which we add different financial indicators as potential explanatory variables:5





























































Sources: Amadeus, Bureau van Dijk and own calculations.
5  This specification instrumentation strategy has been favoured among others in Bond et al. (2003) and Hernando and Martinez-
Carrascal (2003). The depreciation rate is subsumed into the unobserved firm-specific effects, and it is assumed that variation in the 
user cost of capital can be controlled for by including both time-specific, sectoral-specific and firm-specific effects. See Bond et al. 
(2003) for details on the derivation of the investment model.
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(I/K)it= αi+ β1(I/K)it-1+β2Δyit + β3Δyit-1+β4(k-y)it-2+Xit-1′γ + θt+ фs +εit (1)
where i indexes companies i=1...N and t indexes years, t=1...T. Δ denotes a first difference, I/K 
is the investment rate, y is the log of real sales, k is the log of real fixed capital stock, αi are 
company-specific fixed effects, and X represents a vector of financial variables. θt and фs are, 
respectively, time and sectoral effects that control for macroeconomic influences on fixed 
investment that are common across companies, while εit is a serially uncorrelated, but possibly 
heteroskedastic error term. The coefficients β2 and β3 indicate the short-run responsiveness of 
fixed investment to sales growth, while the coefficient β4 indicates the speed of adjustment of 
the capital stock towards its desired level. 
The upper panel in the table reports the results obtained when equation (1) is estimated for each 
of the countries considered. More specifically, the table shows the coefficients estimated for 
each of the three financial variables considered when they are introduced one at a time in the 
equation, and the associated standard errors.6 In line with the descriptive evidence shown 
above, a negative (and significant) coefficient is obtained in most countries for net indebtedness: 
only in the Netherlands does this variable not seem to have a significant impact on investment, 
while in four out of the six countries analysed (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain), the p-value 
associated with the significance of this variable stands below 10% (and close to this level in 
Germany). Hence, these results suggest that a high level of debt can lead to balance sheet 
adjustment in the form of companies deferring or foregoing investment projects.
6  For the non-financial variables, the results are in line with those found in similar studies: the error-correction term (k-y)it-2 is correctly 
signed and statistically significant, and sales growth has a positive short-run impact on investment, which is statistically significant 
in all countries. We find the expected first-order serial correlation in our first-differenced residuals, while there is no evidence of 
second-order serial correlation, the key requirement for validating our instrumentation strategy, and the Sargan test statistics are 
insignificant at conventional levels.
Coefficients for financial variables in the investment equation











































Coefficients for financial variables in the investment equation: differential impact for SMEs











































Sample period 1997-2004 1997-2004 1998-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004 1997-2004
Number of firms 4,229 307 80,858 27,448 731 31,587
% corresponding 
to SMEs 88.84 39.1 97.2 96.8 33.5 97.3
Number of 
observations 27,373 1,503 453,015 155,038 4,326 167,430
Sources: Amadeus, Bureau van Dijk and own calculations.51
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A significantly negative and well-determined effect is also found for the interest debt-servicing 
burden measure, suggesting that the financial pressure of debt servicing plays an important role 
in influencing firms’ investment levels. The evidence in favour of this financial indicator 
having a significant impact on investment is even more robust and widespread than with the 
previous one, as only in the Netherlands is the p-value associated with significance of this 
variable slightly higher than 10%. 
Finally, the upper panel of the table reports the results obtained when profitability is included 
in the specification. This indicator is clearly significant in all the countries analysed except 
Germany and the Netherlands, where the p-value associated with the significance of this 
variable stands somewhat above 20%. 
The impact of financial position on investment: Is fixed investment more constrained by 
financial position for smaller firms? 
To test whether financial pressure constrains investment differently for small and medium-
sized firms than for large firms, the following equation is estimated:
(I/K)it= αi+ β1(I/K)it-1+β2Δyit + β3Δyit-1+β4(k-y)it-2+Xit-1γ1 + Xit-1*Dsmeitγ2+ θt+ фs +εit (2)
where DSME is a dummy variable that takes value one for small and medium-sized7 firms and 
zero otherwise.8 Hence, γ2 captures the differential impact that financial variable X has on 
investment for small and medium-sized firms. 
The results are shown in the lower panel of the table, which reports the values estimated for γ2, 
together with the associated standard errors. Neither indebtedness nor the debt burden seem to 
be more important constraints for investment for small and medium-sized firms than for large 
ones, as the p-value associated with the significance of γ2 stands above 10% for both variables 
in all countries (only in Spain does the p-value for the net indebtedness ratio stand close to this 
level). Likewise the availability of internal finance does not appear to play a more important 
role for investment for small and medium-sized firms than for large firms. Hence, these results 
indicate that the impact of financial position on investment does not seem to depend on firm 
size. However, the analysis of the distribution of firms’ financial position shows that in most of 
the countries analysed (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain) medium-sized firms (and 
especially small ones) tend to face greater financial pressure than large firms (according to the 
debt burden and profitability indicators in particular), suggesting that firms’ financial position 
might restrict fixed investment of small and medium-sized firms more than for large firms.
To sum up, these econometric results point to two main conclusions: first, they support the 
hypothesis that financial pressure faced by firms is important in explaining corporate decisions 
on fixed investment, as indebtedness, the debt burden and profitability indicators are found to 
be significant when included in investment equations. Second, they indicate that the marginal 
impact of firms’ financial position on investment is similar for small and large firms, but the 
overall effect is larger for smaller firms because their financial position is weaker according to 
the proxies for financial pressure used in this box. 
7  Size is defined on the basis of employment (according to this criterion, SMEs would be characterised as firms with less than 
250 employees), assets and operating revenue.
8  The notation for the rest of the variables is the same as above.52
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3.5 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
The existence of possible differences in small 
and medium-sized firms’ access to finance with 
respect to large ones has been widely discussed. 
Evidence based on several surveys conducted 
at the European level by the European 
Commission points to the existence of financing 
constraints in some cases, as perceived by 
firms, although not in all countries. National 
surveys also suggest the existence of some 
financing constraints for small firms, although 
results vary across countries and are not easily 
comparable. Moreover, the measurement of 
financing constraints might be distorted by 
existing subsidies for small enterprises. 
The econometric evidence is mixed, with some 
studies pointing to financing constraints for 
small firms as being the main determinant of 
underinvestment, while others identify additional 
factors as being more relevant in influencing the 
access to finance. Certainly, the difficulty in 
reaching definite conclusions on this issue may 
be related to some methodological problems that 
have not yet been empirically solved. Sample 
bias may also affect the analysis, as it is 
reasonable to expect that financially sound firms 
tend to be over-represented in both survey and 
empirical samples. In addition, results can also 
be determined by differences in simple issues 
such as the definition of firm size, as there is no 
unique definition of SMEs. It may also be the 
case that small firms indeed find ways around 
financial obstacles. A stable bank relationship44 
may help reduce informational asymmetries and 
alternative types of financing, such as trade 
credit45, may contribute to reducing the financial 
constraints of SMEs.
Many studies have described the existence of 
large differences across euro area countries for the 
financing of SMEs (e.g. the European Investment 
Bank report (EIB, 2003)). The analysis carried 
out here indicates that some of the differences 
observed between the financing patterns of SMEs 
and larger firms appear to be driven by differences 
in their respective sectoral compositions and 
relative concentrations across countries. However, 
differences across size classes remain for some 
aspects of the firms’ financing patterns, that is, 
even within a given sector and a given country. 
This applies to a certain extent to the ratio of gross 
operating profit to value added and, more strongly, 
to the reliance on bonds and the share of financial 
assets to total assets (which are all positively 
related to the size of the firm). The differences 
across size classes are also observable regarding 
the degree of reliance on cash and bank loans and 
the ratio of debt to cash flow (which are all 
negatively related to the size of the firm). The 
results on the retention of cash are particularly 
robust. As this variable is often considered to 
be an indicator of the existence of financing 
constraints, the analysis seems to indicate that 
differences might exist across size classes in terms 
of access to finance.  
An econometric analysis based on firm-level data 
has also been performed to analyse whether the 
financial position of firms affects their investment 
decisions (see Box 4). The findings are that firms 
facing a higher degree of financial pressure are 
found to present on average lower investment 
rates. The empirical results also show that the role 
of financial variables does not seem to differ 
across size classes. However, to the extent that 
SMEs tend to be in a somewhat weaker financial 
situation than larger firms, their investment 
decisions might be more affected. In addition, the 
fact that financial factors have an impact on 
investment levels indicates the advisability of 
taking into account financial developments in 
order to improve the assessment of the economic 
outlook. 
44 On the banking side, there is a diversification argument, as 
banks can better afford to retain a relationship with particularly 
financially distressed SMEs than with large firms.
45  See, among others, Boissay and Gropp (2006) and Cuñat (2007).53
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This chapter analyses the major changes that 
have occurred in the euro area financial 
landscape and assesses their impact on corporate 
finance. These changes have broadened the set 
of financial instruments utilised in corporate 
finance, thereby potentially contributing to the 
overall efficiency of the financial system, 
which in turn can be expected to have a positive 
effect on productivity growth through improved 
capital reallocation in the economy. 
The chapter starts with a brief overview of 
external financing developments for euro area 
corporations. In this respect, during the first few 
years of EMU, European corporations have 
benefited from increased availability of funds 
via direct market financing, with a strong surge 
in the net issuance of corporate bonds and shares 
(sub-section 4.1). The robust recourse to these 
instruments has been used to finance higher real 
investment as well as to fund the very large 
increase in M&A activity. More recently, 
innovations in credit markets – such as 
securitisation or credit derivatives – have had a 
significant impact on corporate financing (sub-
section 4.2). In fact, by shifting the risk of 
corporate and households’ loans outside their 
balance sheet, banks seem to be progressively 
assuming a new role, moving from their more 
traditional asset transformation role towards one 
in which they increasingly manage and trade 
credit risk via the financial markets. The growth 
of syndicated loans (loans granted by a group of 
banks to a single borrower) is another step in the 
same direction. This “new role” has been altering 
the dynamics of credit allocation and has probably 
increased the total amount of credit available for 
corporate borrowers. The other main structural 
development affecting corporate finance in 
recent years has been the growth of institutional 
investors such as pension funds, insurance 
companies, private equity and hedge funds. 
These investors are altering the channels of funds 
available to corporations as well as changing the 
set of incentives faced by corporations (sub-
section 4.3). Overall, it is important to bear in 
mind that recent developments in corporate 
finance in the euro area have also been driven by 
more conjunctural factors such as ample liquidity, 
low long-term interest rates, the search for yield 
on the investors’ side, the demand for leveraged 
transactions and the drying up of market-based 
financing after the fall in stock prices in the 
period 2001-2003. Sub-section 4.4 concludes.
Chart 6 provides an overview of the changing 
environment of external financing for non-
financial corporations in the euro area. In 
general, following profitability and investment 
developments, euro area non-financial 
corporations increased their external financing 
considerably between 1995 and 2000. This 
increase occurred for all main financing 
instruments, i.e. loans, debt securities and 
equity, while corporate bonds also increased 
their relative share in these flows. After peaking 
in 2000, in parallel with the economic slowdown 
and the fall in stock market prices, the external 
financing of euro area non-financial corporations 
decelerated dramatically. While the annual rate 
of change of monetary financial institution 
(MFI) loans recovered strongly from 2004 
onwards, the annual rate of change of loans 
granted by other financial institutions (OFIs) 
only recovered from 2005 onwards.47, 48 After 
the boom in the euro area corporate bond 
market from 1999 to 2001, the issuance of debt 
securities and quoted equity by euro area 
non-financial corporations remained overall 
weak up to the first semester of 2006, with 
the exception of a pick-up in corporate bonds 
in 2003, while the role of loans continued to 
increase throughout 2005 and 2006. 
46  Prepared by Stefano Borgioli, David Marqués Ibañez 
(co-ordinator), Carmelo Salleo, Maarten Hendrikx, Laurent 
Nahmias, Romain Perrard, Anssi Rantala and Walter Waschiczek. 
The fact-finding exercise with markets participants was 
coordinated by Stefano Borgioli and David Marqués Ibañez.
47  The negative annual rate of change of OFI loans to non-financial 
corporations in 2004 was related to fiscal factors, which induced 
a substitution of inter-company loans by unquoted equity 
financing.
48  In some euro area countries, leasing is part of OFI loans, while 
in other euro area countries, leasing is part of MFIs (France) or 
of non-financial corporations (Germany). The overall 
importance of leasing is limited, with a share of around 5% in 
the debt liabilities of non-financial corporations according to 
partial information from some euro area countries. 
4  CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 
OF THE EURO AREA46
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4.1  THE DEVELOPMENT OF MARKET-BASED 
FINANCING IN EMU
4.1.1  THE CORPORATE BOND MARKET
As discussed in Chapter 2, non-financial 
corporations in the euro area have historically 
made less recourse to bond finance compared 
with the US and the UK. A first reason is the 























Chart 7 Total bonds over sales of listed 
companies
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Chart 8 Total bond flow over sales of listed 
companies
(in percentage)
Sources: National financial accounts and Datastream.
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traditional reliance of European firms on 
bank financing, which emphasises the benefits 
of the lending relationship in overcoming 
information asymmetries, facilitating the 
financing of investment and financial support 
in difficult times.49 A second possible reason 
is the prevalence of small and medium-sized 
firms in the euro area, for which bond finance 
is not easily suitable. 
The ratio of outstanding stock of bonds to total 
sales for listed firms is substantially lower in 
the euro area than in the US (see Chart 7). On 
the other hand, net bond flows, as a share of 
sales by listed firms, are much closer to the 
corresponding US flows, which is also a 
consequence of the decline registered in the US 
over the past few years (see Chart 8). This 
implies that the appeal of bond markets has 
become more similar in both financial 
markets.  
49  In this respect, Altman et al. (2006) find that the loan market 
does in fact have an informational advantage over bonds. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) show that banks invest for the 
long term compared to bond holders, and therefore have an 
incentive to acquire information and to try to rescue firms in 
financial distress.55
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Following the start of Monetary Union, 
the corporate bond market boomed, with growth 
in net bond issuance outpacing growth in 
bank loans until mid-2004 (see Chart 6). The 
introduction of the euro gave a strong impulse 
to the European corporate bond market, while 
the disappearance of exchange rate risk among 
European countries contributed to enhancing 
the liquidity of the market, prompting investors 
and borrowers to start to take a European 
perspective. Institutional investors increased 
their cross-country exposure, and corporate 
borrowers started to access a broader pool of 
potential investors. Finally, increased bank 
competition lowered underwriters’ fees for 
corporate bonds.50
While the pick-up in M&A activity in 1999-
2000 was instrumental in encouraging bond 
issuance both in the US and the euro area, more 
recently growth in corporate net bond issuance 
activity has stalled compared to growth in 
loans.51 As no structural impediments have 
emerged over the past couple of years, the 
decline in the rate of growth seems to have 
Chart 9 Corporate bond issues by non-financial corporations by rating
Rating breakdown
(EUR bill moving averages)
Rating shares
(in percentages of total)
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been originated by different factors, the most 
prominent being competition from other sources 
of finance. It is worth stressing that similar 
developments have also occurred to some 
extent in the US (see Box 1 in Chapter 2).
The deepening and broadening of the corporate 
bond markets after 1999 have proceeded along 
several dimensions, two of which are most 
significant. First, in terms of credit quality, the 
highest increase in corporate bond issuance 
was recorded for lower-rated bonds. Before 
1999 the market was limited to borrowers 
rated AA or higher. Since the introduction of 
the euro, however, the non-financial corporate 
bond market has been able to accommodate 
a broader spectrum of credit ratings (see 
Chart 9), and the high-yield segment has grown 
substantially.
50 See Santos and Tsatsaronis (2003) and Melnik and Nissim 
(2006).
51  See de Bondt (2005) and Waschiczek (2004).56
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Second, the development of the market has 
been favoured by the diffusion of innovative 
financial products. In particular, over the past 
ten years, hybrid instruments and other financial 
instruments that combine characteristics of 
both equity and debt, and allow firms to obtain 
more flexible sources of finance, have gained 
considerably in importance (see Chart 10). 
For borrowers, convertible bonds (bonds with a 
conversion option to equity) are often seen as a 
low-cost alternative to straight bonds, especially 
by high-growth companies without high levels 
of cash flow. Others use convertible bonds as 
“delayed equity” to avoid short-term equity 
dilution. Due to their conversion option, they 
are rather sensitive to stock market movements. 
Hence, they were particularly popular in the 
stock market boom, and their issuance volume 
grew steadily in the second half of the 1990s, 
especially after the start of EMU. In the period 
1997-2001, the volume of convertible bonds 
issued by euro area companies amounted to 
more that one quarter of all debt securities 
issued by non-financial corporations in the 
euro area. Over the last few years, however, 
issuance has shrunk considerably as the 
relatively low interest rate environment made 
Chart 10 Gross issuance of hybrid financial 
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the use of straight bonds a more attractive 
method of raising finance. 
In contrast, hybrid bonds (subordinated bond 
issues with very high duration) have flourished 
in an environment of low nominal interest rates 
and shrinking corporate bonds spreads, partly 
also due to tax considerations.52 In 2005 
mezzanine finance (instruments that combine 
elements of both equity and loans) increased 
very strongly owing to the increase in M&A 
activity. 
Some other related complex financial 
instruments have also been growing rapidly. 
One of the most prominent in the last couple of 
years is probably the payment in kind (PIK) 
note. A PIK typically does not provide any cash 
flow between the issuing and the maturity date, 
just like a zero-coupon bond. It is usually 
unsecured or very subordinated, long term 
(most maturities are over five years) and, in a 
standard offer, is accompanied by a mechanism 
that allows the investor to share in the future 
success of the business. PIKs are frequently 
issued to finance an acquisition or a leveraged 
buyout, given that they allow the borrower to 
achieve a higher level of leverage without 
having to pay cash interest on all the finance 
raised, and as a result are enjoying fast growth 
in the currently buoyant M&A market. 
Overall, it seems that, especially after the 
introduction of the euro, the wider size of the 
financial market and increased cross-border 
competition have established a situation 
whereby large corporations in particular can 
now tap the corporate bond market relatively 
easily. The market has increased in depth and 
broadened in terms of rating and type of 
products. Most recently, the recent slowdown 
52 In Europe, the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) allow companies to treat hybrid bonds that meet specific 
criteria as equity in their balance sheets, while for tax purposes 
they can be treated like debt – so interest payments can be 
deducted from a company’s tax liabilities.57
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in its growth seems mostly related to competition 
from other sources of finance.  
4.1.2 THE  EQUITY  MARKET
Developments in the equity market have 
mirrored to some extent the broad fluctuations 
in the corporate bond market in recent years. 
Within the equity market, the very large 
fluctuations experienced in the initial public 
offering (IPO) market were particularly 
remarkable, while the secondary public offering 
(SPO) market fluctuated to a lesser extent. 
From an economic viewpoint, the IPO market 
is a particularly relevant segment of the equity 
market as it tends to promote entrepreneurship 
by providing a source of capital for growing 
firms and an exit route for private equity 
investors (see sub-section 4.3).53
Focusing on the developments in the IPO 
market in the euro area, the number of public 
equity offerings accelerated strongly in the late 
1990s and reached a peak in 2000, in a context 
of excessive profit expectations and the so-
called New Economy stock market bubble. In 
the aftermath of the bursting of the bubble, in 
2001 the total number of IPOs decreased 
dramatically and the market remained very 
subdued in following years, although a slight 
Chart 11 Number of IPOs and SPOs by 
non-financial corporations in the euro area
(sum of issues; annual data)
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Chart 12 The share of number of industrial 
and TMT IPO over the total number of IPOs
(percentages) 



















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
recovery took place in 2005 and 2006 (see 
Chart 11).
At the beginning of the observed period, several 
IPOs were simply the effect of privatisation 
processes ongoing at that time in many euro 
area countries, with the consequent listing of 
previously state-owned companies. Afterwards, 
the “hot market period”, broadly ranging from 
1997 to 2000, had a very strong concentration 
of firms operating in the technology, media 
and telecommunications (TMT) sectors (see 
Chart 12). 
From an institutional point of view, the mid-
1990s saw the creation of a variety of specialised 
stock exchanges, focused on innovative 
companies in high-growth sectors. These 
markets aimed at channelling equity funds to 
firms in their early stage of development and 
catering for investors’ appetite for this kind of 
assets.54 There was also an attempt to create a 
single “new” European Stock Exchange with 
53  ECB Monthly Bulletin, October 2005.
54  Such as the Nouveau Marché in France, the Neuer Markt in 
Germany, the Nieuwe Markt in the Netherlands, the Nuovo 
Mercato in Italy, the Nuevo Mercado in Spain, the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) in the UK, and the Easdaq and 
Euro.Nm in Belgium.58
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the alliance of five new markets (Frankfurt, 
Paris, Amsterdam, Milan and Brussels) into the 
so-called Euro.Nm,55 which however ended in 
December 2000 as a result of a reduction in the 
growth expectations of the new markets and 
several corporate governance scandals. The 
most prominent of these new markets, the 
German Neuer Markt, closed down in 2003, 
and most of the companies still listed were 
moved to the ordinary stock exchange. More 
recently, some new exchange-regulated market 
segments have opened up such as Alternext 
(the Euronext exchange-regulated segment), 
IEX in Ireland and Expandi in Italy.  
More generally, the slowdown in equity 
issuance after the peaks reached at around the 
turn of the century is even more marked in 
terms of net issuance developments (i.e. not 
just IPOs) (see Chart 13). This can also partly 
be attributed to the increase in share buyback 
activity by euro area companies in recent years 
Chart 13 Quoted shares issuance by 
non-financial corporations 
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Chart 14 Euro area share buybacks by 
non-financial corporations, total deal value 
and number of deals
(EUR billions and number of deals) 
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(see Chart 14). The decline in the recourse to 
equity in net terms does not seem to be related 
to structural deficiencies of the euro area 
markets, but rather to a broader trend. In this 
respect, net new share issuance activity declined 
in all the major economies, with the most 
extreme case being the US, where it remained 
negative for several years. The main reasons 
behind the much lower net recourse to equity 
financing in recent years were the collapse in 
share prices after the bursting of the New 
Economy bubble, low interest rates and a 
shrinking financing gap. In this respect, the 
very low cost of debt financing has probably 
favoured the substitution of debt for equity 
capital in recent years, as Box 5 below 
suggests.
55  The adoption of uniform admission and trading requirements 
and the possibility for investors to access all the involved 
markets through a common interface were the main rationales 
underlying the creation of the Euro.Nm. 59
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THE COST OF CAPITAL FOR EURO AREA CORPORATIONS
To assess the financing decisions of euro area corporations, it is necessary to calculate the cost 
of capital, which should include the costs of different forms of financing, and in particular the 
cost of raising funds via equity and via debt (both market-based debt and bank loans). The 
weighted average cost of capital can be written as:
 
where rD and rE are the cost of debt financing and equity financing respectively, and D and E 
are the amount outstanding of corporate debt and corporate equity. The real cost of external 
financing of non-financial corporations is calculated as a weighted average of the cost of bank 
lending, the cost of debt securities and the cost of equity, based on their respective amounts 
outstanding, and deflated by inflation expectations. 
The costs of the different means of financing for the euro area are shown in Chart A. Equity 
financing is normally a costlier way of raising funds for euro area corporations, while the cost 
of market-based debt tends to be close to the cost of bank financing. Given the structure of the 
euro area financial system and the importance of bank loans for corporate financing, bank 
lending rates play an important role in defining the cost of funding. Nominal interest rates for 
bank loans aggregated at the euro area level are shown in Chart B for three different maturity 
classes. It is interesting to note that the cost of bank financing is not directly linked to the 











Chart A Real financing costs of non-financial 
corporations according to source
(percent per annum, monthly data)
Sources: ECB, Thomson Financial Datastream, Merrill Lynch 
and Consensus Economics Forecast.
Notes: The real cost of the external financing of non-financial 
corporations is calculated as a weighted average of the cost of 
bank lending, the cost of debt securities and the cost of equity, 
based on their respective amounts outstanding and deflated 
by inflation expectations. The introduction of the harmonised 
MFI lending rates at the beginning of 2003 led to a break in the 
statistical series. 
Chart B Nominal interest rates on new 
business MFI loans to non-financial 
corporations
(percent per annum; monthly averages)
Sources: ECB.
Notes: Within each fixation category rates are weighted 
averages between loans up to EUR 1 million and over 1 million, 
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Data on the euro area financial accounts allow 
us to consider – at a lower frequency than other 
sources – developments in unquoted equity, 
which comprises a very large component 
of equity funding in the euro area. Chart 15 
shows how the decline in unquoted equity since 
2000 has been less marked than for quoted 
equity. More recently, however, financial 
accounts data show a marked increase in quoted 
equity funding in 2004 and 2005, whereas the 
growth rate of funding via unquoted equity has 
continued to decline.
4.2 FINANCIAL  INNOVATIONS  AND  NEW 
FINANCING AVENUES FOR CORPORATIONS
One of the most important innovations in credit 
markets in recent years has been the spectacular 
growth in credit transfer techniques. From a 
corporate finance perspective, it is important to 
understand how innovations in credit markets 
have altered the dynamics of corporate lending 
between banks and markets, and to assess 
whether they have increased the total amount 
of credit available for corporate borrowers. 
Overall, these techniques – which include 
securitisation and credit derivatives – allow 
banks to shift corporate and households’ bank 
loans off their balance sheet and onto the 
financial markets, thus improving asset 
diversification.56 As a result of the use of these 
instruments, banks seem to be progressively 
assuming a new role in which they are managing 
and trading credit risk more actively. 
partly reflect a yield curve that is at times negatively sloped or different volumes of transactions 
across maturities, coupled with the fact that short-term loans (especially overdrafts) are in 
general less collateralised.
A key element for the calculation of the cost of capital is the cost of equity, the return required 
by investors willing to invest in companies’ shares. As such, it is not directly observable and 
needs to be estimated. The cost of equity shown in Chart A is calculated using the Three-stage 
Gordon Dividend Discount Model (DDM) approach as applied by Fuller and Hsia (1984),1 
based on the idea that the current equity price is the discounted value of future dividends. The 
main advantage of this approach is the use of forward-looking information. At the same time, 
however, it relies on a set of strong assumptions concerning future developments of dividends 
and earnings; in addition, the cost of equity calculated as such tends to respond little to current 
movements in stock prices, due to the infinite horizon of the discounting. A different approach 
is to use an asset-pricing model (such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)) and explain 
equity returns through their correlation with a set of common factors, in particular the return 
on the market portfolio.
1  See Fuller and Hsia (2004).
Chart 15 Equity financing of non-financial 
corporations in the euro area
(in growth rates)
Sources: ECB annual national and financial accounts. 2005 data 
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56  In common with most derivatives, credit derivatives can also be 
used – often by sophisticated financial intermediaries such as 
hedge funds – as a source of revenue, thus increasing credit risk 
exposure.61
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In the course of the past decade, banks have 
increasingly made recourse to the sale of loans 
to shed credit risk and to increase funding, 
initially mainly regarding residential mortgages, 
but more recently also for loans to non-financial 
corporations. In addition, over the past few 
years banks have been able to retain loans in 
their portfolio and, at the same time, to sell 
their credit risk exposure via credit derivatives. 
This included credit default swaps (CDSs) or 
the sale of bonds embedding hedging products 
(see sub-sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2). The 
possibility of hedging loans has in turn 
contributed to the significant expansion of 
syndicated loans (see sub-section 4.2.3). From 
a corporate financing perspective, corporations 
have become increasingly aware of the 
possibilities open to them and have benefited 
from easier access to credit from banks, which 
are now able to mobilise significant amounts of 
financing in a very short period of time. 
Market participants from a variety of large key 
financial institutions were contacted in the 
course of a fact-finding mission which 
confirmed the relevance of the current financial 
innovations in reshaping the dynamics of 
corporate financing (see Box 6 for more 
details). Market participants also stressed the 
increasing sophistication of corporate treasurers 
and chief financial officers. The increasing 
familiarity with new products has put 
corporations in a better position to exploit fully 
funding possibilities, for example by switching 
from bond to bank funding, or by changing the 
leverage of firms (for example via share 
buybacks) according to market conditions.  
SECURITISATION OF BANK LOANS57
In recent years, the dramatic increase in the use 
of securitisation techniques is probably the 
most significant example of how financial 
innovation can affect corporate credit in the 
euro area. In broad terms, standard securitisation 
involves the pooling of (financial) assets and 
their subsequent sale, usually via a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV), which issues asset-
backed securities (ABS) that are often bought 
by institutional investors to finance the purchase 
of pooled assets. ABS can be split into tranches 
of different seniority, thereby catering for 
diverse credit risk profiles, which are in turn 
characterised by different credit ratings. Often 
the originator of the assets – in this case the 
bank – retains the tranche bearing the highest 
risk to signal the alignment of its interest to 
that of its investors. In addition, this creates an 
incentive for the originator to continue to 
monitor the credit quality of the underlying 
assets. 
When the assets are effectively moved off the 
bank’s balance sheet, as in the case above, this 
is called a true sale or a cash securitisation. 
When purely the risk of the assets is sold, but 
the assets themselves remain on the balance 
sheet of the originator, this is called a synthetic 
securitisation. A synthetic securitisation is 
normally carried out with the use of credit 
derivatives, such as CDS, which are often 
embedded in bonds (normally called synthetic 
credit default obligations). 
Banks have securitised an increasingly wide 
range of financial assets in recent years, and 
this has given birth to an equally wide range of 
different sorts of ABS. The most commonly 
securitised assets were initially mortgages.58 
In recent years, more sophisticated forms of 
securitisation have been developed, and banks 
can now securitise a large portion of their 
corporate and consumer credit portfolio. Non-
financial companies can also directly resort to 
securitisation techniques. 
Focusing on the drivers of securitisation, it is 
worth mentioning that technological advances 
have enabled the development of sophisticated 
financial transactions that require complicated 
calculations and processing of financial data. 
The dramatic improvements in data storage 
57  A large literature on securitisation and structured finance has 
evolved in recent years. See for instance BIS (2004, 2005a and 
2005b) and Schwarcz (1994) for a comprehensive discussion of 
securitisation.  
58  In practice, two types of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are 
distinguished: securities backed by residential mortgages 
(RMBS), and securities backed by commercial mortgages 
(CMBS).62
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have also contributed to these developments, as 
the accuracy of the pricing of these financial 
products depends to a large extent on data 
availability. 
From an economic standpoint, the demand for 
structured products has grown rapidly, as they 
allow investors to invest in assets that have a 
very specific, sometimes even tailor-made, 
risk-return profile. The very low interest rate 
environment has stimulated securitisation for 
at least two reasons. First, low interest rates 
have increased the credit demand of the private 
sector, which has enabled banks to increase 
their issuance of loans, thus increasing 
considerably the amount of assets eligible for 
securitisation. Second, the demand for 
structured products has also increased due to 
the search for yield, especially on the side of 
institutional investors, as ABS have a relatively 
favourable risk-reward trade-off. For instance, 
the demand for ABS has increased in particular 
from institutional investors that need to achieve 
a certain minimum return (such as hedge funds 
or pension funds).59
Banks have an incentive to securitise assets 
to realise immediately the cash value of the 
originated assets, or simply as a tool for raising 
liquid funds.60 In this respect, the new rules 
on regulatory capital (Basel II) may create 
an incentive for banks to use sophisticated 
techniques in order to manage their exposure 
and diversify credit risk. From the viewpoint of 
corporations, securitisation has most likely 
increased the availability of funds, as banks 
have become more willing to lend funds.   
4.2.1  BROAD DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITISATION
In recent years the size of the market for 
structured products (including true and 
synthetic securitisation) has expanded rapidly 
(at about 30% per annum in the euro area, see 
Chart 16), as has the range of ABS. In the 
Eurosystem’s official statistics, most of the 
securities issued by SPVs are included in debt 
securities issued by non-monetary financial 
corporations, which have indeed been growing 
very strongly in recent years (see Chart 17). 
Regarding the so-called true securitisation, 
the UK is the leading country in Europe 
in terms of securitisation transactions (see 
Chart 16 Total funded structured finance 
issuance by region
(in billions of US dollars; data include cash issuance and 
funded portion of synthetics)
Source: BIS.


















Chart 17 Sectoral breakdown of debt 
securities issued by sector
(annual growth rates) 
Source: ECB.
Notes: Non-monetary financial corporations include insurance 
corporations and pension funds, financial auxiliaries and other 
financial intermediaries.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
























59  See Rajan (2005).
60  See for instance Firla-Cuchra (2005), Rajan (2005), Iacobucci 
and Winter (2005) or Schwarcz (1994).63
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Charts 18 and 19). The market for structured 
products has in similar fashion increased 
considerably in Spain, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy and Ireland. With respect to the 
types of ABS issued, the largest class remains 
mortgage-backed securities – which is therefore 
not importantly linked with non-financial 
corporations – with a growth rate of 
approximately 30% per annum (see Chart 20). 
More recently, collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs), which to a large extent include credit 
risk position toward enterprises, have also 
increased very significantly. According to the 
European Securitisation Forum, in 2006 
the issuance of CDO securities in euro amounted 
to  €88 billion, an increase of 80% on 
the previous year.61 In addition, the so-called 
commercial mortgage-backed securities, i.e. 
bonds collateralised with mortgage loans for 
commercial properties, increased in euro area 
countries, from around €10 billion to almost 
25 billion, with Germany mostly driving the 
growth. 
As already mentioned, so-called synthetic 
securitisation is normally conducted via CDS. A 
CDS is an agreement between a protection 
buyer and a protection seller, whereby the buyer 
pays a periodic fee in return for a contingent 
payment by the seller following a credit event. 
In case a bank is seeking to reduce its exposure 
towards a particular asset, it can buy protection 
against the default risk by paying a periodic fee 
to an investor (often an institutional investor) 
that sells the protection. Overall, CDS allow 
banks and investors to reduce or increase risk 
exposure on a flexible basis. 
The market for CDS has leaped over the past 
few years. The total estimated notional amount 
outstanding of credit derivatives exceeded 
€15 trillion in 2006, according to estimates by 
the British Bankers’ Association and the BIS 
(see Chart 21). It is worth mentioning that the 
heading “credit derivatives” encompasses a 
large variety of products ranging from simple 
bilateral CDS between two counterparties to 
portfolio of CDS embedded in bonds (e.g. in 
synthetic or bespoke CDOs). It is also 
interesting to note that a survey conducted by 
the British Bankers’ Association in 2004 
expected the market by 2006 to reach a size of 
around only 40% of what has actually 
prevailed.
Chart 18 European securitisation. Issuance 
by country
(EUR billions)
Source: European Securitisation Forum. 
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Chart 19 European securitisation. Issuance 
by country, as a percentage of GDP
Sources: European Securitisation Forum and own calculations. 
Note:Data for 2006 excludes CDOs. 
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61  This figure includes funded cash and synthetic deals. 64
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Chart 20 European securitisation. Issuance 
by collateral 
(EUR billions; 2006 data)
Source: European Securitisation Forum (2006).
1)  CDO securities issued in Euros.
2) commercial  mortgage-backed  securities.
3)  includes equipment and other leases.
4) includes leveraged, commercial, consumer, corporate; and 
other loans.
5) includes account, health care, insurance utility and other 
receivables.
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Chart 21 Global credit derivatives market
(EUR billions)
Source: British Bankers’ Association. 





















The above-mentioned developments in 
securitisation and CDS could have indirectly 
impacted on the availability of financing to 
firms. The spreading of risk from the banking 
sector to the whole financial system may 
indeed have caused a shift in the loan supply, 
altering the quantity and price of debt 
financing potentially available to non-financial 
corporations. However, a precise assessment is 
difficult given the scarcity of evidence, the 
novelty of this phenomenon, and the difficulty 
of disentangling possible structural features 
from conjunctural ones, connected to ample 
liquidity, low interest rates and a high appetite 
for yield on the investors’ side (see also 
Box 6).
4.2.2  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SYNDICATED 
LOAN MARKET TO CORPORATE BORROWERS
One of the main sources of corporate financing 
for borrowers is the syndicated loan market. 
Although syndicated loans have a long history, 
the global volume of international syndicated 
loan facilities has risen tremendously over the 
last few decades, increasing in size from USD 
7 billion in 1970 to over USD 3.5 trillion by 
2005. The expansion of the syndicated loan 
markets in the euro area has also seen its 
transformation from a relatively illiquid market, 
in which banks agreed to syndicate lines of 
Chart 22 Syndicated loans granted to 
borrowers from industrialised countries
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credit to normally very large borrowers, into a 
more competitive market with a much more 
liquid secondary market and in which there are 
strong connections with other financial market 
players such as private equity firms, hedge 
funds and other institutional investors. As an 
instrument combining features of bilateral 
relationship lending and publicly traded debt, 
syndicated loans broaden access to capital in 
the euro area by constituting an alternative to 
high-yield bonds and more illiquid bilateral 
loans.  
From a borrower’s perspective, the primary 
reason for preferring syndicated loans is the 
sizeable amount and quicker availability of 
finance that this market provides. Firms not 
willing to issue public debt due to disclosure 
concerns and in need of large loans that bilateral 
lending transactions cannot provide consider 
syndicated loans as an option. Firms with high 
growth potential that are also subject to high 
levels of asymmetric information might also 
prefer loan markets which can offer cheaper 
funds in comparison to the bond market. In 
fact, the composition of syndicated loans by 
Chart 23 Signings of syndicated loans by 
EMU borrowers
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borrowing sector reveals that manufacturing 
and high-tech industries are the principal 
customers for syndicated loans in the euro area. 
The likelihood of renegotiation in case of 
financial stress is another rationale for firms 
preferring a syndicated loan; the large number 
of parties involved in a public issue makes it 
extremely difficult to renegotiate effectively 
the terms of debt agreements, as any new 
agreement must involve the consensus of all 
parties involved. Syndicated loans also offer a 
number of administrative advantages. 
From a lender’s point of view, banks are 
increasingly engaging in syndicated lending as 
these instruments enable them to spread risks 
more effectively by diversifying sector and 
geographical specialisation from the origination 
business. They also allow banks to reduce their 
monitoring and operating costs and to provide 
credit to large borrowers without supplying the 
full amount of finance. This is particularly 
relevant in Europe, where cross-border bank 
lending activity remains very limited. Fees 
involved in the syndication process may also 
be a motivation as these can be quite substantial, 66
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particularly in the case of leveraged deals 
where large global banks act as arrangers. 
The fact that syndicated loans offer the possibility 
of raising larger amounts of finance at attractive 
terms within a tight time frame has made them a 
powerful financial tool for strategic corporate 
transactions such as M&As. In fact, given the 
decline in interest rates, syndicated loans have in 
recent years, besides being used for debt 
repayment purposes, been increasingly used for 
M&A and leveraged buyout (LBO) funding. Their 
growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s (see 
Chart 22) was also supported by the establishment 
of secondary loan markets and by the emergence 
of credit derivatives markets, which allowed 
bank originators to shed part of their credit 
risk and to attract institutional investors to the 
markets. The secondary market for syndicated 
loans has been supported in turn by increased 
transparency, greater use of credit ratings, and 
structured credit financial innovation.
Within the euro area, German and French firms 
are the main clients of the syndicated loan 
market, followed by Spanish and Italian 
borrowers (see Chart 23). The share of loans 
extended to euro area borrowers and issued for 
financing M&A activity increased dramatically 
in 2005 and 2006 (see Chart 24). 
As indicated earlier, the introduction of the 
single currency in Europe has accelerated the 
integration process in most financial market 
segments in Europe.62 In this respect, while 
loan markets are among the less integrated 
financial markets, particularly at the retail 
level, the increase in competition in the 
syndicated loan market is increasing the 
integration of the corporate loan market. 
The total volume of syndicated lending to euro 
area firms in 2005 was approximately 7.5 times 
the level seen in 1998. In contrast, during the 
same period, syndicated lending in the US and 
the UK grew by 37% and 95% respectively. 
While the US dollar has historically been the 
preferred currency for issuing debt in this 
market, this trend changed significantly after 
the launch of the euro. In 1998 barely 5% of 
global syndicated loans were denominated in 
pre-euro European currencies, with the vast 
majority (over 80%) of loans denominated in 
US dollars. Today, rising progressively after 
1999, euro-denominated loans constitute more 
than 20% of the total debt issued in the 
syndicated loan market. A similar pattern can 
be observed for European-based firms, which 
now prefer to borrow in euro.
62  See for example Hartmann et al. (2003) and Baele et al. (2004).
Box 6
FACT-FINDING EXERCISE WITH MARKET PARTICIPANTS 1
At the end of 2006 a fact-finding exercise was carried out with a number of selected major 
financial players involved in the process of underwriting or granting credit to non-financial 
corporations or with a strong expertise on the securitisation process in the euro area.2 In general, 
most market participants agreed that credit markets have significantly changed in the euro area 
over the last few years. This change is partly due to conjunctural factors (ample liquidity and 
the search for yield), but also to structural ones (financial innovation). This process has 
consequences in terms of the products to be used from a corporate financing perspective, but 
it is also perceived to have significant macroeconomic implications. For instance, due to 
securitisation and general structured credit innovation, the amount of credit available to non-
financial corporations via the banking sector is deemed to have increased in recent years. This 
Box summarises the main views of market participants.
1  Prepared by Stefano Borgioli and David Marqués Ibañez.
2  The experts were from the following institutions: Barclays, Deutsche Bank London, Deutsche Bank Frankfurt, European Securitisation 
Forum, Goldman Sachs International, J.P. Morgan, Latham & Watkins, Morgan Stanley and Standard & Poor’s.67
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Most market participants agreed that the current environment of low rates and ample liquidity 
is having a significant impact on the price of credit, compressing corporate spreads and making 
“cheap finance” currently available even for the riskier segments of borrowers.
The low cost of corporate debt has made it a very attractive alternative for borrowers compared 
to equity financing. The relatively low cost of debt also strongly supports M&A activity. In this 
respect, private equity firms are also enjoying favourable conditions for raising additional 
funds for acquisition purposes, often via the banking sector in the form of syndicated loans. 
However, market participants expressed differing views on the current levels of the credit 
cycle. Some institutions expressed their concern about the current levels of credit spreads, and 
a number of debt arrangers went as far as saying that credit spreads were “absurdly benign”. 
Certain agents mentioned that this could mark the peak of the credit cycle. Interesting enough, 
a few credit market analysts noted that from a historical point of view, “turnarounds” of the 
credit cycle are often non-linear and could be quite steep, and that under such a scenario, they 
would expect a significant effect on loan granting. According to most observers, the expected 
worsening of credit conditions has been anticipated (and progressively postponed) for some 
months but to date has yet failed to materialise, even though its likelihood has increased.
Corporate financing 
One major development quoted by most institutions was the considerable change of corporate 
financing patterns, as a consequence of the new role played by banks in moving from balance 
sheet intermediation to risk intermediation. Banks are now increasingly acting as merely the 
initial originators of loans, shifting credit risk to the capital markets and other intermediaries 
through credit derivatives and securitisation. The fact that a rising level of bank exposure has 
exited the banking system also explains not only the resilience of the banking sector but also 
the stable supply of credit in recent years, despite a few significant episodes of corporate 
distress. 
The changing role of banks has been driven by a number of factors. First, short-term pressure 
for banks to perform from banks’ shareholders (and to a lesser extent by other stakeholders in 
the case of savings banks) has increased. Second, financial innovation and risk management 
techniques have allowed banks to shift credit risk to the markets, as well as to quantify better 
their own internal risks position. These developments are also used for internal capital decision 
allocation. On the demand side, the search for yield by investors, which has been directed 
towards credit derivatives and new asset classes such as CDOs, often client-customised, credit 
loan obligations (CLOs) or ABS, has also encouraged this new role of banks.
For securitisation, 2006 was a record year in terms of volumes on the euro area markets, and 
this trend is expected to continue in 2007. Focusing on the investor side, the banking sector, 
traditionally the largest buyer of these instruments, has significantly decreased its share, while 
insurance corporations, pension funds and hedge funds have substantially increased theirs. 
CDO and CLO markets are among the fastest growing segments. Overall, cash and synthetic 
credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments are developing very rapidly and going down the rating 
curve. According to some universal banks interviewed, these institutions could now potentially 68
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be hedging around 80% of their overall credit exposure, up from around 50% just three years 
ago.
Securitisation of SME loans remains relatively limited. Without sufficient standardisation in 
loans, the setting up a securitisation of a pool of SME loans and structuring the whole deal 
remains costly (Germany and Spain have seen some significant SME securitisation in recent 
years, but this has often been linked to regulatory developments and public sector intervention).3 
On the other hand, in the case of securitisation, financial innovation has dropped on the rating 
scale, also given the increased skills and experience acquired by intermediaries and arrangers 
and investor demand, and is progressively trickling down to SMEs.
Syndicated loan market activity has reached record levels, in both investment-grade and 
leveraged finance, mainly propelled by M&As and leveraged buyout activity, again taking 
advantage of available cheap finance and strong liquidity.
Overall, developments in structured credit (including securitisation and credit derivatives) and 
recent developments in loan syndication are expected to have structurally impacted both the 
potential volume of loans available to corporations and the smoothness of the credit cycle. 
According to many institutions, even if the track record is not long enough to allow for a 
meaningful quantitative analysis, financial innovation and the changed role of banks have 
indeed increased the potential loan supply. On the other hand, there is no consensus on whether 
financial innovation has smoothed the credit cycle. This kind of analysis is also complicated 
by the fact that in the past few years, financial innovation has taken place in an environment 
of ample liquidity, very low rates and spreads and low default rates. In such an environment, 
assessing which developments are structural and which ones could be reversed by a turn in the 
credit cycle is not straightforward.
Financial structure
Non-financial corporations are at present managing their financial structure more actively than 
just a few years ago, due to different factors. There is currently more pressure for maximising 
shareholder value; there is greater awareness of the difference in tax treatment and of the 
different prices of financial instruments; and cultural factors connected to a generational change 
of European managers are at work. Financial innovation has broadly enlarged the set of 
instruments potentially available for raising equity and debt finance. This more active attitude 
towards the management of corporations’ capital structure was in the past mainly a feature of 
large firms, but has now started to trickle down to smaller companies, family-owned firms and 
SMEs. 
The Basel II accord is expected to be a significant driving force behind improvements in the 
management of financial structure. Indeed, the accord contains various provisions that 
encourage the extension of credit rating to all companies, not just those that have had recourse 
to the bond markets. More companies are therefore expected to pay more attention to their 
credit rating.
3  In France the Loi Dailly scheme, established in the early 1980s, enables companies to finance their working capital assets (inventories, 
claims on customers) on a dematerialised basis, and actually can be regarded as a substitute for securitisation.69
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Firms may have more opportunities to target a certain level of rating. In this respect, there is a 
tendency towards a higher level of gearing and migrating down the rating scale. Due also to 
existing ample liquidity, downgrades are now less likely to have a strong impact on corporate 
financing conditions. Overall, most analysts agreed that there has been a strong increase in 
corporate debt in the last two years. The funding of this increase has often been used to engage 
in M&A activity. 
Regarding the use of corporate bonds, recent years have been characterised by sustained growth 
in corporate bond issuance. The revenues from such issuance have recently been used for 
refinancing old debt, for distributing higher dividends in the short-term, for real activity 
investment, for financing M&A activities and also for buying back own shares. In the latter 
case, the direct effect is an increase in ROE and an increase in corporate leverage. Among the 
different segments of the corporate bond market, the high-yield market segment has grown 
most significantly, although it continues to be relatively reduced when compared to the US, 
and investor demand for this kind of paper remains strong. Within the high-yield bond segment, 
the credit quality of the average bond has declined significantly, with the share of B and CCC-
rated bonds rapidly growing. While a larger high-yield bond market is perceived by market 
participants to be a structural development, this trend has been supported by a more conjunctural 
component, linked to the ample levels of market liquidity and the still high risk appetite of 
investors.
4.3  NEW FINANCIAL MARKET PLAYERS: 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND PRIVATE 
EQUITY FUNDS
The very significant growth in the role of non-
bank financial market players is one of the most 
considerable developments to have taken place 
in the financial structure of the euro area in 
recent years. The existence of non-bank 
financial market players has at least three main 
effects from a corporate finance perspective. 
First, they strengthen the supply of funds to 
non-financial corporations directly by buying 
corporate bonds or equities. Second, by having 
significant corporate ownership participations 
in the euro area, they can impose market 
discipline and influence the behaviour of non-
financial corporations. Third, they allow banks 
to diversify credit risk more effectively through 
their role as buyers of risk. 
This section aims to explain briefly the latest 
developments with regard to these new financial 
factors and argue that further analysis of their 
incentives and their potential impact on the 
transmission of monetary policy is warranted.63   
An important feature that most institutional 
investors share is that they play a role as a 
delegated monitor of investors, both households 
and corporations – a role that in the past was 
overwhelmingly undertaken by banks. The most 
relevant institutional investors from a corporate 
finance perspective are examined below. The 
selection is not designed to be exhaustive, but 
instead aims to cover the intermediaries that are 
most relevant either due to their size (pension 
funds and insurance companies), their impact 
on corporate governance (such as hedge funds 
and private equity funds), or their importance as 
financial providers at the earlier stages of firm 
creation (venture capital). Box 7 presents in 
detail some of the most recent developments 
related to corporate governance, and the role 
played by the composition and concentration of 
ownership.
4.3.1 INSTITUTIONAL  INVESTORS
Institutional investors include insurance 
companies, pension funds and investment 
companies, such as mutual funds and hedge 
63 See  Rajan  (2005).70
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funds, that are investment vehicles in their own 
right. Overall, they are defined as specialised 
financial institutions that manage savings 
collectively on behalf of other investors towards 
a specific objective in terms of acceptable 
risk, returns and maturity of claims (Davis, 
2001). Institutional investors’ liabilities are the 
dominant asset class in household portfolios in 
several countries, as they facilitate an efficient 
allocation of household resources by providing 
them with a means of pooling savings and 
diversifying risks. 
Against a background of ageing populations 
and rising longevity, a larger proportion of 
household savings is now being placed in 
private-funded pension schemes and life 
insurance policies, therefore providing 
institutional investors with more funds (see 
Chart 25). Experience in some countries has 
shown that the development of private pension 
funds is often inversely related to the degree of 
generosity of the social security systems. 
Moreover, tax benefits associated with life 
insurance contracts are an important reason for 
their popularity as savings vehicles.64
The increasing importance of the investment of 
households in pension funds and in insurance 
Chart 25 Households allocation of main 
financial assets
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64 See  BIS  (2006).
contracts mirrors the decline of investment in 
currency and deposits, and is broadly in line 
with the increase in corporate market financing. 
That is, the increase in their relevance tends to 
lead to newer forms of financing of enterprises, 
which prefer to purchase instruments issued on 
the market to traditional bank intermediation. 
Reflecting the increased role of institutional 
investors, the volume of financial assets held 
by euro area insurance corporations and pension 
funds has risen from end-1997 to mid-2006 
by 96%, to reach around 4,900 billion (see 
Chart 26). Securities other than shares are the 
dominant asset class, worth around 1,900 
billion and increasing by 98% during the 
reference period. Amounts outstanding of 
quoted shares and mutual fund shares remained 
more limited (at around 900 and 1,000 billion 
respectively), but have still grown faster than 
other investments (110% and 205% from early-
1997 to mid-2006 respectively). Other asset 
classes have less quantitative relevance. 
Insurance corporations have in the past 
predominantly invested in high-quality long-
term bonds to match the duration of their 
liabilities. Therefore government bonds, in 
particular those issued by EU and OECD 
countries, continue to represent – albeit to a 
lesser extent than in the past – the bulk of their 
portfolios. For pension funds, the impressive rise 
in investment in mutual fund shares may reflect 
the ongoing transition from defined benefit to 
defined contribution plans, extended portfolio 
diversification or the increasing importance of 
alternative investment in real estate funds, hedge 
funds or private equity funds. In general, there is 
evidence that pension funds tend to contribute to 
the efficiency and liquidity of financial markets, 
fostering innovation and competition among 
intermediaries and increasing the available funds 
for firms. They also contribute to the efficient 
monitoring of listed firms, with favourable 
effects on transparency and on corporate 
governance.71
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Overall, institutional investors have become an 
increasingly important saving medium for 
households, who are in turn indirectly investing 
in equity and corporate bonds issued by non-
financial corporations. These investments in 
financial market instruments are managed by 
professional fund managers, who act as 
delegated monitors of savers. Hence, fund 
managers’ incentives could have an effect on 
their investment behaviour, thereby affecting 
the relative prices and issuance of some 
corporate financing instruments. In this respect, 
two major trends can be identified: the emphasis 
on short-term benchmarking, and absolute 
returns evaluation.
Referring to the first, fund managers are 
increasingly evaluated according to their 
relative performance in relation to a comparable 
index or benchmark. The performance 
evaluation of fund managers often takes place 
at relatively short time periods, even if the 
contractual liabilities of managed funds are 
often of long duration, as in the case of pension 
funds and insurance corporations. This could 
lead to excessively short-term views being 
taken on fund managers’ investment behaviour. 
Regarding the second trend, absolute returns 
assessment is focused on evaluating performance 
against an optimal portfolio composition 
including several investment products, rather 
than making an evaluation linked to a specific 
investment product such as equities or bonds, 
or to a certain geographical area. In this respect, 
in the currently low global interest rate 
environment, many institutional investors have 
been looking for ways to gain additional yield. 
For instance, by investing in credit risk via 
credit derivatives or CDOs, some fund managers 
could improve their performance while at the 
same time obtaining additional credit exposure, 
the risk and value of which might be difficult 
to ascertain. While quantitative information 
regarding the actual investments made by 
institutional investors in these products is 
scarce, there is however some tentative evidence 
that there has been recently a significant shift 
of credit risk outside the banking system. 
According to a recent survey by Fitch Ratings65 
covering 75 major financial institutions, a 
substantial amount of credit risk was shifted 
out of the traditional banking system in the 
period 2002-2006. This is in line with the 
results of the fact-finding exercise described in 
Box 6. 
Turning to hedge funds, these intermediaries 
are unregulated or loosely regulated funds 
which can freely use various active investment 
strategies to target positive absolute returns. 
Hedge funds typically operate as limited 
partnerships or limited liability companies 
which often chose to register offshore, in 
order to minimise reporting and regulatory 
requirements. Their shares are normally offered 
only via private placements. Compared to 
traditional asset management, hedge funds 
have greater latitude in their active management, 
and often apply investment techniques such as 
short-selling (the selling of borrowed securities) 
or strong leverage (expanding trading positions 
with borrowed money). They are subject to 
few or no restrictions regarding the type of 
instruments they can invest in, and generally 
change their portfolio composition much more 
Chart 26 Financial assets of insurance 
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65 Fitch Ratings, “Global Credit Derivatives Survey: Indices 
Dominate Growth as Banks’ Risk Position Shifts”, September 
2006. See also ECB, “Financial Stability Review”, December 
2006.72
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frequently than traditional funds.66 Often hedge 
funds directly engage in corporate financing 
for a very short time period.
For many institutional investors, placements in 
hedge funds represent an alternative investment 
due to uncorrelated returns, which therefore 
offers an interesting opportunity to diversify 
their portfolio. Initially restricted to institutional 
and very sophisticated investors, hedge funds 
have become increasingly accessible to a 
broader circle of investors. On average, the 
investment yield of hedge funds shows little 
correlation with that of equity or bond indices, 
and they therefore offer opportunities for risk 
diversification.67
The overall size of hedge funds is still relatively 
limited, but their leverage and active role in 
markets makes them much more important than 
their size alone. As at the first quarter of 2006, 
the global hedge fund industry had an estimated 
USD 1.2 trillion of assets under management, a 
year-on-year increase of 13%. The global 
number of hedge funds increased to around 
9,000 in 2005. In relative terms, at the end of 
2004 assets managed by hedge funds represented 
2.2% of the global assets managed by insurance, 
pension or other investment funds (up from 
0.7% in 1998). Hedge funds located in or 
managed from the EU numbered around 1,250 
in January 2006. They had assets of more 
than €300 billion (see Chart 27), and their share 
as a percentage of total investment is growing. 
For instance, in Europe 51% of institutional 
investors now invest in hedge funds. Pension 
funds in particular have expressed growing 
interest, as have insurance companies.68
Hedge funds are often active investors in 
corporate equity and active shareholders of the 
companies in which they invest. Hedge fund 
activism differs, quantitatively and qualitatively, 
from the more moderate forms of activism that 
traditional institutional investors engage in, 
and they often take a much more active 
corporate governance stance69 with regard to 
corporations. The distinction between hedge 
funds and private equity funds can therefore 
Chart 27 Global hedge funds by source of 
investment – regional breakdown 






























Chart 28 Asset under investment of hedge 



































66 For more information on hedge fund characteristics and 
strategies, see also Garbaravicius and Dierick (2005) or 
European Commission (July 2006).
67  See Garbaravicius and Dierick (2005).
68 European  Commission  (2006).
69  See also Kahan and Rock (2006). 73
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sometimes be rather blurred. This activism 
takes a variety of forms, from putting public 
pressure on portfolio companies to change their 
business strategy, to running proxy contests to 
gain seats on the board of directors of portfolio 
companies, to litigating against present or 
former managers. An indirect effect of this 
activism is that it imposes market discipline; 
however, as in the case of private equity firms, 
hedge fund strategies might often be excessively 
oriented towards the short term.
4.3.2  PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE EURO AREA 
(VENTURE CAPITAL AND BUYOUT FUNDS)
The private equity markets provide medium or 
long-term equity or equity-linked finance for 
privately held firms at various stages of their 
life cycle. Private equity firms are professionally 
run investment firms which collect funds from 
investors and redirect them to firms in the form 
of risk capital.
The private equity industry is usually divided 
up into two separate activities.70 Venture capital 
funds typically concentrate on the early-stage 
and expansion investments of growth-oriented 
firms, often expanding industries, whereas the 
buyout segment of private equity industry is 
involved in the acquisition and restructuring of 
existing, and usually large, companies in more 
mature industries. 
Venture capital financing is mainly used by 
early-stage companies to start up business 
activities and to make the necessary investments 
in order to bring innovations onto the market. 
Traditional external financing instruments, 
such as bank loans, may not be available for 
such firms because of their low and uncertain 
cash flows, their lack of collateral and high 
informational asymmetries between the 
entrepreneur and the potential investors. 
Venture capital deals are frequently executed 
with a high proportion of equity71 and are often 
complemented by more traditional financing 
methods. Venture capital is not, however, just 
another financing method, but also a source of 
management expertise for growth-oriented 
firms. A commonly expressed view is that the 
venture capital markets are not yet well 
developed in the euro area, and more activity 
would be desirable in order to boost innovation 
and productivity growth in the economy.72
The buyout segment typically concentrates on 
management acquisitions, i.e. on management 
buyouts (MBOs) or management buy-ins 
(MBIs) of more mature companies with 
established business plans, and is usually less 
risky than the venture capital segment.73 The 
target companies of buyout funds can either 
be listed companies which have been taken 
private by the funds or large privately held 
companies.
The buyout segment of the private equity 
industry aims at improving the efficiency of 
mature firms with predictable cash flows by 
enforcing cost reductions, restructuring their 
management and organisation and/or selling 
off unprofitable parts of the target firms. 
Furthermore, buyout deals are often associated 
with high debt levels (which is why the press 
often refers to buyouts as LBOs), which may 
financially discipline the management and 
help to align the incentives of managers and 
owners.74 Since buyouts are typically highly 
leveraged, the target firms need to generate 
large and steady cash flows in order to service 
their high debt payments, which is why buyouts 
70  This classification follows the definition of private equity used 
by the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA). EVCA statistics comprise the main data source used 
in this section. Some sources apply other classifications, so that 
private equity can for example in some cases purely refer to the 
buyout segment of the industry. For a discussion of the various 
conventions, see European Commission (2006b).
71  For a description of the venture capital financing process, see 
Tirole (2006) and Gompers and Lerner (1999).
72  See e.g. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002), and European Commission 
(2006a and 2006b). Anecdotal evidence from several 
commentators (see fact-finding exercise, Box 6) also suggests 
that while overall corporate funding remains buoyant, the 
supply of venture capital funds continues to be scarce in 
Europe.
73 In an MBO, the current management of the target firm is 
involved, whereas in an MBI a new external management team 
buys the company and assumes responsibility for its 
management.
74  In addition to secured debt and equity, several other financing 
instruments that have both debt and equity features, such as 
mezzanine debt and preference shares, can be used to finance 
private equity deals.74
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are concentrated in mature industries, where 
cash flows are relatively stable. In Europe, the 
buyout segment of the industry has lately come 
in for some criticism, raising worries over the 
long-term credit quality of the companies that 
have been taken over. A more fundamental 
critique of the actions of private equity firms is 
based on the misalignment between the short 
to medium-term interest of private equity 
capitalists and the target companies’ longer-
term prospects.75
In the euro area, the private equity industry has 
undergone considerable changes in recent 
years (see Chart 29). While the rapid growth 
and the subsequent decline of venture capital 
investments at the turn of the century were 
mainly caused by the boom-bust cycle of the 
New Economy, the buyout segment has grown 
relatively steadily over the years. Consequently, 
the focus of private equity investments has 
shifted from early and expansion-stage 
investments to corporate acquisitions and 
industry restructurings in the buyout segment, 
which currently makes up around two-thirds of 
all investments in the industry.76 By comparison, 
in 2005 buyouts comprised 73% of all 
investments in the UK. In the US, the relative 
sizes of the venture capital and buyout segments 
are quite similar to Europe, and the buyout 
segment comprised 61% of total private equity 
investment in 2004 (Jenkinson, 2006). 
Despite the ongoing process of financial 
integration in Europe, over 80% of private 
equity investment in the euro area is directed 
towards domestic companies. Several reasons 
have been suggested to explain the reluctance 
of private equity companies to make cross-
border investments. National differences in 
regulation and legal conventions, taxation and 
fiscal policy and cultural differences may 
impact on operating and administrative costs 
and hence the willingness to engage in cross-
border investments. Therefore, investment and 
fundraising decisions may be more determined 
by these factors than by the business 
opportunities of companies themselves, and the 
efficient allocation of capital in Europe may 
thus be to some extent hindered.77 On the other 
hand, the development of financial markets is 
deemed to contribute positively to capital 
reallocation from declining industries to 
industries with better growth prospects, an 
important determinant of productivity growth 
in the economy (Wurgler, 2000). 
In recent years the total venture capital 
investment relative to the size of the economy 
has stayed stable at around 0.075% of GDP in 
the euro area, but with relatively large 
differences across individual countries (see 
Chart 30). The relatively poor development of 
venture capital fundraising and investment 
compared to the buyout segment might be 
Chart 29 Funds raised and invested by 
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75  See Jenkinson (2006) and Bloomberg (2006). 
76  The data on private equity collected by the EVCA consist of the 
funds raised and invested as risk capital by private equity firms. 
Hence, the data do not cover private equity activities by private 
persons (i.e. so-called business angels) or the debt financing 
associated with deals. Due to the latter fact in particular, the 
total amount of transactions and the economic significance of 
private equity are much greater than the figures show. The data 
include all euro area countries except Luxembourg. The data 
presented in this section describe private equity activities 
mostly by country of management, i.e. the country data reflect 
the amount of investments made by the private equity firms 
located in that particular country. Hence, the data utilised do not 
cover private equity investments made from abroad, e.g. by 
private equity firms from the UK and the US to the euro area, 
and may therefore be on the conservative side. Private equity 
investments by country of destination, i.e. by country of the 
target company, are only available for total private equity, and 
not separately for the venture capital and buyout segments.   
77  See e.g. European Commission (2006b). 75
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explained by their relatively low profitability. 
Given the much higher risk associated with 
venture capital investments relative to the more 
predictable buyout segment, the realised returns 
seem, particularly in early-stage activity, to be 
extremely modest in Europe.78
The growth of buyout fundraising has been 
particularly strong recently, and the development 
of buyout investments in the euro area points 
towards increased activity relative to GDP. 
Cross-country differences are more substantial 
than in venture capital investments (see 
Chart 31). 
In recent years, strong cash positions and 
favourable financing conditions such as low 
interest rates have contributed to the rapid 
increase in highly leveraged buyout deals. 
Overall, most buyouts are indeed quite heavily 
leveraged and often financed via syndicated 
loans.79 In the year up to the third quarter of 
2006, LBO activity in the euro area reached 
almost EUR 80 billion (see Chart 32),80 fuelled 
by the availability of funds via syndicated 
lending. 
The boom in buyout activity has raised some 
concerns about its potential implications for 
the credit quality of companies.81 As buyouts 
have become larger and more leveraged, the 
Chart 30 Venture capital investments by 
country of management
(% of GDP)
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riskiness of loans has increased considerably. 
According to BIS (2006), in 2004-2005 around 
80% of all LBO loans were characterised as 
high-yield facilities (measured by newly issued 
loans with ratings below BB-). The significance 
of buyout funds in terms of investment has 
grown fairly steadily over the last decade and is 
likely to continue in the near future owing to 
the potential for corporate restructuring in 
Europe.
In terms of the economic impact of private 
equity, the role of venture capital in financing 
young and innovative firms is well understood. 
At the same time, the long-term effects of 
78  The investment returns of European venture capital funds during 
the period 1994-2003 were on average 8.3% annually, whereas 
buyout funds generated a higher return of 12.7%. During the 
same period, early-stage venture capital funds performed 
particularly badly, with returns of only 1.3%. The corresponding 
figures covering the same time period for the US are much 
higher for venture capital returns than in the buyout segment at 
25.4% and 7.8% respectively. In particular, early-stage 
investments yielded a robust return of 37.0% (Machado and 
Raade, 2006).
79  Combining the buyout deal data provided by Mergermarket and 
Bowne (2006), which include both equity and debt associated 
with the deals and cover 25 European countries, and data from 
the EVCA survey of 21 European countries, it is possible to 
calculate that up to 80% of the deals are financed with debt. 
Jenkinson (2006) reports somewhat lower leverage ratios of 
around 60-65% for European buyouts in recent years.
80  ECB, December 2006.
81  See BIS (2006), Wall Street Journal (2006), Standard & Poor’s 
(2005) and Economist (2006a).76
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Chart 32 The value of LBO transactions 
targeting euro area firms and LBO-related 
syndicated lending
(EUR billions)
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buyout activities of private equity firms on 
target companies are more controversial. On 
the one hand, the incentives between 
management and shareholders can be aligned 
more effectively than in publicly held 
82 While the number of European buyouts has recently risen 
dramatically, considerable opportunities still remain with regard 
to European integration, de-conglomeration, family ownership 
and succession issues, etc. Hence the number of funds focused 
on European buyouts has also been increasing (Jenkinson, 
2006).
companies, where the connection between 
ownership and control is less tight. On the other 
hand, it is not clear the extent to which private 
equity activities are aligned with those of the 
target companies. All in all, private equity 
incentives are having an impact on corporate 
governance and can thus speed up the 
restructuring of industrial structures across 
Europe. In addition, buyouts are normally 
highly leveraged operations – often with only 
30% equity in their capital structure. In this 
respect, there are indications that some private 
equity firms have pushed up the debt levels in 
target companies by paying out large dividends 
which have been financed by new debt.82
Box 7
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EURO AREA AND RECENT POLICY REFORMS  1
An important aspect to look at when assessing the state of the corporate sector in the euro area 
is corporate governance. Corporate governance addresses how to avoid and eventually manage 
the potential conflicts arising between investors and firm managers and among different classes 
of investors. Corporate governance is very much related to the main characteristics of the 
financial system in place. Some of these characteristics and how they relate to the possible 
emergence of conflicts among stakeholders are outlined below. After that, recent policy reforms, 
first in the US and in the EU, and then in some of the euro area countries, are briefly 
described.
One important factor affecting differences in financial structures around the world is the degree 
of ownership concentration.2 This is reflected directly, for example, in the ratio between listed 
and non-listed shares in the corporate sector. A noteworthy characteristic of the euro area 
financial system is the extensive use and the importance of non-listed shares, which in turn 
reflects the importance of large shareholders and family ownership structures.3 Differences in 
ownership structure also have an impact on corporate governance. Because large investors have 
more power, they are typically also the ones to exercise corporate governance, especially in 
systems where legal arrangements give relatively less power to minority shareholders. The 
fundamental problem with large shareholders, however, is that their interests may not always 
1 Prepared  by  Angela  Maddaloni.
2  See La Porta et al. (1999).
3  See for example ECB (2002).77
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coincide with the interests of all the investors. They have the power to appoint directors and 
managers and to make major corporate decisions that normally require the approval of a range 
of shareholders. These conflicts of interests may also affect the performance of a firm, and 
there is some evidence that ownership concentration and profitability are not monotonically 
linked.4 Ownership concentration seems to be a characteristic linked to the geographical 
location. As far as listed companies are concerned, in the Anglo-Saxon countries (primarily the 
US and the UK), corporate ownership tends to be much more dispersed than in other continental 
Europe countries or in Asia. Only in the Netherlands and in Switzerland is the concentration 
measure low and similar to the value for the US and the UK (see Chart A). 
In the US, one of the factors affecting the dispersion of shareholdings is the significant use of 
equity-based reward systems (i.e. stock options) for managers. In continental Europe and Asia, 
it is much more common to have large shareholders – often in the form of controlling family 
owners. As a result, problems when they have arisen have tended to derive from large owners 
exploiting their dominant role. In the US by contrast, recent corporate scandals were 
characterised by a strong conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, between 
managers and external intermediaries – primarily financial intermediaries – as well as 
reputational intermediaries, such as auditors. 
In systems where ownership is more concentrated, large shareholders often enjoy a close 
relationship with the management and have an incentive to monitor a firm’s activities. The 
identity of these large shareholders may be important as well. The role of institutional investors 
differs across countries and only in few countries – Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK 
and the US – do they tend to have a larger shareholding stake than other kinds of investor (see 
Chart B). This may have possible implications for corporate structures, investment choices, 
dividend policies and more broadly for corporate governance and the way firms are run. For 
example, there is some evidence that institutional investors – pension funds in particular – tend 
Chart A Ownership concentration in top-10 
quoted companies
(in percentage)
Chart B Stakeholding rights of insider versus 
institutional investors
(in percentage)
Sources: ECB calculations using Reuters Kobra database 
(2005). See also Hartmann et al. (2007a).
Notes: Calculated on the basis of data available for the largest 
shareholders in 10 top quoted companies in terms of market 
capitalisation in each country. 
Sources: ECB calculations using Reuters Kobra database 
(2005). See also Hartmann et al. (2007a).
Notes: Calculated on the basis of data available for five largest 
insider and institutional shareholders in 10 top quoted 
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4  See Shleifer, A. and W. Vishny (1997). 78
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to be more careful in exercising their 
monitoring role than other shareholders, and 
may at times increase firms’ valuation.5
Problems arise when the advantages from the 
privileged position enjoyed by large 
shareholders outweigh the benefits to all the 
shareholders. The presence of cross-
shareholdings, voting agreements and pyramid 
structures – common features of European and 
Asian systems – can make market discipline 
ineffective, as the only option left for minority 
shareholders is to sell their shares.6 Chart C 
shows a measure that quantifies shareholders’ 
rights against expropriation by corporate 
insiders against self-dealing.7 Under this 
measure, the enforcement of shareholder 
rights is stronger in Ireland, in the US and in the UK, whereas a large number of European 
countries could significantly improve their enforcement of shareholder protection.   
Another factor that may hamper market discipline is the lack of relevant information that is 
publicly disclosed. Some studies8 have tried to measure earnings opacity in companies’ financial 
accounts: in terms of this measure, the US generally performs better than other countries, 
although looking at the scandals which came to light in 2001-2003 in the US, it could be argued 
that more information does not always coincide with more disclosure. In this context, the 
increasing use of financial innovations and the related disclosure requirements is a key issue. 
Offshore entities or SPVs can serve the purpose of processing fraudulent transactions, as 
happened for example regarding the Enron and the Parmalat scandals. In the presence of these 
instruments, it can be very difficult for an investor to comprehend the true financial position 
of the company. 
Financial and reputational intermediaries play a key role in this respect. Financial intermediaries 
can often carry out a variety of activities – underwriting, research and brokerage activities for 
example – with the same company. In Europe, banks play a very important role and are often 
also large shareholders and/or sit on companies’ boards. Even if they do not hold equity directly, 
they can be custodians for customers that are shareholders and vote on their behalf. In addition, 
banks are often directly involved in the management of the company. Especially in systems 
where ownership is more dispersed, reputational intermediaries such as auditing companies and 
rating agencies review and analyse information on companies’ activities. However, although 
their role is designed to guarantee shareholder value, they have on occasion proven to be 
ineffective. 
Chart C Enforcement of shareholder rights 
against self-dealing
(anti self-dealing index)
Sources: Djankov et al., 2006 and ECB calculations.
Notes: The index ranges from 0 to 1. Higher bars indicate better 
shareholder protection. The index incorporates ex-ante and 
ex-post private control of self-dealing transactions. Euro area 
(EA) figures are averages of EA country data weighted by stock 
market capitalisation. Data are from May 2003.























5  See Qiu and Wan (2006) and Giannetti and Laeven (2006).
6  Parmalat, for example, was characterised by a strong pyramid structure, with two companies at the top that were exclusively 
controlled by majority shareholders, and which precluded minority shareholders from having an effective monitoring role.
7  See Djankov et al. (2006). Self-dealing may include executive excessive compensation, transfer pricing, directed equity issuance, 
personal loans to insiders up to outright theft of corporate assets.  
8  See Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003).79
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Corporate governance reforms 
In the aftermath of the recent wave of corporate scandals, several reforms were implemented 
with the objective of addressing some of the problems brought to light by these events. In the 
US, the reforms were mainly included in the Sarbanes-Oxley act and several changes in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requirements for disclosure of information of 
public companies. Investment banks are now required to put in place effective Chinese walls 
between their research functions and their underwriting business. In case accounting statements 
accompanying company reports are proven to be inaccurate, CEOs and chief financial officers 
can face criminal prosecution.
Policy responses in the EU – which took the form of several Directives to be implemented at 
the national level – seemed to be more inspired by a principle-based regime, emphasising 
transparency and self-governance, rather than a rule-based regime.9 In May 2003, the European 
Commission adopted the “Company Law and Corporate Governance Action Plan,” which is 
based on two guiding principles: improving transparency and empowering shareholders. No 
proposal was made for a European Governance Code, and it was recognised that “in this area 
soft law instruments such as recommendations, rather than prescriptive detailed legislation” 
are more appropriate.10
In this context it should be emphasised that the ultimate objective of these policy reforms 
should be to improve the allocation of productive capital in Europe by increasing the efficiency 
of the financial system. Recent studies suggest that improving corporate governance is likely 
to increase the size of the financial markets and thus can help to allocate capital towards sectors 
of the economy with higher growth potential.11
The main regulatory change which took place in the EU was the adoption of the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for financial years starting on or after 1 January 2005. 
After this date, all EU listed companies need to follow these common standards in their 
consolidated financial statements. The aim of the IFRS is to increase the transparency and 
comparability of financial statements, for example by recognising the fair value of stock 
options (a measure which has also been implemented in the US since June 2005) and similar 
forms of employee compensation, as well as information on SPVs and similar entities. 
Recent policy reforms in euro area countries
The key points of the policy reforms carried out in euro area countries in the wake of the EC 
Directive are summarised in Table 29 and Table 30 of Annex 8. Most of the reforms are directed 
only at listed companies, although they often contain the recommendation that non-listed 
companies should whenever possible follow the proposed guidelines. The majority of reforms 
addressed issues related to the composition of the Board and the disclosure of conflicts of 
interest of members of the Board or directors. The new codes and laws called for improved 
information disclosure, especially concerning remuneration plans and equity-based schemes. 
All in all, the implemented reforms did not seem to improve significantly the rights of minority 
shareholders. Only in Spain and in Italy have recent laws protecting investors’ rights explicitly 
9  See ECB (2005).
10 See speech by Charlie McCreevy (2005).
11 See Hartmann et al. (2007b).
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4.4 CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Over the last decade the financial landscape of 
the euro area has changed substantially, and 
this process has had a significant impact on 
non-financial corporations in terms of the cost 
and availability of funds and the incentives 
they receive from the capital markets. The 
introduction of the euro was an important 
structural feature that has directly affected the 
financial markets of the euro area by increasing 
their size and encouraging cross-border 
competition. EMU has broadened and deepened 
the corporate bond market and significantly 
widened the size of the equity market.
As a result of financial innovation, new products 
have entered the market and modified the role 
and functions of intermediaries, thereby 
affecting the financing dynamics from banks to 
corporations. For instance, securitisation 
processes and the increasing use of credit 
derivatives have eased commercial banks’ 
passage from being balance sheet intermediaries 
to becoming originators and sellers of credit 
risk. At the same time, the role and relevance of 
non-bank intermediaries has increased across 
the board, from insurance corporations and 
pension funds to hedge funds. In addition, the 
role of private equity in providing finance and 
management to non-financial corporations has 
substantially expanded in the last few years. 
The increased importance of hedge funds and 
private equity funds has also affected the 
governance of euro area corporations, although 
it is not yet clear whether this influence has 
been positive or negative from a corporate 
governance perspective. The importance of 
venture capital funds remains overall still 
limited.
Furthermore, the Basel II accord has triggered 
an increase in credit ratings, especially the 
credit ratings of SMEs (which are mainly 
provided through internal ratings-based (IRB) 
systems and external credit assessment 
institutions (ECAIs)). The development of 
credit ratings and the possibly stronger 
relationship between credit ratings and the 
pricing of external finance is likely to influence 
the management of firms and to persuade them 
to place more emphasis on transparency and 
sound financial management in order to reduce 
information asymmetries and thus benefit from 
enlarged opportunities in the access to 
finance.
It is not easy at this juncture to disentangle 
which dynamics are of a structural nature, and 
to what extent, and which ones can mainly be 
explained by conjunctural factors such as the 
ample liquidity prevailing in the market, 
historically low interest rates and the high 
appetite for returns displayed by investors. At 
the same time, from a corporate finance 
perspective four tentative conclusions can be 
drawn. 
First, the new role of banks in originating, 
pooling and distributing credit risk outside the 
banking system should affect non-financial 
corporations by providing them, under most 
economic scenarios, with easier and cheaper 
access to corporate funds. The competition 
put in place some limitations on the assignment of and incompatibility requirements for external 
advisors (auditing and revision companies for example). It should be emphasised that the 
number of reforms reflected in Annex 8 is not per se an indicator of the level of good governance 
in the various countries. Indeed, some countries have not needed to pass new laws because their 
legal framework broadly matched the EC Directive.
Concerning enforcement, codes of corporate laws are often based on the “comply or explain” 
principle; at the same time, recent laws protecting investors’ rights have to some extent 
increased the criminal and administrative consequences of not abiding by the rules. 81
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among banks, and between banks and other 
financial intermediaries, should also lower the 
overall cost of corporate financing. Therefore, 
it is likely that firms may benefit from more 
favourable financial conditions for a given 
level of interest rates, as a consequence of a 
shift in the supply of funds.
Second, in relation to the interest rate channel, 
as credit granted is evaluated on a more mark-
to-market basis and the banking sector becomes 
more competitive, the speed of transmission of 
monetary impulses to bank interest rates across 
the whole maturity spectrum is expected to 
increase.83
Third, turning to the so-called credit channel, 
the effect of the changing role of banks on the 
transmission mechanism is not so clear-cut. On 
one hand, the importance of banks in providing 
funds has increased. On the other hand, by 
managing credit risk better and shifting risks 
from banks’ balance sheets to the markets, the 
importance of the traditional role of banks’ 
conditions from a monetary policy perspective 
should decrease significantly under normal 
circumstances. In addition, recent developments 
have been dictated by a very strong increase in 
available public information and credit signals 
of corporate borrowers’ credit quality. This 
latter effect is narrowing the information gap 
between lenders and borrowers, thereby 
decreasing the information problems that 
originated in the broad credit channel in the 
first place. 
Fourth, it is likely that the lower concentration 
of credit risk on banks will make them less 
vulnerable in the event of shocks. However, it 
cannot be ruled out that episodes of mispricing 
of credit risk may be followed by abrupt 
adjustments, which may pose new challenges 
to the stability of the financial system. Such 
patterns may be relevant for monetary policy 
and financial stability considerations alike, 
noting that even in normal circumstances, the 
different distribution of credit risk in the 
economy may affect the way the transmission 
mechanism operates.
83  In this respect, the paucity of studies examining this issue in the 
US suggests that securitisation positively influences the speed 
of transmission of the policy rate to bank lending rates. See 
Estrella (2002) and Loutskina and Strahan (2006).82
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THE BACH DATABASE85
The Bank for the Accounts of Companies 
Harmonised (BACH) database was created by 
the European Committee of Central Balance 
Sheet Data Offices (ECCBSO)86 with the 
support of the European Commission. The 
database is managed by the European 
Commission (DG ECFIN), and is published 
on the European Commission website. The 
BACH database contains harmonised annual 
accounts statistics of non-financial corporations 
provided by national central balance sheet 
offices (CBSOs) to allow for cross-country 
comparisons.87 Mainly for confidentiality 
reasons, no individual corporation data are 
provided; instead, the database provides 
sectoral data across firm sizes. It covers annual 
aggregated data for nine euro area countries 
(Germany, Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) 
and additionally for Denmark, Sweden, the US 
and Japan. All countries contributing to the 
BACH database deliver aggregates based on 
non-consolidated financial statements88 broken 
down by NACE industrial sub-sectors (up to a 
maximum of 58 different activity sectors) and 
main industry groupings, with three different 
size classes. Up to 94 accounting items covering 
the asset and liability side of the balance sheet, 
the profit and loss account as well as additional 
information on investment flows and cumulative 
depreciation are available. For the euro area 
countries (except Finland), most data are 
generally available from the beginning of the 
1990s (late 1980s), whereas the data for Finland 
are only available from 1999 onwards.
Countries which provide data to BACH from 
exhaustive surveys (such as Belgium) or use a 
statistical sampling method in connection with 
an expansion procedure (e.g. Finland) provide 
results that are representative for the entire 
population. These datasets are defined in BACH 
as “genuine variable samples”. The datasets of 
some other countries are built from non-
exhaustive surveys. In order to overcome this 
bias – especially survivor bias and sample 
rotation bias – sliding samples have been built 
for Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain.
In terms of timeliness, the most recent data are 
available in the BACH website with a time lag 
of 11 months for France, 12 months for Belgium, 
Italy and Spain, 13 months for Germany, 
Portugal and Finland, 14 months for Austria, 
and 15 months for the Netherlands. Accordingly, 
all datasets for the participating euro area 
countries are available 15 months after the end 
of the reference year. 
THE COMPILATION OF THE BACH INDICATORS 
IN THE STRUCTURAL ISSUES REPORT
In the context of this report, it should be 
stressed that, as Tables 11 a-b and 12 show, the 
coverage of the data supplied by the different 
national CBSOs to the BACH database varies 
considerably. Only the data transmitted by 
Belgium, the Netherlands and, to some extent, 
by Finland, France, Germany and Italy provide 
a comprehensive coverage of the non-financial 
corporations sector. The coverage is lower in 
the samples provided by the remaining 
countries, and sometimes embodies only a 
limited set of NACE sectors. Higher degrees of 
coverage are observed in the “traditional” 
sectors, such as manufacturing, electricity, gas 
and water supply, and the transport, storage and 
communication sectors. Otherwise, the 
coverage is lower, especially for earlier years. 
84  Prepared by Annalisa Ferrando, Petra Köhler-Ulbrich, Elmar 
Stoess and Katia Tombois.
85  For more details, see BACH User Guide (2001).
86  The ECCBSO was set up in 1987 to improve the analysis of 
corporate accounts data. The Committee is made up of 
representatives of the NCBs or the NSIs (plus the Italian 
Centrale dei Bilanci) of 12 of the 25 EU Member States plus the 
European Commission.
87  To make the data comparable despite the existing differences in 
accounting rules and layout, the data have been reprocessed 
based on the 4th Community Company Law Directive (78/660/
EEC). Complete harmonisation is not possible, but the BACH 
database provides the necessary information to analyse the 
remaining methodological differences and to decide whether an 
item could be comparable or not, depending on the purpose of 
the study.
88  With the exception of the Netherlands, which provides nationally 
consolidated data for the main Dutch groups, in combination 
with non-consolidated data for smaller non-financial 
corporations. 98
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For most countries, the original BACH data 
were downloaded from the website of the 
European Commission. However, some 
countries amend such data, for example Spain, 
France and Portugal, which provide amended 
databases excluding non-financial holding 
companies. These companies, which typically 
have a low turnover, are mainly included in the 
SME size category following the BACH size 
classification according to turnover and hence 
can distort the results for SMEs. In some other 
countries, such as Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands, non-financial holdings are already 
excluded in the original BACH data, while in a 
couple of other countries, these companies only 
play a minor role. Overall, the results for SMEs 
should therefore not be affected to any major 
extent by non-financial holding companies.
The analysis in the report also covers a sample 
of non-financial corporations in Greece. Data 
were taken from ICAP, a commercial database, 
for the period 2000-2005. Greek indicators 
were not included in the euro area aggregate 
Table 12 Number of non-financial corporations in the BACH database
(in thousands – 2003 for the sectors covered by this report)
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI
D-Manufacturing 21.9 9.9 2.6 38.7 17.6 14.5 6.7 5.1 16.4
E-Electricity, gas and water supply 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6
F-Construction 26.1 3.2 0.9 20.6 1.9 12.7 4.6 1.5 18.6
G-Wholesale and retail trade 72.2 9.5 1.8 60.9 10.9 39.2 10.0 4.6 28.9
H-Hotels and restaurants 14.2 - 0.3 6.1 0.3 4.0 3.6 0.3 6.4
I-Transport, storage and communication 10.6 1.9 0.4 9.5 1.7 6.5 2.0 1.0 13.1
K-Real estate, renting and business activities 85.5 6.9 2.0 28.3 1.7 45.3 3.2 1.8 25.7
Source: European Commission (DG ECFIN).
Table 11 Data coverage in the Bach database
a) turnover 
(turnover in each sector covered by this report, as a percentage of total turnover in each sector, 2003)
Source: European Commission (DG ECFIN).
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI
D-Manufacturing n.a 77 n.a n.a 77 93 n.a 68 n.a
E-Electricity, gas and water supply n.a 72 n.a n.a 76 100 n.a 83 n.a
F-Construction n.a 36 n.a n.a 40 93 n.a 36 n.a
G-Wholesale and retail trade n.a 58 n.a n.a 79 89 n.a 49 n.a
H-Hotels and restaurants n.a n.a n.a n.a 46 86 n.a 23 n.a
I-Transport, storage and communication n.a 89 n.a n.a 73 91 n.a 68 n.a
K-Real estate, renting and business 
activities n.a 40 n.a n.a 50 91 n.a 34 n.a
b) employment 
(employment in each sector covered by this report, as a percentage of total employment in each sector, 2003)
BE DE ES FR IT NL AT PT FI
D-Manufacturing 100 n.a 21 78 n.a n.a 41 n.a 97
E-Electricity, gas and water supply 100 n.a 73 82 n.a n.a 34 n.a 92
F-Construction 100 n.a 9 70 n.a n.a 37 n.a 86
G-Wholesale and retail trade 100 n.a 22 76 n.a n.a 28 n.a 91
H-Hotels and restaurants 100 n.a 11 58 n.a n.a 21 n.a 82
I-Transport, storage and communication 100 n.a 42 58 n.a n.a 21 n.a 90
K-Real estate, renting and business activities 100 n.a 21 68 n.a n.a 15 n.a 8299
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owing to some remaining methodological 
differences between BACH and the commercial 
database. There are no data available on Ireland 
and Luxembourg. 
For the purpose of this report, non-financial 
corporations are defined following the NACE 
sector classification:
All – Total non-financial corporations; sum of 
D, E, F, G, I, H and K (excluding A, B, C, M 
and O owing to the unavailability of data in 
some major countries89)
D – Manufacturing
E – Electricity, gas and water supply
F – Construction
G – Wholesale and retail trade
I  – Transport, storage and communication
X – Other services90, which is defined as the 
sum of:
  –  H – Hotels and restaurants91; 
  –   K – Real estate, renting and business 
activities.
Firm sizes are defined following the following 
size classification in the BACH database:
As a general rule, indicators are computed on 
the basis of the variable sample figures if the 
formula includes only one period. By contrast, 
for the calculation of annual growth rates, 
sliding sample figures are used. In the cases of 
Belgium, for which the coverage of firms is 
100%, and Finland, the variable sample is also 
used for the calculation of growth rates. 
With respect to the aggregation of the BACH 
data, the indicators are calculated by summing 
up the variables (in EUR) from the most 
disaggregated level (e.g. small firms in the 
manufacturing sector in a particular country) to 
a more aggregated level of firm sizes, sectors 
and countries (e.g. all firms in the manufacturing 
sector in a particular country, or all firms in a 
particular country), up to the most aggregate 
level (which is all firms in the euro area). For 
each indicator, the respective formula is applied 
by summing up the variables (in EUR) in the 
numerator and dividing them by the sum of the 
variables (in EUR) in the denominator. For 
example, to calculate the debt-to-equity ratio 
for all firms in a country, the debt figures (in 
EUR) of small, medium-sized and large firms 
in all non-financial sectors in this country are 
summed up and divided by the sum of capital 
and reserves of small, medium-sized and large 
firms in all non-financial sectors in the country. 
This calculation method gives large firms and 
large sectors a proportionally higher weight in 
the aggregate which can be seen in the 
indicators, as the indicator values for large 
firms are generally close to the indicator values 
for all firm sizes.   
Size class  Turnover (T) in million EUR
0 all sizes all
1 small T <10
2 medium 10 ≤ T <50
3 large T ≥ 50
89  A: agriculture, B: fishing, C: mining, M: education, O: other 
community, social and personal service authorities. 
90 In the national accounts, the service sector generally also 
includes the sectors G and I. However, for the purposes of 
economic interpretation in the context of this report, it could be 
advisable to investigate separately the “wholesale and retail 
trade” as well as the “transport, storage and communication” 
sectors owing to their special importance, and some specific 
developments from the “other services” sector. Sectors M 
(education), N (health and social work), O (other community, 
social and personal service authorities) and P (activities of 
households) are not included in the definition of the “other 
services” sector, mainly as data on these sectors are not provided 
by some major countries in BACH.   
91  Data on sector H are not available for Germany. For Austria, 
figures are only available for the total non-financial corporations 
and for small enterprises, owing to confidentiality reasons 
related to the low number of large and medium-sized firms in 
this sector.100
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LIST OF INDICATORS USED IN THE REPORT
The codes in the list of indicators below refer 




–  Debt to equity: Creditors and provisions for 
pensions and similar obligations93 as a % of 
capital and reserves94 [(F + I + J1) / L]  
–  Maturity (mis)matches: Short-term assets 
to short-term debt (liquidity ratio): current 
assets/creditors (amounts payable within 
one year) [D / F]
– Maturity (mis)matches: Fixed assets to 
long-term debt (including provisions for 
pensions and similar obligations): fixed 
assets/(creditors (amounts payable after 
more than one year) + provisions for 
pensions and similar obligations) [C / (I + 
J1)] 
–  Cash to total assets [D4/AE]
–  Share and composition of fixed assets as a 
% of total assets: 
–  Tangible fixed assets [C2/AE]
–  Financial fixed assets [C3/AE] 
– Maturity structure of debt: Relative 
importance of short-term and long-term 
debt as a % of total debt:
–  Creditors (amounts payable within one 
year) [F/(F + I + J1)]
–  Creditors (amounts payable after more 
than one year) including provisions for 
pensions and similar obligations [(I + 
J1)/(F + I + J1)] 
Legend
A.  Subscribed capital unpaid
C. Fixed  assets
C.1 Intangible  fixed  assets
C.2   Tangible fixed assets
C.3   Financial fixed assets
D.   Current assets
D.4   Cash at bank and in hand
E.   Prepayments and accrued income
AE.   Total assets (A + C + D + E)
F.     Creditors: amounts becoming due and 
payable within one year
F.101 Other financial creditors
F.2   Amounts owed to credit institutions
I.     Creditors: amounts becoming due and 
payable after more than one year
I.1   Debenture loans
I.101  Other financial creditors
I.2   Amounts owed to credit institutions
J.1    Provisions for pensions and similar 
obligations
L.  Capital and reserves
L.1 Subscribed  capital
L.2  Share premium account
R1. Net  turnover
S.  Total operating income
R7.    Value adjustments on non financial 
assets
R12.    Value adjustments on financial assets
R.13.a Interest paid on financial debts
T.    Added value BACH (S – Costs of 
materials and consumables – Other 
operating charges and  taxes)
U.    Gross operating profit (T – Staff 
costs)
R21    Profit or loss for the financial year 
(Profit on ordinary activities before 
taxes + Extraordinary income – 
Extraordinary charges – Taxes on 
profit) 
  – Statement of investment –
R263. Acquisitions – sales and disposals
92  In contrast to the database, the codes are used here as if the 
variables were presented in absolute terms (i.e. disregarding the 
presentation in percentages of total assets or turnover in the 
BACH database). 
93  In the definition of debt according to the financial accounts, the 
ECB includes pension fund reserves. Provisions for pensions 
and similar obligations are partly not reported for Belgium, 
France and the Netherlands. For the purposes of this report, 
Belgium provided estimations based on the available data for all 
sectors and size groups. For France, the item is not relevant, and 
it is not reported for the Netherlands.  
94  Subscribed capital unpaid (A) has not been included as it is not 
yet available to the companies.101
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–  Investment in tangible fixed assets 
(acquisitions – sales and disposals of 
tangible fixed assets) as a % of value added 
[R263 / T]95
Debt and capital 
–  Debt to assets [(F + I + J1) / AE]
– Reimbursement  capacity:  Total  debt/cash 
flow [(F + I + J1) / (R21 + R7 + R12)]
–  Debt/turnover [(F + I + J1) / R1]
–  Equity/turnover [L / R1]
–  Bank loans/total debt [(F2 + I2) / (F + I + J1)] 
–  Bonds/total debt [I1 / (F + I + J1)]
–  External equity to turnover [(L1 + L2) / R1]
–  Cost of debt [R13a/(F2 + I2 + F101 + I101 +  I1]
PROFIT AND LOSS STATEMENT
Profitability
–  Gross operating profit as a % of value added 
[U / T]
–  Return on assets:  Profit/loss for the financial 
year as a % of total assets in the current 
year [R21t / AE t]
–  Return on equity: Profit/loss for the financial 
year as a % of capital and reserves at the 
beginning of the year96 [R21t / L t-1] 
–  Cost of debt [R13a/(F2 + I2 + F101 + I101 +  I1]
NATIONAL AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS STATISTICS
Along with the BACH database, national and 
financial accounts have also been widely used 
in this report. The main objective of national 
accounts is to measure the economic performance 
of a country, for example by GDP and the uses 
of GDP (e.g. consumption and fixed investment). 
Besides these overall economic indicators, data 
are also available for the following different 
sectors: households, general government, and 
financial and non-financial corporations. 
Financial accounts provide corresponding 
sector-specific information for the acquisition 
of financial assets and external financing. These 
highly aggregated datasets compiled by NSIs 
and NCBs can be considered secondary 
statistics, as a large amount of primary data 
(e.g. turnover and production statistics, data on 
wages and employment, MFI statistics, capital 
market and balance of payments statistics) are 
used in the compilation of the data. National 
and financial accounts statistics are available 
for nearly all euro area and EU countries, and in 
2006 the ECB and Eurostat published yearly 
integrated sectoral accounts for the first time.
USE OF INDICATORS BASED ON INDIVIDUAL 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (BACH) VERSUS 
INDICATORS BASED ON THE NATIONAL AND 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS
An alternative to using individual aggregated 
data like BACH when analysing the financial 
structure of firms is data from national and 
financial accounts (NFAs). However, there are 
a few specific differences between BACH and 
NFA data. According to ESA 95, which is 
obligatory for the NFAs in the euro area and in 
the EU, non-financial corporations also include 
partnerships in the NFAs; these are however 
not taken into account in the BACH database. 
Other differences that may hinder comparability 
between the sources include the valuation 
methods and prices that are used in the statistics. 
BACH relies on accounting figures that are 
mainly based on book value, although some 
assets are valued at market prices, following 
national accounting rules and/or the new IFRS 
recommendations. NFAs tend to privilege 
market values, but sometimes estimate values 
for missing information, such as non-marketable 
securities. Furthermore, the detailed activities 
95  If the investment variables R253, R263 and R273 do not exist 
for all countries, they may be substituted by the change in the 
stock in period t.    
96  This ratio is calculated based on the sliding sample.102
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or legal form of firms covered by BACH or 
NFA data, or even among different national 
data providers for BACH or for international 
NFA data, tend to vary. For example, in the 
context of national accounting statistics, while 
the euro area, the UK and Japan follow the ESA 
95, the US statistical accounting system partly 
uses different definitions. With respect to the 
delineation of the sectors, the US non-financial 
business sector broadly corresponds to the non-
financial corporations defined in the System of 
National Accounts (SNA 93), including both 
incorporated and unincorporated businesses. 
Lastly, by contrast to the non-financial 
corporations in the other three economic areas, 
the US non-financial business sector also 
includes sole proprietorships.
On the whole, the main advantage of NFA 
statistics is their exhaustive coverage. They 
therefore provide a broad overview that can be 
complemented by individual data collections such 
as BACH, which provide more detailed insight 
into specific aspects, such as firm-size issues. 
PROFITABILITY AND THE INTEREST BURDEN OF 
NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN THE EURO AREA
SECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS ACROSS COUNTRIES97
Over the last decade, some general trends have 
affected the non-financial corporate sector 
across countries and across sectors. The 
introduction of the Single Market in 1993 led 
to the increasing integration of the European 
economies in the area of trade and financial 
flows as well as within the production process 
(relocation/outsourcing of some activities). 
This tendency has been reinforced at the 
worldwide level due to a wider globalisation 
movement. The completion of the Single 
Market has required the liberalisation of 
industries, among other things via the 
privatisation of state-owned companies, 
especially in the industries characterised by a 
bottleneck infrastructure with natural monopoly 
characteristics (the so-called network 
industries). In many economic sectors, the end 
of the nineties was also distinguished by a large 
wave of mergers and acquisitions leading to a 
Chart 34 Interest burden of non-financial 
corporations in the euro area
(percentages) 
Source: ECB annual national and financial accounts.
Note: 2005 data are preliminary estimates.
net interest payments to gross operating profit of 
non-financial corporations (left-hand scale) 
net interest payments to GDP (right-hand scale)
gross interest payments to debt of non-financial 
corporations (right-hand scale) 

















Chart 33 Profitability and investment of 
non-financial corporations in the euro area
(percentages)
Source: ECB annual national and financial accounts.
Note: 2005 data are preliminary estimates.
gross saving to gross operating surplus of 
non-financial corporations (left-hand scale)
gross fixed capital formation to gross operating 
surplus of non-financial corporations (left-hand scale)
gross operating surplus of non-financial corporations 
to GDP (right-hand scale)















97  Prepared by Vanessa Baugnet.103
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more concentrated environment.98 Finally, the 
dissemination of new technologies throughout 
the business process is another key characteristic 
of the period 1995-2005. 
Besides these common developments, some 
specific events could have punctuated the 
development of a particular sector in a particular 
country during the period under review. This 
could for example have been a major regulatory 
change, the collapse of one (or more) very 
important firm(s) within one sector, or any 
other particular event, sufficiently important to 
affect the sector/country as a whole. 
This short section aims at briefly summarising 
to what extent the general trends mentioned 
before have varied across sectors and across 
countries and at reviewing the possible sector- 
or country-specific events. That would facilitate 
the comprehension of the financial situation of 
non-financial corporations examined at the 
sector level, on the basis of the BACH 
indicators.
MANUFACTURING (D)
In the manufacturing sector, the 1995-2005 
period was mainly characterised by the 
continuing deregulation/privatisation process 
and an increased competition climate between 
European non-financial corporations. At the 
same time, a large wave of M&A transactions, 
widespread among all manufacturing sectors 
and to a large extent driven by the ITC industry, 
resulted in a more concentrated environment. 
The greatest bulk of these transactions took 
place within national borders. When strategic 
interests were at stake, governments sometimes 
supported the limited capital opening of public 
companies or/and the creation of national 
champions.99 However, this attitude is far from 
being systematic because strong mitigating 
factors are also at work: regulatory powers of 
the European Commission esp. for competition 
affairs, pragmatism of Governments as well as 
the normal game of market forces. 
In AT, two major events particularly invigorated 
product market competition during the nineties. 
First, the AT’s accession to EU in 1995 and, 
second, the opening of the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) economies which has boosted 
output and productivity of Austrian NFCs, 
thanks to lower import prices, higher import 
penetration, reduced barriers to trade and 
investment and outsourcing of part of their 
production to CEE countries.
As the behaviour of the ITC industry played a 
major role in the business cycle during the 
period 1998-2001, it might be useful to examine 
the weight of this sector in the manufacturing 
sector at a country level. At the end of the 
eighties, DE appeared as the country where 
medium-high and high-technology intensity 
industries are most represented, in comparison 
with the other EU countries under review. After 
the ITC revolution BE joined DE as a country 
where the weight of high technology intensity 
industries is higher; in FI there has been a 
particularly rapid change in the industry 
structure related to the increasing share of ICT 
in the manufacturing sector.
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY (E)
As called by the EU directives, the sector of 
gas and electricity has been progressively 
liberalised in all European countries from the 
end of the nineties onwards. The speed and the 
extent of the liberalisation process however 
differed across countries. Moreover, as far as 
the competitive conditions are concerned, the 
point of departure was not identical in each 
98  After having dramatically decreased from 2002 to 2004, the 
value of M&A transactions in which euro area firms acted as 
acquirers surged in 2005 and the first part of 2006 to levels 
relatively close to those seen during the M&A boom in the late 
nineties and early 2000s. Current M&A activity contrasts with 
the former wave in many respects. First, cash-based transactions 
are currently predominant, whereas stock-based deals (still 
relatively costly) play a minor role. Second, in terms of sectoral 
composition, the telecommunications, media and technology 
sector play this time a minor role, whereas the oil and gas 
industry, the sectors basic materials, healthcare and utilities 
prevail. 
99 These considerations related to “strategic interests” and 
“national champions” prevail in other sectors, particularly in 
sectors E and I.104
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country, for example in terms of the number of 
competitors and of the market share of the 
largest producer. In BE, FR, GR, NL, PT and 
ES, less than 4 companies on average operated 
on the electricity market before the liberalisation 
started, while several hundreds of small entities 
were active in this segment in AT, FI, DE and 
IT. In BE, GR and FR, the market share of the 
largest electricity generator exceeded 90 p.c. in 
1999, whereas it came to less than 30 p.c. in 
AT, FI, DE and NL. In ES, IT and PT, showed a 
situation halfway between these two extremes 
with largest supplier‘s market shares between 
50 and 70 p.c. 
The unbundling of the networks (transmission 
and distribution activities) from the trading 
operations to allow non-discriminatory access 
has been the primary aim of liberalisation along 
with the disenfranchisement of the former 
monopoly supplier. In the electricity market, 
AT, BE, DE, GR, PT and IT have achieved 
the formation of completely independent 
transmission system operators at the beginning 
of the years 2000 while in the gas market it was 
the case only for AT, BE, ES and IT. In the other 
countries, the separation took place in a less 
fundamental way, pertaining only to the 
accounts, the management or the ownership. 
Legal separation is the most convincing way if 
total non-discrimination is guaranteed but the 
possibility that the original incumbent may still 
have a large advantage by virtue of the extent 
of his access and his know-how of the system 
cannot be excluded. 
The effective opening up of the market to new 
suppliers in the electricity sector was achieved 
in 2001/2002 in AT and DE and in 2003/2004 in 
ES, FI, NL and PT. The same development took 
place a little bit later in the gas market, in AT, 
DE, ES in. In the other euro area countries (BE, 
GR, FR, NL for the gas market only, IT for the 
electricity market only), the market opening is 
not yet completely realised. In PT, the 
unbundling of the gas sector was realized in 
2006 and the liberalization will start in 2007 
and occur progressively till 2009.
Turning to the level of concentration, proxied 
by the market share of the largest producer, no 
major reduction did occur between 1999 and 
2004, except ES and IT, as we would expect it 
stemmed from the changing competitive 
environment. Insofar, the liberalisation process 
can be qualified as theoretical in some countries 
as the predominance of one or two large 
supplier(s) (in general a national champion) 
has not been called into question. 
In the water supply sector, no specific change 
took place during the last decade.
CONSTRUCTION (F) 
Developments in the construction sector cannot 
be isolated from house prices developments 
(on the secondary market), as they represent a 
benchmark for the price on the primary market, 
affecting the expected profitability of 
investment in the construction sector (supply 
adjustment). Rapid rise in house prices can also 
boost the demand for new dwellings, both for 
owner-occupied dwellings and for own-for-rent 
dwellings (as rents are adjusted, to some extent 
and with a certain time lag, to house prices). 
However, the relationship between these 
variables is far from going one-way, as weak 
developments in the construction sector and/or 
the scarcity of land can lead to surge in house 
prices in the secondary market. In spite of that, 
it is useful to take a quick look at house prices 
developments in the various countries under 
review, as they may have a non-negligible 
impact on developments in the construction 
sector. 
Aggregate euro area residential property price 
developments mask substantial disparities 
across individual countries. During the first 
part of the period under review, i.e. the 1995-
1999 period, NL, GR and FI showed residential 
property price increases substantially above the 
euro area aggregate, whereas the opposite was 
true for AT, DE, FR and IT. In BE, ES and PT 
residential property price changes were broadly 
in line with euro area-wide developments. 
During the second part of the period under 105
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review, house prices cooled down in NL, GR 
and FI but they accelerated sharply in FR, ES, 
BE and IT. In DE, AT and PT, however, the 
growth of residential property prices remained 
subdued, at rates well below the euro area 
aggregate.
In AT and DE gloomy house prices during the 
last decade have been associated with a falling 
demand for houses. AT showed a construction 
boom in the early nineties. In DE, some specific 
problem like overcapacities in the housing 
market in East Germany have worsened the 
situation. As a consequence, in both countries 
many insolvencies had been observed in the 
construction sector during the last decade. 
Several large construction companies were 
declared bankrupted in 1996 and 2000 in AT 
and in 2002 and 2005 in DE.
In GR, the 2004 Olympic Games led to great 
infrastructure developments during 2002 and 
2003 and to a lesser extent in 2004. 
Turning to country-specific regulatory 
developments, the central government in ES, in 
1996 and 2000, made several changes in order 
to raise the available supply of buildable land, 
which made a positive contribution to the 
construction sector. Conversely, in the NL, 
where the construction market was still highly 
regulated, due inter alia to the growing scarcity 
of building land, the government has put 
restrictions on new building locations, in 
particular via the VINEX policy (entry into 
force in ...). This new regulation has restrained 
competition, as it implies that large building 
companies may hold a dominant position by 
acquiring land position.
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE (G)100  
Since the mid-nineties, Europe has shown an 
overall trend towards an increased concentration 
through mergers and acquisitions. Accordingly, 
European countries started liberalising the 
sector in the early nineties, which to some 
extent actually facilitated to some extent the 
entry of large retail outlets – mostly due to a 
context where large retails outlets had already 
gained an overwhelming market power in 
selected geographical areas, as well as the 
widespread adoption of new technologies. In 
some countries, however, deregulation has 
slowed down, as a result of the demand for 
protection from competition from small 
shopkeepers. Some countries, like ES, have 
introduced new restrictions on shop opening 
hours, whereas other countries, like FR and 
again ES, have tightened the zoning laws to 
restrict the entry of new large retails outlets – 
mostly due to a context where large retail 
outlets had already gained an overwhelming 
market power in selected geographical areas. 
These stricter retail regulations effectively 
reduced the entry of very large stores, and may 
have entailed an upward impact on prices, as 
they curbed competition in some areas. Another 
explanation for possible upward impact on 
prices may be that some large retail groups 
sought to finance an aggressive growth in 
emerging countries which led them to limit 
competition on their home market by focusing 
on margins rather than market share. 
In general, this sector has suffered a major 
price pressure during the last decade, due to the 
increasing competition between large retailing 
groups operating on an international level, 
the emergence of hard discount chains, the 
introduction of the euro leading to an easier 
comparability of prices by euro area customers. 
In some countries, specific events have 
reinforced this tendency: in AT, for example, 
the development of the CEE’s retail sector has 
added to pressures, as many consumers went 
shopping because of the lower prices. Moreover, 
the laws on discounting have been gradually 
liberalised in this country, allowing lower 
prices more frequently and consequently 
reducing total margins. 
100  For more details see “Competition, productivity and prices in 
the euro area services sector” (2006), ECB Occasional paper 
No. 44.106
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In ES, a 1996 law imposed limits on the periods 
to pay suppliers for large supermarkets, leading 
to a drop of their income.
FINANCIAL POSITION OF NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS IN THE TEN NEW EU MEMBER 
STATES (NMS-10)101
In addition to the information included in Box 
3 on the financial position of non-financial 
corporations in the NMS-10, this section reports 
some additional comparisons in terms of the 
saving, investment and financing needs of non-
financial corporations in the NMS-10 as 
compared to euro area corporations.
Table 13 shows that in all NMS-10 compensation 
of employees and employers’ social contributions 
were below the euro area median, and in some 
cases even below the euro area minimum. The 
relatively higher share of gross operating surplus 
in total gross value added in the NMS-10 is in 
line with the data on macro-competitiveness, 
which show comparative unit labour cost levels 
in the NMS-10 to be far lower than those in the 
euro area. This may be partly explained by the 
presumably more pronounced short-term impact 
of inward FDI on average productivity levels 
than on average wage levels.
Both net other taxes on production and the income 
and wealth tax burden were above the euro area 
minimum in all NMS-10 for which data were 
available except in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, where net other taxes on production 
were negative (implying that subsidies exceed 
other taxes on production); however, the income 
and wealth tax burden was clearly higher than the 
euro area median. In three of the six NMS-10 for 
which data were available, non-financial 
corporations had an income and wealth tax burden 
ratio (as a percentage of gross operating surplus) 
that was higher than the corresponding tax ratio in 
the euro area aggregate, while in the other three 
countries, non-financial corporations had a tax 
burden somewhat above the euro area minimum.
The interest burden was typically lower in the 
NMS-10 than the euro area median (which is in 
Table 13 Derivation of net saving of non-financial corporations in the NMS-10
Country Year



























tion of fixed 
capital
Czech Republic 2003 117.8 -3.1 8.3 1.0 24.7 14.9 -0.2 42.4
Estonia 2003 126.6 1.6 5.5 2.1 28.4 5.6 -25.2 31.9
Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lithuania 2004 77.0 0.2 1.9 -0.5 54.3 5.4 0.2 23.3
Latvia 2004 87.7 2.8 -1.2 7.0 52.1 5.6 -2.4 36.3
Hungary n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland 2004 109.1 4.1 4.1 -0.2 30.8 9.0 -0.3 45.9
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Slovakia 2003 109.2 -2.0 6.1 1.0 12.7 13.8 0.9 59.1
Memorandum items:
EU-12 2004 151.6 4.1 6.1 11.6 48.1 8.1 -3.0 39.6
EU-12 median 155.6 0.9 6.6 12.1 37.3 11.9 -1.5 39.9
EU-12 minimum 77.6 -0.3 1.5 0.3 7.1 2.8 -11.2 23.6
EU-12 maximum 211.3 13.4 16.1 34.6 57.6 17.9 0.7 63.0
Source: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations.
Notes: Net interest payments: interest burden, i.e. interest paid minus interest received. (Net) other property income: excluding the  
allocation of other primary income account, i.e. excluding distributed income and reinvested earnings on FDI in the reporting country. 
Allocation of other primary income account: distributed income and reinvested earnings on FDI in the reporting country.
101  Prepared by Thomas Reininger and Zoltan Walko.107
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ANNEX 1
line with the lower share of debt financing in 
total financing). On the other hand, net other 
property income constituted a rather negligible 
source of entrepreneurial income in the NMS-
10 as opposed to the euro area. This is 
attributable to the fact that the level of financial 
assets and of shares and other equity on the 
assets side has been comparatively lower in 
these economies, as has the degree of inter-
company linkages in general and that of outward 
FDI in particular.
Reflecting the great importance of inward FDI 
in the NMS-10, reinvested earnings on FDI in 
the reporting country play a far more important 
role in the NMS-10 than in the euro area, while 
non-financial corporations’ distributed income 
was close to the euro area minimum. This 
Table 14 Saving, investment and financing needs of non-financial corporations in the NMS-10
Country Year























Czech Republic 2003 10.4 4.6 57.4 67.2 1.9 -12.4 33.3 -45.7
Estonia 2003 5.5 2.2 39.6 75.1 n/a -51.2 35.0 -86.2
Cyprus n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Lithuania 2004 14.7 0.7 38.7 41.5 6.1 -9.8 9.2 -19.0
Latvia 2004 11.7 8.0 56.0 75.8 16.8 -36.7 38.9 -75.6
Hungary n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland 2004 9.7 3.2 58.8 48.5 8.0 2.4 39.2 -36.9
Slovenia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Slovakia 2003 10.2 2.8 72.0 75.7 -1.1 -3.9 n/a n/a
Memorandum items:
EU-12 2004 6.5 3.6 49.7 54.9 1.1 -6.4 28.8 -35.1
EU-12 median 5.2 3.8 62.6 57.5 0.9 -10.6 37.4 -29.2
EU-12 minimum -12.9 0.4 33.9 37.4 -0.9 -26.8 -4.7 -118.5
EU-12 maximum 43.8 19.1 79.9 93.7 6.0 38.1 91.7 6.7
Country Year























Czech Republic 2003 2.7 1.2 15.1 17.6 0.5 -3.3 8.7 -12.0
Estonia 2003 1.5 0.6 10.6 20.1 n/a -13.7 9.4 -23.1
Cyprus 2003 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -3.7 11.0 -14.7
Lithuania 2004 4.9 0.2 12.8 13.7 2.0 -3.2 3.0 -6.3
Latvia 2004 3.8 2.6 18.1 24.5 5.4 -11.8 12.6 -24.4
Hungary 2005 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -5.7 9.3 -15.0
Malta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Poland 2004 1.8 0.6 11.3 9.3 1.5 0.5 7.5 -7.1
Slovenia 2005 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a -4.9 9.3 -14.2
Slovakia 2003 2.1 0.6 15.1 15.9 -0.2 -0.8 n/a n/a
Memorandum items:
EU-12 2004 1.3 0.7 10.0 11.0 0.2 -1.3 5.8 -7.0
EU-12 median 1.0 0.8 11.1 10.2 0.2 -1.9 7.6 -6.3
EU-12 minimum -2.0 0.1 7.4 8.6 -0.2 -4.6 -1.0 -20.4
EU-12 maximum 9.0 3.0 17.2 15.0 1.2 8.2 15.8 1.5
Source: ECB, Eurostat and own calculations. 
Notes: Gross saving: net saving plus net capital transfers plus consumption of fixed assets. Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-): ratio derived 
from published data for net lending/net borrowing or from data for net financial transactions. (The latter approach was chosen in the case 
of Cyprus, Hungary and Slovenia due to a lack of (recent) data on sectoral national accounts.) Data for net lending/net borrowing may thus 
deviate somewhat from the difference between gross saving and gross (fixed and other) capital formation. Net incurrence of liabilities: ratio 
derived as the difference of the ratios of net lending / net borrowing minus net acquisition of financial assets.108
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implies – ceteris paribus – that both non-
financial corporations’ internal financing and 
the overall catching-up process in these 
countries have been strengthened.
It is noteworthy that in the NMS-10, both net 
saving and gross saving by non-financial 
corporations (which do not include reinvested 
earnings on FDI in the reporting country) were 
at or in most cases above the euro area average 
when measured as a ratio to GDP (see Table 14, 
bottom). At the same time, non-financial 
corporations’ investment-to-GDP ratio was at 
or in most cases above the euro area maximum 
ratio in all NMS-10 (except in Poland), in line 
with their status as catching-up economies. 
Consequently, non-financial corporations’ net 
borrowing relative to GDP exceeded the euro 
area average (in most cases considerably) in 
all NMS-10 except in Slovakia, where it 
stood at the euro area average level, and in 
Poland, where non-financial corporations were 
net lenders.
Given the already relatively high net borrowing 
requirements in the NMS-10 (with the exception 
of Slovakia and Poland), the generally high 
level of net financial investment (except in 
Lithuania) signals that, on average, non-
financial corporations in the NMS-10 did not 
face serious constraints in incurring (net) 
financial liabilities. However, real investment 
was higher than net financial investment in all 
NMS-10 for which data were available.109
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Table 15 Shares in the value added of non-financial corporations across euro area countries
(as a percentage of non-financial corporations)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 average 
1995-2005
Belgium
Manufacturing 29.2 28.9 29.1 28.5 27.5 27.6 26.4 26.2 25.1 25.1 24.7 27.1
Electricity, gas and water supply 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.9 3.7
Construction 7.4 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.1
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 17.6 17.3 17.0 16.8 17.0 16.5 16.9 17.7 18.5 18.9 18.8 17.6
Transport, storage and communication 11.8 11.4 11.3 11.7 11.6 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.8 11.8 12.2 11.6
Other services1) 29.9 31.0 31.2 32.1 32.7 33.6 34.5 34.2 34.2 34.1 34.4 32.9
Germany
Manufacturing 31.7 31.3 31.6 31.9 31.7 32.1 31.9 31.5 31.5 31.9 32.5 31.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.9
Construction 9.5 8.9 8.4 7.8 7.8 7.3 6.7 6.5 6.2 5.9 5.4 7.3
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 15.3 15.3 15.3 15.6 15.3 15.5 15.5 15.0 14.7 14.9 14.9 15.2
Transport, storage and communication 7.9 7.6 7.8 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.2 7.9
Other services1) 32.5 33.5 33.6 33.7 34.4 34.9 35.7 36.4 36.8 36.3 36.2 34.9
Greece
Manufacturing 19.7 19.6 17.6 17.8 17.8 18.1 17.7 17.2 16.8 16.4 16.7 17.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.6 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9
Construction 9.8 9.7 10.0 10.7 11.0 11.3 12.5 12.3 13.0 12.6 12.9 11.5
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 20.7 21.7 21.7 20.5 20.1 19.2 20.1 19.8 19.7 20.0 20.3 20.4
Transport, storage and communication 10.3 9.3 9.7 10.1 12.9 13.3 12.5 12.9 12.7 14.2 14.6 12.1
Other services1) 35.9 36.5 38.0 37.7 35.0 35.2 34.5 35.1 35.1 34.2 35.4 35.7
Spain
Manufacturing 27.1 27.0 27.2 26.9 25.9 26.6 25.8 24.7 23.9 23.0 23.3 25.6
Electricity, gas and water supply 4.1 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.5 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.7 3.2
Construction 11.0 10.5 10.3 10.6 11.2 11.9 12.7 13.4 14.2 15.1 15.6 12.4
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 16.6 16.6 16.4 16.3 16.4 16.0 15.9 15.4 15.3 15.4 15.7 16.0
Transport, storage and communication 11.5 11.5 11.7 11.9 11.7 10.5 10.5 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.6 11.0
Other services1) 29.8 30.1 30.4 30.7 31.2 32.1 32.5 33.2 33.4 33.5 34.7 32.0
France
Manufacturing 27.2 26.7 27.2 26.9 24.1 23.9 22.8 21.8 21.0 20.6 19.7 23.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.5 3.6 3.2 3.3 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.8
Construction 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.4 7.4 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9 8.4 8.6 7.6
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 15.5 14.8 15.0 15.0 15.9 15.7 16.1 16.1 16.5 16.0 15.7 15.7
Transport, storage and communication 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.0 9.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.3
Other services1) 37.1 38.4 38.8 39.1 40.5 41.5 42.0 42.2 42.6 43.0 44.0 40.8
Ireland
Manufacturing 47.3 44.7 45.1 46.2 47.3 45.8 44.4 45.1 40.5 38.5 36.2 43.7
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
Construction 8.4 8.4 8.1 8.4 9.1 10.2 10.6 10.9 12.0 12.9 14.8 10.3
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 14.5 15.8 14.6 13.0 12.4 12.2 12.7 12.9 13.9 14.5 14.2 13.7
Transport, storage and communication 8.6 8.8 8.6 8.7 8.4 8.5 7.4 7.3 8.1 8.1 7.8 8.2
Other services1) 18.5 20.0 21.5 21.7 21.5 22.0 23.3 22.4 24.1 24.4 25.3 22.2110
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Table 15 Shares in the value added of non-financial corporations across euro area countries 
(cont’d)
(as a percentage of non-financial corporations)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 average 
1995-2005
Italy
Manufacturing 31.0 30.5 30.3 30.3 29.4 29.1 28.3 27.5 26.5 26.4 25.6 28.6
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9
Construction 7.4 7.4 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.3 7.5 7.8 8.1 8.4 7.4
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 19.4 18.9 18.7 18.4 18.0 17.7 17.8 17.1 16.8 16.3 16.1 17.7
Transport, storage and communication 9.7 9.9 9.8 10.2 10.1 10.1 10.5 10.8 10.6 10.6 10.9 10.3
Other services1) 29.3 30.3 31.0 31.0 32.5 33.3 33.3 34.3 35.4 35.7 36.3 33.0
Luxembourg
Manufacturing 22.8 21.2 21.2 20.7 19.5 19.3 18.0 16.7 16.2 15.7 15.3 18.8
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3
Construction 10.8 10.4 10.1 10.0 10.3 9.8 10.1 10.9 10.9 10.6 10.0 10.4
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 17.7 17.4 17.3 16.2 16.5 15.6 16.0 16.1 16.5 16.1 16.1 16.5
Transport, storage and communication 13.7 15.4 16.2 16.7 17.1 17.8 17.3 16.9 16.6 17.7 17.9 16.7
Other services1) 32.6 33.0 32.9 34.1 34.3 35.5 36.5 37.3 37.6 37.6 38.4 35.4
Netherlands
Manufacturing 27.1 26.0 24.9 24.3 23.3 23.3 22.4 22.0 22.3 22.7 22.5 23.7
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4
Construction 8.4 8.3 8.1 8.0 8.3 8.4 8.7 8.8 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.5
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 20.2 19.9 20.3 20.3 20.8 20.8 20.7 21.3 20.9 20.8 20.3 20.6
Transport, storage and communication 10.7 10.5 10.9 11.2 10.7 10.7 10.8 11.3 11.7 11.6 11.3 11.1
Other services1) 30.7 32.5 33.4 33.9 34.6 34.8 35.3 34.1 33.6 33.8 34.8 33.8
Austria
Manufacturing 28.4 28.0 28.2 28.0 28.2 28.6 28.3 27.8 27.2 27.1 27.0 27.9
Electricity, gas and water supply 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.5
Construction 11.5 11.8 11.7 11.7 11.6 11.1 10.5 10.4 10.8 10.6 10.6 11.1
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 19.0 18.9 18.9 18.6 18.4 18.6 18.5 18.2 18.1 18.2 17.9 18.5
Transport, storage and communication 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.2 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.3 9.9 9.7 10.3
Other services1) 26.0 26.3 26.8 27.4 28.0 28.6 29.6 30.1 30.2 31.0 31.5 28.7
Portugal
Manufacturing 28.3 29.0 28.5 27.7 27.0 26.0 25.6 25.2 24.8 24.6 25.0 26.5
Electricity, gas and water supply 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0
Construction 9.7 9.8 10.6 10.9 11.0 11.6 11.9 11.7 10.5 10.7 11.1 10.9
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 21.4 20.8 20.9 20.6 20.1 20.4 20.8 20.7 20.8 20.6 21.0 20.7
Transport, storage and communication 9.9 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.5 10.5 11.0 11.0 11.3 10.3
Other services1) 26.3 26.0 26.0 26.8 28.1 28.2 27.6 28.2 29.0 29.0 30.1 27.8
Finland
Manufacturing 37.3 35.7 35.5 36.4 35.5 36.9 35.7 34.7 33.4 32.6 32.2 35.1
Electricity, gas and water supply 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.3 2.9 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.1 2.8 3.1
Construction 6.5 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.2 7.3 7.5 8.1 7.4
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods 14.2 14.5 14.9 14.3 14.1 13.6 13.8 14.3 14.4 14.7 14.7 14.3
Transport, storage and communication 14.3 14.6 14.4 14.3 14.6 14.7 15.0 15.2 15.2 15.0 14.5 14.7
Other services1) 23.6 24.4 24.6 24.2 24.9 24.7 25.2 25.7 26.5 27.1 27.8 25.3
Source: Eurostat, ESA 95.
1) Other services include hotels and restaurants as well as real estate, renting and business activities.
Note: Non-financial corporations have been defined as the sum of the sectors, which are mentioned in the table. Estimate for 2003 for 
Belgium and Greece and for the Italian construction sector in 2002 and 2003 based on the average growth of the other euro area 
countries.111
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Table 16 Profitability and cost of euro area non-financial corporations across firm sizes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gross operating profit to turnover
 All  sizes 8.9 8.7 8.4 9.2 9.2 8.8 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.8 8.4
 Large  enterprises 9.6 9.3 9.0 9.9 9.7 9.3 9.0 9.3 8.9 9.1 8.6
 Medium-sized  enterprises 7.6 7.3 7.4 7.7 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.8 7.7
 Small  enterprises 7.5 7.4 7.5 7.7 8.2 8.3 8.2 8.1 8.0 8.3 8.4
Return on assets 1)
 All  sizes 2.2 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.2 2.2 1.5 2.5 3.2 3.9
 Large  enterprises 2.3 2.3 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.4 1.6 2.7 3.3 4.1
 Medium-sized  enterprises 2.0 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.7 2.9
 Small  enterprises 2.0 2.1 2.4 3.1 3.5 3.6 1.6 0.9 2.3 3.2 3.7
Return on equity 1)
 All  sizes 7.0 6.6 8.1 9.0 9.7 9.7 6.5 4.5 7.2 8.8 10.4
 Large  enterprises 7.2 6.8 8.5 9.2 10.0 10.5 7.4 4.8 7.9 9.5 11.7
 Medium-sized  enterprises 6.7 6.1 7.3 8.2 8.1 6.2 5.7 6.0 5.8 7.5 8.0
 Small  enterprises 6.1 6.4 7.1 9.0 9.6 9.4 3.8 2.3 5.7 7.4 8.2
Profit/loss to turnover
 All  sizes 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.3 1.6 2.6 3.5 4.2
 Large  enterprises 2.2 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.5 2.5 1.7 2.8 3.5 4.2
 Medium-sized  enterprises 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.9
 Small  enterprises 1.7 1.9 2.2 3.0 3.6 4.2 1.9 1.2 2.9 4.9 6.1
Cash flow to turnover
 All  sizes 7.1 7.0 7.2 7.9 8.1 8.4 7.4 7.2 7.6 8.5 8.7
 Large  enterprises 7.9 7.7 7.9 8.6 8.7 9.0 7.9 7.7 8.0 8.6 8.7
 Medium-sized  enterprises 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.8 6.0 5.7 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.8 6.7
 Small  enterprises 6.0 6.1 6.3 7.0 7.6 8.4 6.7 5.6 7.1 10.0 10.8
Operating expenses to turnover
 All  sizes 94.5 94.5 94.6 94.1 94.3 94.7 94.6 94.7 94.8 94.5 94.8
 Large  enterprises 94.2 94.2 94.4 93.8 94.2 94.6 94.6 94.6 94.7 94.4 94.9
 Medium-sized  enterprises 95.1 95.1 95.0 94.8 94.6 95.1 95.0 94.9 95.0 94.9 95.0
 Small  enterprises 94.8 94.9 94.9 94.6 94.3 94.4 94.6 94.6 94.6 94.5 94.6
Taxes on profit to value added
 All  sizes 4.6 4.9 5.5 6.4 6.6 6.3 5.9 4.9 5.5 6.2 5.9
 Large  enterprises 4.6 5.0 5.7 6.6 6.8 6.3 6.0 4.6 5.6 6.6 6.1
 Medium-sized  enterprises 4.9 5.1 5.8 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.1 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.3
 Small  enterprises 4.0 4.1 4.6 5.2 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.0 4.9 4.9 5.0
Value adjustments on non-financial and financial fixed assets and provisions to value added
 All  sizes 19.7 19.7 19.5 19.9 19.6 21.2 21.7 22.7 20.8 21.1 19.7
 Large  enterprises 22.2 22.0 22.1 22.4 22.1 24.2 24.0 26.0 23.6 23.5 21.9
 Medium-sized  enterprises 16.2 16.2 15.8 16.0 16.2 16.9 18.2 17.7 17.8 16.6 15.7
 Small  enterprises 14.1 14.3 14.1 13.8 13.4 14.1 15.9 14.4 13.6 16.3 15.2
Investment in tangible fixed assets to value added
 All  sizes 14.4 15.1 13.9 17.3 15.2 17.9 17.1 16.3 14.3 12.4 14.9
 Large  enterprises 15.6 16.4 14.6 18.3 15.8 19.2 18.7 17.2 15.0 14.5 16.7
 Medium-sized  enterprises 13.3 13.4 13.1 16.6 14.5 16.8 15.1 15.1 12.3 8.9 12.6
 Small  enterprises 11.0 11.9 12.2 14.2 13.9 14.0 13.0 13.4 13.4 8.1 9.8
Investment in intangible fixed assets to value added
 All  sizes 1.2 0.6 1.3 2.0 1.9 3.8 2.4 1.3 1.5 2.0 1.8
 Large  enterprises 1.2 0.3 1.4 2.3 2.1 4.9 2.7 1.2 1.5 2.2 2.0
 Medium-sized  enterprises 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.5 1.5
 Small  enterprises 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5
Investment in financial fixed assets to value added
 All  sizes 6.2 9.0 11.4 11.8 14.1 20.9 14.9 10.5 10.5 13.0 18.2
 Large  enterprises 7.3 11.1 15.0 13.5 18.0 24.1 15.4 12.0 13.1 13.8 21.8
 Medium-sized  enterprises 4.0 3.8 3.7 4.3 4.7 7.3 7.4 2.6 5.2 9.0 10.6
 Small  enterprises 4.4 6.1 6.1 12.4 8.4 21.7 20.3 12.3 6.1 14.1 11.6
Sources: European Commission, BACH database; ECB and NCB calculations.
Note: Firm sizes are defined according to turnover: small firms (turnover < € 10 million), medium-sized firms (turnover € 10-50 
million), large firms (turnover > € 50 million).
1) Return on assets and return on equity are defined as the profit / loss of the financial year in percentage of total assets and, respectively, 
capital and reserves.112
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Table 17 Debt and interest burden of euro area non-financial corporations across firm sizes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Debt, annual rate of change in percentages 
 All  sizes 4.6 0.9 6.8 6.9 10.2 19.6 4.4 3.3 2.6 2.5 5.2
 Large  enterprises 3.7 0.6 4.8 6.2 10.8 23.6 4.2 3.2 3.2 2.5 5.3
 Medium-sized  enterprises 7.1 1.7 8.8 6.3 10.7 9.5 5.8 3.6 1.2 2.7 5.3
 Small  enterprises 6.0 1.5 13.2 10.2 7.3 13.0 4.1 3.8 1.8 2.2 4.6
Capital and reserves, annual rate of change in percentages 
 All  sizes 6.5 5.5 9.8 8.1 9.4 18.4 9.6 3.3 5.2 6.3 8.6
 Large  enterprises 6.3 5.2 9.1 7.2 8.0 17.9 9.6 2.6 7.3 5.6 8.6
 Medium-sized  enterprises 7.7 6.6 7.4 7.5 10.3 14.1 5.9 8.4 1.8 12.6 5.3
 Small  enterprises 6.6 5.7 15.4 12.8 15.1 24.1 12.4 2.3 0.9 4.0 10.9
Debt to assets
 All  sizes 60.2 58.8 59.0 58.1 58.1 58.8 58.0 57.5 57.4 56.1 55.4
 Large  enterprises 58.0 56.6 56.6 55.7 56.3 58.1 57.6 56.9 56.8 56.2 55.6
 Medium-sized  enterprises 66.5 65.2 66.0 65.4 64.5 63.9 63.5 62.6 62.1 59.4 59.2
 Small  enterprises 63.8 62.6 62.5 61.8 59.8 57.7 55.1 55.3 55.7 53.1 51.8
Debt to equity
 All  sizes 190.8 178.5 178.7 177.1 177.0 179.1 170.1 169.3 165.9 153.6 148.9
 Large  enterprises 181.0 169.4 168.4 168.4 173.1 182.4 174.8 174.6 169.4 162.3 158.2
 Medium-sized  enterprises 229.4 215.3 222.7 218.8 211.3 202.1 197.9 189.9 186.6 163.2 162.0
 Small  enterprises 200.3 187.8 185.4 180.0 165.1 149.3 133.3 134.9 138.1 121.6 114.0
Debt to cash flow
 All  sizes 752.1 749.3 727.8 695.2 710.7 724.6 814.3 857.9 799.1 731.7 699.9
 Large  enterprises 688.7 689.8 656.4 631.7 655.8 674.5 757.3 787.0 738.4 685.9 651.4
 Medium-sized  enterprises 907.4 915.2 921.3 894.2 903.0 974.4 959.9 949.9 948.7 880.6 882.3
 Small  enterprises 942.6 910.8 921.6 855.7 818.2 789.6 1,014.0 1,255.5 990.9 816.4 788.4
Gross interest payments to gross operating profit 
 All  sizes 32.0 28.8 29.1 26.2 24.8 28.8 31.7 33.1 34.1 31.9 30.6
 Large  enterprises 29.2 26.0 26.1 24.5 23.4 27.6 30.2 29.7 29.5 27.8 27.1
 Medium-sized  enterprises 33.4 30.3 27.4 24.7 23.6 26.9 28.8 27.1 27.4 25.0 24.1
 Small  enterprises 45.8 42.9 46.6 37.9 33.9 37.8 44.3 61.0 68.0 64.6 59.8
Gross interest payments to debt
 All  sizes 7.9 7.1 6.4 5.8 4.9 5.2 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.5
 Large  enterprises 7.4 6.7 6.0 5.6 4.8 5.1 5.6 5.1 4.5 4.2 4.3
 Medium-sized  enterprises 8.8 7.9 6.9 5.9 5.1 5.5 5.7 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.6
 Small  enterprises 9.5 8.3 7.3 6.5 5.6 5.9 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.1
Sources: European Commission, BACH database; ECB and NCB calculations.
Note: Firm sizes are defined according to turnover: small firms (turnover < € 10 million), medium-sized firms (turnover € 10-50 
million), large firms (turnover > € 50 million). Debt is defined as the sum of creditors (amounts payable within and after more than one 
year) and provisions for pensions and similar obligations.  113
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Table 18 Capital structure of euro area non-financial corporations across firm sizes
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Short-term assets to total assets
 All  sizes 50.5 49.1 50.3 47.8 48.0 47.9 46.9 46.2 46.6 44.9 45.26
 Large  enterprises 45.3 44.0 45.0 42.9 43.6 44.3 43.3 42.3 42.4 41.7 42.37
 Medium-sized  enterprises 63.3 62.4 62.7 59.8 59.4 58.8 57.9 57.9 57.9 55.3 55.47
 Small  enterprises 61.1 59.8 61.0 59.1 56.7 54.3 53.1 52.6 53.6 47.9 48.03
Intangible fixed assets to total assets
 All  sizes 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.86
 Large  enterprises 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.4
 Medium-sized  enterprises 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.68
 Small  enterprises 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.8 2.79
Tangible fixed assets to total assets
 All  sizes 30.1 30.7 28.8 31.0 27.9 26.2 25.9 27.0 25.7 23.9 22.89
 Large  enterprises 33.2 33.7 31.6 33.7 29.6 27.5 27.3 28.8 26.9 25.9 24.83
 Medium-sized  enterprises 24.0 24.8 24.2 28.3 27.3 27.1 27.0 26.3 26.7 23.9 23.65
 Small  enterprises 22.3 22.6 21.3 21.2 21.1 19.7 18.9 19.5 19.6 16.3 15.07
Financial fixed assets to total assets
 All  sizes 16.0 16.9 17.6 17.8 20.5 22.0 23.1 22.5 23.2 26.5 27.1
 Large  enterprises 18.0 19.0 20.0 19.9 23.1 24.0 25.0 24.1 25.7 27.2 27.63
 Medium-sized  enterprises 9.7 9.6 9.8 8.8 10.0 10.8 11.5 12.1 11.6 17.0 17.07
 Small  enterprises 13.6 14.5 14.5 16.8 19.2 23.1 25.2 24.9 23.7 31.9 32.91
Short-term debt to total debt
 All  sizes 62.6 62.7 63.8 61.7 62.9 65.0 63.2 63.1 61.7 59.6 59.49
 Large  enterprises 59.4 59.9 60.6 58.6 60.7 63.8 62.1 61.8 60.1 58.8 59.03
 Medium-sized  enterprises 70.2 69.9 70.4 67.4 67.7 67.7 65.8 66.3 64.7 63.1 63.56
 Small  enterprises 68.0 67.3 69.7 69.0 67.5 68.2 65.8 65.9 65.7 59.6 57.66
Long-term debt to total debt
 All  sizes 37.4 37.3 36.2 38.3 37.1 35.0 36.8 36.9 38.3 40.4 40.51
 Large  enterprises 40.6 40.1 39.4 41.4 39.3 36.2 37.9 38.2 39.9 41.2 40.97
 Medium-sized  enterprises 29.9 30.2 29.6 32.6 32.3 32.3 34.2 33.7 35.3 36.9 36.44
 Small  enterprises 32.0 32.7 30.3 31.0 32.6 31.9 34.2 34.1 34.3 40.5 42.34
Short-term assets to short-term debt
 All  sizes 134.0 133.2 133.6 133.5 131.3 125.1 127.7 127.3 131.4 134.2 137.27
 Large  enterprises 131.6 129.9 131.3 131.4 127.5 119.6 120.9 120.5 124.4 126.3 129.06
 Medium-sized  enterprises 135.7 136.9 135.0 135.7 136.0 135.9 138.6 139.6 144.2 147.6 147.36
 Small  enterprises 140.9 142.1 140.2 138.5 140.6 138.2 146.6 144.3 146.6 151.6 160.86
Long-term assets to long-term debt
 All  sizes 214.9 227.2 227.5 229.9 236.6 248.7 244.7 249.0 238.4 239.0 229.49
 Large  enterprises 227.2 241.8 241.5 242.9 250.0 260.6 256.1 260.5 249.5 247.9 239.49
 Medium-sized  enterprises 179.8 186.1 185.3 183.9 190.0 194.7 189.0 194.2 187.1 198.8 190.31
 Small  enterprises 184.8 190.6 198.8 208.1 216.6 242.2 243.5 245.5 236.3 237.6 220.99
Sources: European Commission, BACH database; ECB and NCB calculations.
Note: Firm sizes are defined according to turnover: small firms (turnover < € 10 million), medium-sized firms (turnover € 10-50 
million), large firms (turnover > € 50 million).114
ECB
Occasional Paper No 63
June 2007
Table 19 Profitability and cost of euro area non-financial corporations across sectors  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gross operating profit to turnover
 All  sectors 8.9 8.7 8.4 9.2 9.2 8.8 8.7 8.9 8.6 8.8 8.4
 Manufacturing 9.1 8.8 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.0 8.3 8.3 8.0 8.4 8.1
  Electricity, gas and water supply 30.4 30.4 28.7 24.1 23.9 20.9 19.6 21.3 20.1 19.1 15.9
 Construction 5.7 5.4 5.4 5.9 5.8 6.6 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.7 7.0
  Wholesale and retail trade 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.1
   Transport, storage and 
communications 22.1 20.9 17.8 20.8 19.7 16.5 16.9 17.7 17.0 19.1 19.2
 Other  services 1) 12.9 13.2 12.9 14.2 14.3 14.7 14.7 15.1 15.1 14.7 14.7
Return on assets 2)
 All  sectors 2.2 2.2 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.2 2.2 1.5 2.5 3.2 3.9
 Manufacturing 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.6 3.6 4.5 2.7 2.7 2.4 3.4 4.5
  Electricity, gas and water supply 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.5 2.6 2.6 3.5 3.9
 Construction 0.4 0.8 1.2 2.0 1.7 4.2 2.9 3.1 2.7 3.5 3.1
  Wholesale and retail trade 3.0 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.5 3.7
   Transport, storage and 
communications 0.4 -0.3 0.6 2.0 2.7 0.9 0.1 -1.9 2.2 2.5 2.6
 Other  services 1) 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.7 1.2 0.0 1.9 3.0 3.9
Return on equity 2)
 All  sectors 7.0 6.6 8.1 9.0 9.7 9.7 6.5 4.5 7.2 8.8 10.4
 Manufacturing 8.0 8.0 9.6 10.0 10.1 12.5 7.7 7.6 6.6 9.4 12.1
  Electricity, gas and water supply 7.6 7.7 7.5 7.5 7.7 6.9 9.7 7.2 6.9 9.4 10.9
 Construction 2.2 3.8 5.9 8.9 7.9 18.8 12.9 12.1 10.5 14.7 12.5
  Wholesale and retail trade 11.6 9.9 10.6 11.5 13.0 12.8 11.3 10.3 11.3 11.1 11.8
   Transport, storage and 
communications 1.2 -0.8 1.9 6.3 9.1 3.4 0.4 -7.0 7.4 7.8 7.7
 Other  services 1) 5.3 5.4 6.6 7.8 7.9 6.9 2.9 0.1 4.8 6.9 8.7
Profit/loss to turnover
 All  sectors 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.3 1.6 2.6 3.5 4.2
 Manufacturing 2.3 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.2 4.0 2.5 2.6 2.3 3.1 4.2
  Electricity, gas and water supply 5.3 6.0 6.3 5.6 6.4 5.4 7.1 5.3 5.2 7.1 7.4
 Construction 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.8 1.6 3.9 2.7 3.0 2.5 3.0 3.1
  Wholesale and retail trade 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.7
   Transport, storage and 
communications 0.9 -0.5 1.2 3.6 5.2 2.0 0.2 -4.0 4.4 4.8 5.1
 Other  services 1) 4.0 4.5 5.2 5.8 6.3 6.5 3.0 0.1 4.7 10.4 13.3
Cash flow to turnover
 All  sectors 7.1 7.0 7.2 7.9 8.1 8.4 7.4 7.2 7.6 8.5 8.7
 Manufacturing 7.5 7.4 7.8 7.9 8.1 8.8 7.4 7.8 7.3 7.9 8.4
  Electricity, gas and water supply 23.7 24.3 24.6 19.1 20.3 17.7 17.8 18.5 15.9 17.9 16.2
 Construction 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.3 4.9 7.0 5.9 6.4 5.7 6.0 5.8
  Wholesale and retail trade 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.4 3.4
   Transport, storage and 
communications 15.6 13.7 13.3 16.4 16.9 15.3 12.0 9.5 15.1 15.0 14.9
 Other  services 1) 12.8 12.9 12.8 14.1 14.4 15.7 13.8 10.5 14.1 21.8 23.2
Operating expenses to turnover
 All  sectors 94.5 94.5 94.6 94.1 94.3 94.7 94.6 94.7 94.8 94.5 94.8
 Manufacturing 94.4 94.3 94.1 94.1 94.1 94.5 95.0 95.2 95.2 95.0 95.2
  Electricity, gas and water supply 78.5 78.6 79.3 82.0 83.0 85.6 85.6 85.9 86.7 87.0 89.4
 Construction 97.7 98.1 95.7 96.1 96.9 96.0 95.8 95.5 96.2 95.8 95.8
  Wholesale and retail trade 97.5 97.7 97.8 97.6 97.5 97.7 97.4 97.4 97.4 97.5 97.7
   Transport, storage and 
communications 86.0 87.1 89.8 88.1 89.3 91.4 90.2 89.7 89.4 86.8 87.4
 Other  services 1) 91.7 91.2 91.3 90.9 90.9 90.6 90.8 90.5 90.4 90.8 90.9115
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Table 19 Profitability and cost of euro area non-financial corporations across sectors (cont’d)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Taxes on profit to value added
 All  sectors 4.6 4.9 5.5 6.4 6.6 6.3 5.9 4.9 5.5 6.2 5.9
 Manufacturing 4.8 5.0 5.9 6.8 6.8 7.1 6.3 5.5 5.7 6.2 6.2
  Electricity, gas and water supply 3.6 4.4 4.7 8.6 10.5 6.9 8.0 7.3 9.2 10.4 8.0
 Construction 2.3 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.6 4.8
  Wholesale and retail trade 5.8 5.8 6.5 7.2 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.0 7.2 7.8 7.3
    Transport, storage and 
communications 4.1 4.8 4.8 5.6 5.4 3.7 3.8 0.7 3.2 6.7 5.6
 Other  services 1) 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.7 5.0 5.1 4.6 4.1 4.2 3.4 3.7
Value adjustments on non-financial and financial fixed assets and provisions to value added
 All  sectors 19.7 19.7 19.5 19.9 19.6 21.2 21.7 22.7 20.8 21.1 19.7
 Manufacturing 18.5 18.2 18.6 18.6 18.7 19.3 20.6 21.4 20.9 20.1 18.6
  Electricity, gas and water supply 39.1 39.2 41.1 34.6 35.9 36.6 34.6 41.4 34.7 36.4 36.7
 Construction 12.4 12.3 12.1 11.2 10.7 10.3 10.4 10.9 10.6 10.1 9.6
  Wholesale and retail trade 14.6 15.0 15.0 15.1 14.8 15.0 15.6 15.3 15.7 15.0 15.1
    Transport, storage and 
communications 26.7 26.7 25.3 25.7 24.8 32.1 28.4 31.1 25.8 24.7 24.3
 Other  services 1) 18.3 17.5 16.1 18.2 18.0 20.4 23.3 22.1 19.9 25.1 21.6
Investment in tangible fixed assets to value added
 All  sectors 14.4 15.1 13.9 17.3 15.2 17.9 17.1 16.3 14.3 12.4 14.9
 Manufacturing 11.7 12.7 12.7 16.4 13.5 14.6 14.4 12.6 11.8 10.9 10.9
  Electricity, gas and water supply 24.8 28.2 24.7 21.3 12.6 28.5 27.0 28.3 28.0 28.5 33.6
 Construction 6.8 6.3 6.5 8.6 9.6 10.3 11.4 13.9 9.7 5.5 8.9
  Wholesale and retail trade 11.7 11.8 11.6 12.9 12.4 12.5 11.3 11.3 10.9 9.0 9.0
    Transport, storage and 
communications 25.3 24.6 16.4 21.1 21.9 24.6 25.6 21.8 16.9 18.5 21.5
 Other  services 1) 18.6 18.2 18.8 23.1 20.7 26.5 21.3 22.4 18.8 11.3 21.4
Investment in intangible fixed assets to value added
 All  sectors 1.2 0.6 1.3 2.0 1.9 3.8 2.4 1.3 1.5 2.0 1.8
 Manufacturing 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.0 1.2 1.4 1.4
  Electricity, gas and water supply 0.8 -8.2 0.6 0.9 2.6 2.4 1.1 0.0 0.7 1.3 3.2
 Construction 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.4 1.5
  Wholesale and retail trade 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.6 2.5 3.2 2.3 1.8 2.0 1.5 2.1
    Transport, storage and 
communications 1.5 1.4 1.3 4.4 2.4 13.0 3.9 -0.8 1.7 5.0 2.1
 Other  services 1) 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.6 2.7 3.7 2.2 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.1
Investment in financial fixed assets to value added
 All  sectors 6.2 9.0 11.4 11.8 14.1 20.9 14.9 10.5 10.5 13.0 18.2
 Manufacturing 6.4 8.1 9.6 8.8 9.5 14.8 11.5 10.9 9.8 9.0 10.9
  Electricity, gas and water supply 5.8 12.0 20.6 31.5 31.8 49.4 19.8 18.2 22.7 13.4 28.8
 Construction 4.7 3.6 2.1 3.6 12.1 2.7 2.6 1.7 4.2 3.4 4.1
  Wholesale and retail trade 5.0 6.4 7.8 7.7 6.7 10.5 12.4 7.9 6.5 4.6 6.1
    Transport, storage and 
communications 3.5 8.1 21.4 12.1 26.1 29.0 14.3 8.5 15.3 4.1 19.8
 Other  services 1) 13.0 22.4 15.1 20.3 17.3 40.0 31.0 14.6 10.1 43.8 49.8
Sources: European Commission, BACH database; ECB and NCB calculations.
Note: For Germany, data for the sectors “electricity, gas and water supply”, “transport, storage and communication” and “other services” 
are only available from 1998 onwards. For Portugal, data for the sector “electricity, gas and water supply” start in 1996 and for 
“wholesale and retail trade” in 1997. For Finland, data for all sectors only start in 1999. 
1) Other services include hotels and restaurants as well as real estate, renting and business activities.
2) Return on assets and return on equity are defined as the profit / loss of the financial year in percentage of total assets and, respectively, 
capital and reserves.116
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Table 20 Debt and interest burden of euro area non-financial corporations across sectors  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Debt, annual rate of change in percentages 
 All  sectors 4.6 0.9 6.8 6.9 10.2 19.6 4.4 3.3 2.6 2.5 5.2
 Manufacturing 5.6 1.8 7.5 8.1 8.1 15.9 5.9 3.4 2.3 3.7 3.5
  Electricity, gas and water supply 1.0 -0.9 -4.1 4.1 2.7 26.3 7.4 5.0 3.5 3.9 13.8
 Construction 5.6 3.6 2.8 4.9 13.1 12.8 6.3 4.3 1.1 2.7 8.8
  Wholesale and retail trade 7.0 2.3 9.1 6.2 10.0 10.8 7.3 1.5 2.4 3.2 5.4
   Transport, storage and 
communications -0.6 -5.0 4.4 2.9 17.6 43.8 -4.4 3.2 3.4 -2.1 4.2
 Other  services 1) 5.5 2.4 13.7 11.0 11.7 13.5 6.7 4.2 2.7 2.8 4.8
Capital and reserves, annual rate of change in percentages 
 All  sectors 6.5 5.5 9.8 8.1 9.4 18.4 9.6 3.3 5.2 6.3 8.6
 Manufacturing 6.1 5.9 8.8 7.9 6.6 14.0 5.1 4.9 2.7 5.8 7.8
  Electricity, gas and water supply 3.9 11.5 12.9 4.0 5.5 15.0 8.8 5.8 9.5 1.7 7.8
 Construction 0.2 2.3 5.4 10.4 12.9 16.0 9.6 11.9 6.6 8.6 17.3
  Wholesale and retail trade 7.4 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.0 11.3 24.4 4.3 7.2 6.8 7.2
   Transport, storage and 
communications 8.4 -2.7 9.1 5.2 10.0 27.6 4.8 3.2 13.6 7.1 9.1
 Other  services 1) 8.6 7.5 15.7 14.6 19.0 29.5 14.3 -1.9 1.7 8.2 9.7
Debt to assets
 All  sectors 60.2 58.8 59.0 58.1 58.1 58.8 58.0 57.5 57.4 56.1 55.4
 Manufacturing 57.7 56.5 56.8 56.9 56.6 57.2 57.1 56.7 56.6 56.7 55.2
  Electricity, gas and water supply 53.3 51.1 48.4 45.6 44.3 46.8 47.4 47.3 47.2 47.1 48.9
 Construction 73.6 73.4 72.4 71.2 71.6 71.6 71.4 68.2 67.8 69.9 69.1
  Wholesale and retail trade 69.9 68.7 69.2 68.9 68.2 68.6 66.0 64.7 63.8 64.6 65.0
   Transport, storage and 
communications 57.0 55.7 56.4 55.2 58.1 61.8 61.8 58.1 58.6 56.4 54.8
 Other  services 1) 59.6 57.6 58.2 58.8 57.4 55.2 53.3 55.2 55.5 51.4 50.7
Debt to equity
 All  sectors 190.8 178.5 178.7 177.1 177.0 179.1 170.1 169.3 165.9 153.6 148.9
 Manufacturing 170.4 159.9 160.6 159.7 158.3 160.2 160.8 159.0 159.1 158.1 148.2
  Electricity, gas and water supply 193.3 166.6 141.9 136.8 131.4 138.2 132.9 129.2 127.7 127.9 138.2
 Construction 379.7 372.1 352.6 322.5 331.4 323.9 316.4 263.3 262.7 294.8 276.5
  Wholesale and retail trade 272.5 255.9 260.8 256.5 250.8 253.5 220.7 208.3 198.6 206.8 210.1
   Transport, storage and 
communications 163.4 162.8 170.8 173.4 197.7 230.3 219.7 212.6 194.4 173.4 160.0
 Other  services 1) 166.7 151.3 155.7 169.0 157.6 140.2 128.4 140.8 142.7 116.1 112.0
Debt to cash flow
 All  sectors 752.1 749.3 727.8 695.2 710.7 724.6 814.3 857.9 799.1 731.7 699.9
 Manufacturing 646.0 643.7 613.8 608.9 621.5 585.2 706.2 690.2 742.5 665.6 610.6
  Electricity, gas and water supply 569.6 534.2 484.3 532.5 534.7 605.2 548.2 508.5 609.3 542.4 578.3
 Construction 1,544.4 1,488.5 1,378.0 1,210.6 1,350.1 944.6 1,122.5 1,028.3 1,090.1 1,012.6 1,160.9
  Wholesale and retail trade 977.2 1,009.8 1,017.1 961.4 919.3 950.7 911.0 917.2 849.8 895.4 885.1
   Transport, storage and 
communications 754.8 773.7 792.3 607.3 662.4 877.0 1,037.7 1,293.4 764.1 713.2 710.8
 Other  services 1) 980.6 976.8 955.1 891.4 871.5 850.2 990.5 1,354.8 1,000.0 802.4 734.6
Gross interest payments to gross operating profit 
 All  sectors 32.0 28.8 29.1 26.2 24.8 28.8 31.7 33.1 34.1 31.9 30.6
 Manufacturing 29.4 26.3 25.3 23.9 21.7 25.0 29.6 28.3 27.6 24.3 24.0
  Electricity, gas and water supply 25.4 20.5 18.0 19.4 19.5 22.5 19.8 18.0 24.2 19.0 23.0
 Construction 40.4 37.9 33.6 27.3 24.6 21.3 21.6 22.6 21.2 19.8 21.5
  Wholesale and retail trade 33.4 31.3 31.0 26.9 24.3 30.1 25.5 23.8 22.3 21.0 21.3
   Transport, storage and 
communications 27.2 25.3 28.9 23.6 24.1 29.2 36.4 37.4 36.0 25.2 27.7
 Other  services 1) 68.2 60.7 67.4 47.7 44.0 48.5 54.0 69.7 76.1 87.3 72.0117
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Table 20 Debt and interest burden of euro area non-financial corporations across sectors 
(cont’d)
Source: European Commission, BACH database; ECB and NCB calculations.
Note: For Germany, data for the sectors “electricity, gas and water supply”, “transport, storage and communication” and “other services” 
are only available from 1998 onwards. For Portugal, data for the sector “electricity, gas and water supply” start in 1996 and for 
“wholesale and retail trade” in 1997. For Finland, data for all sectors only start in 1999.
1) Other services include hotels and restaurants as well as real estate, renting and business activities.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gross interest payments to debt
 All  sectors 7.9 7.1 6.4 5.8 4.9 5.2 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.5 4.5
 Manufacturing 8.3 7.4 6.6 6.1 5.1 5.5 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.4 4.3
  Electricity, gas and water supply 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.1 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 3.6 4.1
 Construction 9.1 8.2 7.3 6.1 4.5 4.5 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.5
  Wholesale and retail trade 8.0 7.3 6.4 6.0 5.1 5.6 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.5
    Transport, storage and 
communications 7.1 7.4 6.8 6.4 5.3 5.2 6.3 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.9
 Other  services 1) 7.5 6.3 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.9 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.5118
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Table 21 Capital structure of euro area non-financial corporations across sectors  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Short-term assets to total assets
 All  sectors 50.5 49.1 50.3 47.8 48.0 47.9 46.9 46.2 46.6 44.9 45.3
 Manufacturing 56.3 54.5 54.9 54.9 53.8 53.0 52.0 51.8 51.1 51.6 51.4
  Electricity, gas and water supply 18.4 17.2 18.8 22.8 22.7 23.1 24.7 23.6 23.5 23.4 25.8
 Construction 77.2 77.2 76.8 75.8 72.9 73.5 72.8 71.3 73.6 75.5 76.4
  Wholesale and retail trade 69.5 68.8 68.9 68.8 68.8 68.7 66.1 65.0 65.3 67.4 67.1
   Transport, storage and 
communications 22.5 22.8 24.2 23.6 29.1 34.8 32.4 30.1 29.3 28.2 25.3
 Other  services 1) 46.6 44.0 47.4 43.0 42.2 40.2 39.6 40.2 41.3 35.2 36.7
Intangible fixed assets to total assets
 All  sectors 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.8 3.9
 Manufacturing 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.6 3.7
  Electricity, gas and water supply 4.5 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.4 3.3 3.3 4.0 3.9
 Construction 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.0
  Wholesale and retail trade 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.3 4.6
   Transport, storage and 
communications 1.7 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.9 4.7 5.0 4.2 4.9 6.5 6.4
 Other  services 1) 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.6
Tangible fixed assets to total assets
 All  sectors 30.1 30.7 28.8 31.0 27.9 26.2 25.9 27.0 25.7 23.9 22.9
 Manufacturing 21.4 21.4 20.6 20.3 19.7 18.2 18.0 17.5 17.4 17.0 16.3
  Electricity, gas and water supply 64.0 66.3 65.4 57.3 47.9 49.7 49.9 52.0 50.3 51.5 45.7
 Construction 11.6 11.4 11.3 11.8 14.1 14.5 16.0 17.4 14.2 11.9 11.2
  Wholesale and retail trade 15.6 15.8 15.3 15.5 15.1 14.3 15.0 15.3 14.9 14.0 14.0
   Transport, storage and 
communications 63.2 65.5 59.3 58.1 47.6 40.3 40.8 45.4 41.3 43.7 43.5
 Other  services 1) 27.7 27.8 26.1 33.6 31.7 29.6 27.7 28.5 29.2 20.5 19.8
Financial fixed assets to total assets
 All  sectors 16.0 16.9 17.6 17.8 20.5 22.0 23.1 22.5 23.2 26.5 27.1
 Manufacturing 19.6 21.2 21.6 21.6 23.2 25.0 26.0 26.3 26.8 27.0 28.0
  Electricity, gas and water supply 10.0 11.3 11.2 16.2 25.2 23.4 21.5 19.6 21.7 19.9 23.3
 Construction 9.7 9.9 10.2 10.6 11.0 10.1 8.8 8.5 9.0 9.5 9.4
  Wholesale and retail trade 11.6 12.1 12.3 12.0 12.2 12.7 14.5 15.2 15.1 13.5 13.5
   Transport, storage and 
communications 10.4 7.8 12.3 13.7 18.4 19.3 20.7 19.3 23.6 20.7 24.0
 Other  services 1) 22.8 25.1 23.2 20.9 23.3 27.4 29.9 28.0 26.2 40.9 39.9
Short-term debt to total debt
 All  sectors 62.6 62.7 63.8 61.7 62.9 65.0 63.2 63.1 61.7 59.6 59.5
 Manufacturing 68.2 67.4 68.7 68.4 68.1 69.3 68.6 68.8 66.7 67.6 67.7
  Electricity, gas and water supply 28.5 29.4 31.4 36.3 38.9 40.5 41.9 44.9 43.1 42.5 43.3
 Construction 84.5 85.0 84.5 83.6 80.2 79.9 77.9 78.7 81.8 82.4 76.3
  Wholesale and retail trade 79.9 79.7 79.8 80.5 81.1 81.5 80.3 79.8 78.6 78.8 79.3
   Transport, storage and 
communications 36.6 40.8 38.0 36.8 45.6 56.9 50.4 49.4 44.1 43.9 40.9
 Other  services 1) 52.9 51.9 55.1 53.0 53.4 54.3 52.8 52.3 52.9 44.4 44.5
Long-term debt to total debt
 All  sectors 37.4 37.3 36.2 38.3 37.1 35.0 36.8 36.9 38.3 40.4 40.5
 Manufacturing 31.8 32.6 31.3 31.6 31.9 30.7 31.4 31.2 33.3 32.4 32.3
  Electricity, gas and water supply 71.5 70.6 68.6 63.7 61.1 59.5 58.1 55.1 56.9 57.6 56.7
 Construction 15.5 15.0 15.6 16.4 19.8 20.1 22.1 21.3 18.2 17.6 23.7
  Wholesale and retail trade 20.2 20.3 20.2 19.6 18.9 18.5 19.7 20.2 21.5 21.2 20.7
   Transport, storage and 
communications 63.4 59.2 62.1 63.2 54.4 43.1 49.6 50.6 55.9 56.1 59.1
 Other  services 1) 47.1 48.1 44.9 47.0 46.6 45.7 47.2 47.7 47.1 55.6 55.5119
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Table 21 Capital structure of euro area non-financial corporations across sectors (cont’d)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Short-term assets to short-term debt
 All  sectors 134.0 133.2 133.6 133.5 131.3 125.1 127.7 127.3 131.4 134.2 137.3
 Manufacturing 143.0 143.3 140.6 141.0 139.6 133.8 132.7 132.8 135.4 134.5 137.5
  Electricity, gas and water supply 121.5 114.9 123.8 137.7 131.8 121.9 124.2 111.1 115.3 117.1 121.6
 Construction 124.1 123.7 125.5 127.3 127.0 128.4 130.9 132.9 132.7 131.2 144.9
  Wholesale and retail trade 124.5 125.5 124.8 124.2 124.2 122.9 124.8 126.0 130.4 132.2 130.1
    Transport, storage and 
communications 107.9 100.2 113.1 116.2 109.9 99.1 104.1 104.7 113.2 113.9 112.6
 Other  services 1) 147.8 147.2 147.7 138.0 137.5 134.3 140.7 139.1 140.7 154.4 162.6
Long-term assets to long-term debt
 All  sectors 214.9 227.2 227.5 229.9 236.6 248.7 244.7 249.0 238.4 239.0 229.5
 Manufacturing 234.9 244.0 250.0 247.8 252.0 263.0 264.4 266.7 253.4 258.8 251.6
  Electricity, gas and water supply 206.0 220.8 237.2 259.9 278.9 270.4 267.7 286.8 281.0 278.7 246.9
 Construction 194.8 201.6 197.8 199.4 183.1 177.4 165.9 190.1 204.1 189.4 131.1
  Wholesale and retail trade 210.5 218.1 216.8 225.8 235.7 239.7 254.1 260.9 247.7 231.9 229.9
    Transport, storage and 
communications 208.4 227.9 209.8 213.1 218.0 241.3 217.2 234.3 212.8 224.0 222.9
 Other  services 1) 185.9 197.5 195.6 202.1 212.5 232.9 236.7 222.9 220.2 223.2 216.3
Source: European Commission, BACH database; ECB and NCB calculations.
Note: For Germany, data for the sectors “electricity, gas and water supply”, “transport, storage and communication” and “other services” 
are only available from 1998 onwards. For Portugal, data for the sector “electricity, gas and water supply” start in 1996 and for 
“wholesale and retail trade” in 1997. For Finland, data for all sectors only start in 1999.
1) Other services include hotels and restaurants as well as real estate, renting and business activities.120
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WEIGHTING SCHEME
To take into account existing differences in size 
and sectoral composition, the analysis in 
Chapter 2 uses adjusted financial indicators to 
apply a common weighting scheme to all 
countries. In other words, instead of aggregating 
for each country the values calculated 
for each size-sectoral combination (e.g. small 
manufacturing firms and large energy firms) 
with the weight that each combination holds in 
that country, we apply a common weight to all 
countries – the weight of each size-sectoral 
combination in the euro area (as derived from 
the BACH database). This way, all countries 
are made to have the same size-sectoral 
composition and therefore, to the extent that 
BACH accurately mapps national economies, 
the country-level variables calculated this way 
should reflect cross-country differences rather 
than differences in the size or sectoral 
composition of each country.
Analytically: 
t d dst s dst Yi yi we () () ()
,, ,, =∑∑
where Y is the aggregate value of the variable 
at the country level, y the value of the variable 
at the size-sectoral level and w the weight in 
terms of value added of the size-sectoral 
combination. I denotes 1…n countries and e 
the euro area, d denotes 1…p size classes, s 
denotes 1…q sectors and t denotes 1…T years 
recorded in the sample. 
Since the weighting scheme is the same for all 
variables and is based on value added, the 
values of the indicators for the euro area change 
as well. This is because the implicit weighting 
scheme for the unadjusted indicators is different 
for each variable and is based on the variable 
used as the denominator for each ratio.
INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS
Chapter 2 uses a set of institutional indicators, 
most of which have been recently collected by 
Hartmann et al. (2006). This annex contains the 
definitions and references to the original data 
sources used to construct the indicators.
FOR LEGAL PROTECTION
Shareholders’ rights:
Data sources: R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, 
A. Schleifer and R. W. Vishny (1998), “Law 
and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy; 
OECD Corporate Governance and Company 
Law Database.
Notes: The index ranges from 0 to 6. The lower 
the score, the weaker shareholders’ rights are. 
The index is computed as the sum of the 
following variables: (1) proxy by mail allowed; 
(2) shares not blocked before meeting; 
(3) cumulative voting or proportional 
representation; (4) oppressed minorities 
mechanism; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) 
percentage of share capital needed to call an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting. Variables 
from (1) to (5) equal 1 if allowed and 0 
otherwise, while (6) equals 1 when the minimum 
required percentage is less than 20%, and 0 
otherwise. This update is not available for the 
US for 2005. Data for 1998 have been appended. 
Euro area figures are averages of euro area 
country data weighted by stock market 
capitalisation.
Creditors’ rights:
Data source: Djankov et al. (2006a).
Notes: The index ranges from 0 to 4. The higher 
the score, the higher the degree of protection. A 
score of one is assigned when each of the 
following rights of secured lenders is defined 
in laws and regulations. First, there are 
restrictions, such as creditor consent or 
minimum dividends, for a debtor to file for 
reorganisation. Second, secured creditors are 
able to seize their collateral after the 
reorganisation petition has been approved, 
i.e. there is no “automatic stay” or “asset 
freeze”. Third, secured creditors are paid first 
out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt 
firm, as opposed to other creditors such as 
government or workers. Finally, if management 
ANNEX 2
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102 Prepared  by  Annalisa  Ferrando.121
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does not retain administration of its property 
pending the resolution of the reorganisation, 
euro area figures are averages of euro area 
country data weighted by GDP.
FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS
Data source: “Governance Matters V: Aggregate 
and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-
2005”.
Notes: The rule of law indicator reveals the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
the quality of contact enforcement, the police, 
and the courts as well as the likelihood of crime 
and violence.
FOR BANK MARKET STRUCTURE
H statistics:
Data sources: Bankscope and ECB calculations.
Note: The H statistic measures the elasticity of 
firms’ output to input prices. Under competition, 
the H statistic is 1, and under monopoly equal 
to or lower than 0. More information on the 
computation of this indicator can be found in 
sub-section 3.7 of Hartman et al. (2006). Euro 
area figures have been estimated by considering 
the euro area as a single country (i.e. using all 
euro area banks).
FOR TAXATION
Data source: “Taxation of Corporate and Capital 
Income”, OECD (2005).
Notes:  Combined corporate income tax rates 
typically apply to or are targeted at “small 
(incorporated) businesses”, where they are 
targeted based on size alone (e.g. number of 
employees, amount of assets,  turnover or 
taxable income), and not on the basis of 
expenditure or other targeting criteria. A “small 
business corporate tax rate” may be a special 
statutory corporate tax rate applicable to (all or 
part of) the taxable income of qualifying 
“small” firms (e.g. ones that meet a turnover, 
income or asset test), or an effective corporate 
tax rate below the basic statutory corporate rate 
provided through a tax deduction, or a credit 
for “small” firms determined as a percentage of 
qualifying taxable income (e.g. up to a given 
threshold).122
ECB
Occasional Paper No 63
June 2007
ANNEX 3
SMES IN THE EURO AREA:  
SECTORAL AND COUNTRY LANDSCAPES103
This annex provides an indication of the role 
that SMEs play across the various sectors of 
the economy and across the euro area countries. 
In order to provide an alternative analysis to 
the one based on the BACH database (see 
Annex 1), another source with different 
representativeness characteristics – the 
Observatory of European SMEs – is used to 
assess the weights of SMEs at the sectoral and 
country levels.104
The data from the Observatory suggest that the 
overwhelming majority of euro area enterprises 
are SMEs, with only 0.2% of companies 
classified as large firms (i.e. ones with 250 or 
more employees, see Table 22). Most SMEs are 
micro-enterprises, employing less than ten 
persons (this class accounts for more than 90% 
of all firms). In addition, around two-thirds of 
the labour force work in SMEs, generating 
around 60% of value added in the euro area. 
The relevance of SMEs differs considerably 
across sectors (see Chart 35). On the basis of 
data related to the EU 15, SMEs clearly play a 
key role in some sectors such as construction, 
wholesale trade and retail trade, where they 
account for more than 70% of employment and 
value added (rising to over 85% in the 
construction sector). By contrast, large firms 
predominate in large-scale industries, such as 
extraction and transport and communication, 
where they account for more than 60% of value 
added and more than half of employment (with 
75% in the extraction sector) (see Charts 36 
and 37).
In addition, there are large disparities in 
the SME landscape across countries (see 
Table 22 Stylised facts on SMEs in the euro area
Micro Small Medium SME Large Total
Number of enterprises (X 1000) 14 640  964  138 15 743  30 15 773
in %  92.8  6.1  0.9  99.8 0.2
Occupied persons (X 1000) 43 753 18 724 13 428 75 905 28 206 104 111
in %  42  18  12.9  72.9  27.1
Value added (euro millions) 1 315 339 1 146 331 978 818 3 440 548 2 303 5 743 963
in %  22.9  20  17 58.9  40.1
Source: Observatory of European SMEs (2003 data for number of enterprises and occupied persons, 2000 data for value added).
Note: Size is defined on the basis of the number of occupied persons (1 to 9 for micro firms, 10 to 49 for small firms, 50 to 249 for 
medium-sized firms, 250 and over for large firms).
103  Prepared by Philippine Cour-Thimann.
104 The figures presented by the Observatory of European SMEs 
rely on EUROBASE, the ENSR (European Network for SME 
Research) database on the size class structure of European 
enterprises developed by EIM on the basis of ‘Enterprises in 
Europe’ from Eurostat. For the purposes of this report, it is 
important to highlight that the use of this alternative source has 
some drawbacks since: i) it is based on a different size criterion 
(on the number of employees instead of turnover as in the 
BACH database, delimiting four instead of three size classes); 
ii) it includes sole proprietors and partnerships (instead of just 
corporations as in the BACH database); iii) it is neither 
regularly updated nor timely; and iv) data for the euro area are 
not readily available.123
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Medium-sized ﬁ  rms (< 250 employees)
Source: Own calculations based on Observatory of European SMEs.
Notes: Data are for 2000 and are not readily available for the euro area. The sectoral breakdown corresponds to the NACE 
classification.124
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Source: Own calculations based on Observatory of European SMEs. 
Notes: Data are for 2000 and are not readily available for the euro area. The sectoral breakdown corresponds to the NACE classification.125
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Source: Own calculations based on Observatory of European SMEs. 
Notes: Data are for 2000 and are not readily available for the euro area. The sectoral breakdown corresponds to the NACE 
classification.126
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Table 23). While SMEs account for two-thirds 
of employment in the euro area, this share is 
much higher in Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece (80% or more, based on data for 2000). 
Employment is especially concentrated in 
micro firms in these countries (as well as in 
Belgium). By contrast, the share of SMEs in 
employment is much lower in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland (at around 60%). In 
fact, among the four size groups, large 
companies clearly account for most of the 
employment in these countries as well as in 
Austria and Ireland. In terms of value added, 
the contribution from SMEs is above the euro 
area average of around 60% in Italy, Greece 
and Luxembourg (at around 70% or above), 
and considerably below in Ireland (at 33%), or 
in Finland and France (at around 45%).
Table 23 Weights in value added and employment by size group for each country
(in percentages, 2000 data)
Value added Employment
micro small medium SME large micro small medium SME
Austria 14 18 19 51 49 24 22 20 65
Belgium 29 20 15 64 36 43 16 10 69
Finland 18 14 12 44 56 26 17 16 59
France 18 15 13 46 54 34 19 14 67
Germany 19 21 19 60 40 28 20 11 60
Greece 34 30 19 83 17 57 17 13 87
Ireland 7 11 16 33 67 25 24 21 70
Italy 32 24 15 71 29 48 21 11 80
Luxembourg 9 14 51 74 26 24 24 25 72
Netherlands 16 16 24 56 44 25 18 19 62
Portugal 24 22 21 67 33 38 23 18 79
Spain 20 17 18 66 45 47 20 13 79
Euro area 23 20 17 60 40 36 20 13 69
Source: Observatory of European SMEs. 127
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This annex explains the methodology used in 
Chapter 3 to address the question of how the 
financing pattern of SMEs differs from that of 
large firms when also accounting for sectoral 
and country factors. 
VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
A simple tool that can be used to assess whether 
size matters for the financing pattern of a firm 
is variance decomposition, which allows the 
variance of a dataset that can be explained by a 
certain factor (such as firm size) to be compared 
with what is left unexplained by that factor.106
To this aim, the factor is used to organise the 
dataset into classes (e.g. small firms, medium-
sized firms and large firms). The variance 
explained by a factor is also called variance 
between classes, and the residual variance is 
the variance within classes. In terms of sums of 
squares:
SS SS SS between d within d =+ ,
where d represents size classes. 
With the BACH data, the classes can be 
organised around factors such as size (3 size 
classes), sector (6), country (9) or time (11 
years from 1995 to 2005, or a subset). Thus, a 
structural analysis of the financing patterns of 
firms can be conducted by making full use of 
the size, sectoral and country dimensions of 
BACH (leaving aside the time dimension).107 
The “variance between” captures the 
heterogeneity between the classes considered. 
For example, when the factor size is considered, 
the variance between size classes expressed in 
percentage of the total variance captures the 
contribution of size to the heterogeneity of 
firms’ financing patterns, relative to the overall 
heterogeneity due also to the other (sectoral 
and country) dimensions. The variance 
decomposition is conducted in a similar way 
for the sector and country factors. The “variance 
between” obtained from these decompositions 
can then be compared to assess the relative 
relevance of the factors. This allows conclusions 
to be drawn on how relevant size is in explaining 
financing patterns, vis-à-vis the sector of 
activity or country of origin.
As for the “variance within”, it is the sum of 
the variances within each of the (e.g. size) 
classes: 









The variance within a given size class captures 
the heterogeneity of the class that is due in part 
to the sector and country dimensions, using 54 
observations (6 sectors times 9 countries). The 
variance within a size class can be usefully 
compared with the variance within another size 
class. For instance, the heterogeneity of small 
firms can be found to be larger than that of 
medium-sized or large firms for a given 
financial indicator.
The “variance within” can also be decomposed 
further in several ways, allowing several 
overlapping factors to be captured. For instance, 
in the case of the size factor:
SSwithin d = SSd, between s + SSd, within s = 
SSd, between i + SSd, within i ,
where d represents size classes, s sectors and 
i countries, and where SSd, between s is, for a 
given size class d, the sum of squares between 
sectors s. 
SSd, between s and SSd, between i can be compared to 
assess the relative relevance of the sector and 
country factors for the variability of financing 
patterns in a given size class.
105  Prepared by Philippine Cour-Thimann.
106  The analysis conducted here is a one-factor variance analysis 
and not a multifactor variance analysis (i.e. one in which several 
factors would be considered jointly).
107  The average over the period 1999-2005 is taken for each size-
sector-country observation. Alternatively, one observation per 
year could have been used. This would have implied an 
additional source of variation associated with the time 
dimension, and a priori lowered the computed contribution of 
size to the total variance. Considering the time dimension would 
allow for an analysis of the relevance of variations over time 
in comparison to other sources of variability such as sector, 
country or size.
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Overall, the variance decomposition sheds light 
on the heterogeneity in the financing pattern 
of firms, and in particular on the relative 
contributions of each factor to the variance in 
this pattern. A statistical test based on the ratio 
of the variance between over the variance 
within components can also be used to assess 
the significance of each factor (size, sector and 
country) for the financing pattern. 
WEIGHTING SCHEME
As shown in Annex 1, the sample of firms used 
in BACH is partly biased.108 This bias could 
affect the conclusions obtained with regard to 
the relevance of size (or another factor) for the 
financing pattern of firms. To minimise this 
problem, the analysis in Chapter 3 is conducted 
also on the basis of adjusted data. That is, the 
financial indicators are weighted, using the 
breakdown of value added by sectors in the 
national accounts of the euro area countries 
(which are by definition representative of the 
economies in question).
In addition to allowing for the correction of 
biases in the country and sector representations 
in the BACH database when analysing the 
relevance of size, the weighting scheme applied 
in Chapter 3 also serves a second purpose, that 
is, to isolate the effect of size by controlling for 
country and sectoral effects. This purpose is 
similar to that of Chapter 2 (see also Annex 2), 
where the role of the country there is replaced 
by that of size here. Indeed, the weighting 
scheme used in Chapter 3 also corresponds to 
applying the same country-sectoral composition 
to all size classes. While this masks part of the 
heterogeneity that exists across size classes, it 
does allow the size-level variables to reflect 
differences that relate solely to the size factor, 
and not to the concentration in the different 
countries or the sectoral composition of each 
size class. 
In addition to the size factor, the relevance of 
the sector of activity and country of origin also 
briefly analysed in Chapter 3 ideally calls for 
the use of similar weighting schemes, where 
the role of size is replaced respectively by that 
of sector or country. However, for the country-
size and sector-size combinations, only a partial 
weighting scheme based on value added in the 
sectoral national accounts has been applied 
(again owing to the lack of information on 
size).109 The use of partial weighting schemes 
in Chapter 3 implies that the differences 
between adjusted indicators computed at the 
sectoral (and country) levels will not only 
reflect sectoral (country) differences, but also 
differences in the size class concentrations in 
each sector (country) as reported in BACH. 
Regarding the variance decomposition, the 
sample bias mentioned above could also affect 
the conclusions obtained with regard to the 
relevance of size (or another factor) for the 
financing pattern of firms. Therefore, the 
variance decomposition is conducted also on 
the basis of adjusted data. Thus, the variance 
within a size class is equal to the weighted sum 
of squared differences (which are the differences 
between the indicator and its weighted average 
in the size class), where the weights are the 
shares of value added for the sector-country 
combinations in total value added, aggregated 
over the sectors and countries considered. 
However, the variance between size classes is 
not weighted as there is no of information on 
size in the national accounts.
108 Some sectors and countries are over/under-represented.
109  BACH was still used to derive the weights for the sector/size 
combinations in Chapter 2, where it was crucial to weight the 
data by relating size for the purpose of the analysis conducted, 
notwithstanding the introduction of bias. Therefore, the size/
sector combinations are not fully comparable to those of 
Chapter 2.129
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Table 24 Overview of European surveys on investment/business constraints
Country Title Conducted  by  Periodicity/ 
last date
Sample size and 
sectors
Definition of size Questions more directly 





States of the 
EEA and 
Switzerland)

























Which of the following 
factors has been the major 
constraint on your 
business performance over 
the last two years?
With how many banks do 
you have credit lines?
Did you obtain all the 
loans you needed from 
your banks in the last three 
years?
What is the most important 
reason why you did not get 
































Which of the following 
factors has been the major 
constraint on your 
business performance over 






























Would you say that in 
general your company’s 
current financing is 
sufficient to see your 
projects through?
Which of the following 
would best assure the 
development of your 
company?
Which of the following 
institutions did your 
company go to in order to 
obtain one or several types 
of financing?
30 countries 










The survey is 
not at firm-level. 





The questionnaire asked 
about the existence of a 
financing gap, the reasons 
for such a gap, and the 
type of gap (equity or 
debt).
110  Prepared by Paola Antão.130
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directly related to 
business constraints
Results












and services to 
enterprises





There is one 
question that looks 
at the evolution of 
credit standards 
(interest rates, 
charges and fees, 
credit volume, 
collateral) over the 
previous six months.
General credit 
conditions have been 
improving since 2002. 
Smaller firms tend to 
evaluate credit 
conditions less 
favourably than large 
firms.
































during the last 
12 months?
Very few firms, even 
in the micro-firm 
class, claim to have 
encountered any 
problems in obtaining 
external financing 
(around 3% of service 
firms and 5% of 
manufacturing firms). 
Thus, financial factors 
do not seem to 
constrain firms’ 
activities significantly.






















– last review 
Sep. 2006
All sectors
FIBEN data = 









of size can 
be used: on 




A scoring of risk and 
default probability 
(with horizons of 
1, 2, 3 years) is 
annually computed 
based on the balance 
sheet data.
The balance sheet 
data completed with 
interview-based 
evidence are used to 
construct credit 
ratings at the firm 
level, which are 
provided to the 
banking sector 
(updated on a daily 
basis).
A low credit rating 
can be considered as 
an indicator of 
financing constraints. 
The credit rating 
distribution highlights 
a relationship between 
size and default as 
well as a relationship 
with the sector of 
activity.






a) Ifo Institute 
b) KfW 
Bankengruppe





















50 and 199, 
between 200 
and 999 and 
≥1000 




a) SMEs investment is 
more volatile than 
investment of large 
firms. 
b) In the 2005 report, 
SMEs listed the lack 
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Table 25 Overview of national surveys on investment/business constraints (cont’d)







directly related to 
business constraints
Results




Banca d’Italia (not 
regular) 
2003







(C, D, E, G, H, 










1. State whether, at 
the terms and 
conditions (cost and 
collateral) currently 
applied, the firm 
would like to 
borrow more from 
banks or other 
lenders. 
2. If you answered 
yes to the above 
question, please say 
whether the firm 
would be willing, at 
present, to pay a 
slightly higher rate 
of interest or to 
accept slightly 
harsher terms and 
conditions (e.g. 
extra collateral) in 
order to borrow 
more.
1. The survey reveals 
that some 11% of 
firms, in industry and 
services alike, wish to 
borrow more from 
banks and financial 
institutions at current 
conditions regarding 
cost and collateral 
(this figure is 2.3% 
lower than in 2002).
Regarding size, this 
figure is 10% of firms 
with less than 49 
employees and 14% 
for firms with more 
than 50 employees. 
This may suggest that 
larger firms may be 
more constrained than 
smaller ones. 
2. Only 3.2% of firms 
willing to accept 
slightly worse credit 
conditions were 

























The sample is 
divided into four 
categories: firms 
that have obtained 
bank finance (34%), 
firms that are 
declined bank 
finance (4%), firms 
that avoid bank 
finance due to 
earlier negative 
experiences with 
banks (3%), and 
firms that rely on 
other financing 
sources, but not 
because of earlier 
negative experiences 
with banks (59%). 
The research looks 
into the following 
questions: What are 
the main bottlenecks 
for obtaining bank 
finance? According 
to banks, what 
should firms do to 
become eligible for 
finance? According 
to firms, what 
should banks do to 
become eligible as 
financiers?
Very few firms report 
to have encountered 
problems in obtaining 
external financing 
(3% of the sample), 
and few firms have 
avoided applying for 
bank financing purely 
because of difficulties 
in the past with 
obtaining bank 
finances (just 4% of 
the sample). 132
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Table 25 Overview of national surveys on investment/business constraints (cont’d)







directly related to 
business constraints
Results










firms in sectors 
C, D, E, F, G, 












1. Were your 
investment decisions 
constrained for any 
reason?
2. If yes, for what 
reason? 
3. Out of the 
reasons mentioned, 
please indicate the 
most important one.
1. Around 50% of ﬁ  rms 
with less than 49 
employees answered 
positively, while 46% 
of ﬁ  rms with more than 
250 also answered the 
same way. 
2. Three main reasons 
can be identified: 
decreasing sales, 
uncertain returns, and 
self-financing 
restrictions. Around 
14% of firms 
mentioned the 
difficulty in obtaining 
credit. 
3. However, this is 
“the most” important 
factor for only 4% of 
firms. 
[In the 1990s the 
ranking for the main 
reasons was: high 
level of interest rates, 
self-financing 
capacity, difficulty in 
obtaining credit.]















































a) How are each of 




and other factors) 
influencing 
investment?
b) What factors 
limit your firms’ 
activity?
a) In recent years, 
ﬁ  nancial situation is 
ranked in second or 
third place as a factor 
inﬂ  uencing investment, 
after the evolution of 




policy, ﬁ  scal rules, etc).
b) Financial difﬁ  culties 
are ranked in fourth 
place by around 11% of 
ﬁ  rms. This factor is 
among the most 
important factors that 
ﬁ  rms quote as limiting 
their activity in recent 
years, after the 
weakness of demand, 
the increase in 
competition and 
shortage of qualiﬁ  ed 
workers. 
In general, smaller 












SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON FINANCING 
CONSTRAINTS 111
Table 26 Selected empirical studies on financing constraints (mainly in euro area countries), 
by factor and methodology 
Mainly euro area countries Other countries




Galeotti et al. (1994) IT
Bianco (1997) IT
Gaiotti and Generale (2001) IT
Beaudu and Heckel (2001) AT, BE, 
FR, IT,DE, ES, NL and PT
Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) LU 
Butzen et al. (2001) BE
Cincera (2002) BE
Gérard and Verschueren (2002) BE







Väänänen (2005) FI 
Athanasoglou et al. 
(2006) GR
Wagenvoort (2003) 
Almeida et al. (2004)
Ayyagari et al. (2006)
Beck et al. (2006)
Beck et al. (2005)
Carpenter et al. (1994)
Demirgüç-Kunt and 




Opler et al. (1999) US
No size 
effect
Bond et al. (2003a) BE, FR, DE and 
UK
Bond et al. (2003b) DE and UK
Chatelain et al. (2003) 
Van Ees et al. (1998) NL
Carpenter and Rondi (2000) IT 
Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) FR
Valderrama (2001) AT 
Chirinko, and von Kalckreuth (2003) 
DE
von Kalckreuth (2001) DE
Mizen and Vermeulen (2005) DE 
andUK
Pál and Ferrando 
(2006) AT, BE, FR, 
IT, DE, ES, NL and 
PT
Bond and Meghir 
(1994) UK









Kadapakkam et al. (1998) FR, DE, 
CAN, UK, US and JP 
Audretsch and Elston (2002) DE
Drakos and Kalandranis (2005b) GR
Kadapakkam et al. 
(1998) FR, GR, 









Low Van Ees et al. (1998) NL Bond and Meghir 
(1994) UK 
Fazzari et al. (1988)
Almeida et al. (2004)
No dividend 
effect
Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) FR
Chirinko, and von Kalckreuth (2003) 
DE
Drakos and Kalandranis (2005b) GR
Gaiotti and Generale (2001) IT
Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1998)
No bond rating von Kalckreuth (2001) DE Cummins et al. 
(2006)
Whited (1992)
Almeida et al. (2004)
Carpenter et al. (1994)
Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1998)
Hu and Schiantarelli 
(1994)
Age - Newer firms Valderrama (2001) AT
Carpenter and Rondi (2000) IT
Lünnemann and Mathä (2001) LU
Cincera (2002) BE








Beck et al. (2006)
Firms that do not belong 
to a group
Becker and Sivasadan (2006) 
(Amadeus)
Carpenter and Rondi (2000) IT











Fuss and Vermeulen (2006) BE
Leverage/bankruptcy risk Van Ees et al. (1998) NL 
Gérard and Verschueren (2002) BE
Drakos and Kalandranis (2005b) GR
Fuss and Vermeulen (2006) BE
Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal 
(2005) ES
Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) FR
Hu and Schiantarelli 
(1994)
111  Prepared by Paola Antão.134
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Table 26 Selected empirical studies on financing constraints (mainly in euro area countries), 
by factor and methodology (cont’d)
Mainly euro area countries Other countries
Investment equation Other methods Investment equation Other methods
Sectoral Butzen et al. (2001) BE









Rajan and Zingales 
(1998)
Low creditworthiness Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2003) 
DE
Chirinko and von Kalckreuth (2002) 
DE
Mizen and Verrmeulen (2005) DE 
and UK
More uncertainty Bo et al. (2003) NL 
Domestic ownership/
fewer shareholders
Cincera (2002) BE Beck et al. (2006)









Pál and Ferrando 
(2006) AT, BE, FR, 
DE, IT, NL, PT and 
ES135
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Table 27 Short description of selected empirical studies on financing constraints 



























CF/A, Q, Size 





Use five alternative approaches 
to divide the sample between 
constrained and unconstrained 
firms: payout policy, asset size, 
bond rating, commercial paper 
rating, Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) 
index. Constrained firms show a 
positive relation between cash 
and cash flow [smaller, with 
lower payout ratio, no rating]. 

































1) The first part uses a financial 
planning model based on 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998). Most firms are not able 
to finance growth exclusively 
with internal resources. Results 
suggest that small firms may be 
more financially constrained. 
2) The larger the size of a firm 
(log of sales), the higher its short 
term and long term indebtedness.
Only listed 
firms. Size is 
measured in 
terms of market 
value for the 









Q, by GMM 
estimates 
I/K (I/ K) t-1; Qt-1; 
(CF/K) t-1; 
(net sales/K) t-1; 
ownership 
concentration ; 
size (log of net 
sales) 
Medium-sized firms appear to be 
more liquidity-constrained than 
either the smallest or the largest 
firms [the class identified as 
small size firms, already includes 
firms that can be considered as 
medium]. 




have less than 
500 employees. 
Considers the 











and fixed effects) 
and the Directed 
Acyclic Graph 
methodology as a 
robustness test.
Firm growth GDP per capita; 
firm size (log of 
sales); obstacles 
Finance, crime and political 
instability are the obstacles 
which directly affect firm 
growth. Larger firms are less 
financially constrained. 
In the survey, 
small firms 
employ 5 to 
50 employees, 
medium: 51 to 
500; large: 




















model (test the 
prediction of the 
credit channel)
ΔK t/ K t-1 ΔCA/CA t-1; 
ΔC /C t-1; 
(CF /K) t-1 
[CA= turnover, 
C= cost of 
capital]
Smaller firms show greater 
sensitivity to higher investment 
cash flow 
Beck et al. 
(2006) 
WBES 




Probit model Financing 
obstacle
Country and firm 
characteristics 





Older, larger and foreign-owned 
firms report lower financing 
constraints. [The size conclusion 
is robust for both definitions of 
size]. Monotonic relationship 




log of sales and 
size dummies.136
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in 1999 and 
2000
Regressions Firm  growth Firm 
characteristics 





Survey results indicate that in the 
large majority of countries, the 
financing obstacle is the most 
important one to growth. Smaller 
firms are more constrained, and 
are also the ones that benefit most 
from a reduction in any obstacle. 
Divides the 
sample in terms 














model and Euler 
equation. GMM 
estimator









1; log outputt-1; 
log Kt-1
In general, there are financing 
constraints which are felt to be 
less severe when there is better 
financial development. 
Conglomerate firms face lower 
financing constraints (perhaps 
because they have access to 
internal capital). Do not study 
age or size. 
Use a sample 
of large firms, 
as data quality 
is better than 





Euler equation I/K  (I/K)t-1; (I/K)2t-
1; (S/K)t-1; (CF/
K)t-1; (D/K)2t-1
Firms with a stable relationship 
with a bank are less responsive 
to financial constraints. Smaller 
firms are more financially 
constrained than large ones.
Small firms are 
defined as 
having < 100 
employees, 
large firms 
have > 500. 










estimator of an 
investment 
equation
2) I/Kt-1  2) Market to book 
equity value; 
(S/K) t-1; Δ 
working capital/







For reasonable assumptions, 
investment-cash flow 
sensitivities are a good measure 
of financing constraints. Firms 
confronted with greater 
uncertainty suffer more 
financing constraints.
96 listed firms








model and Euler 
equation (GMM, 
within) 




sales growth t-1; 
CF/Kt-1; CFt-1/






The sensitivity of investment to 
financial variables is more 
significant in the UK than in the 
other countries. Results are 
consistent with differences in the 
financial systems of these 
countries. There is no size effect. 
They 
investigate the 






this is not the 
reason t for the 
difference in 
results.













Financial constraints are more 
relevant in the UK. British firms 
with no R&D are more 
constrained. There is no size 
effect, although this may be 
because there are no really small 





Size is defined 
in terms of real 
sales. Discuss 
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share issue/K ; 
(share issue/K)t-1 
There is excess sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow, no size 
effect but a dividend effect – there 
is an excess sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow 
concentrated among firms paying 
low dividends. Results are 



























Larger firms tend to hold less 
liquidity than smaller firms. This 
effect disappears when sector 
dummies are included. 
The results 















by cash flow, 
GMM estimation 





Estimate separate equations for 
different sizes and sectors. They 
work with the population and not 
a sample. Small firms’ 




firms. A firm is 
considered 


























Size is not the most important 
dimension to consider. Age is a 
much more relevant dimension, 
and young firms face financing 
constraints. When combining 
both dimensions they say that a 
new, small firm’s investment 
tends to be more sensitive to 
internal funds. Affiliation with 
pyramidal business groups 




sample may not 
include small 
firms as it 
excludes firms 




is measured in 
terms of sales. 
Small firms 
have on average 
250 employees, 















InvI / TA Invt-1/TA, S/TA, 
(S/TA) t-1, (S/
TA) t-2, CF/TA, 
(CF/TA) t-1, (CF/
TA) t-2
Internal financing is relevant for 
all firms, but small firms have 
larger internal finance effects. 
Split the data into three panels: 
1981:1-1983:4; 1984:1-1988:3 
and 1988:4-1992:4. Also split the 
sample by bond ratings. Non-
rated firms have larger cash flow 
effects than rated firms in all 
periods. Between periods, the 
effect is greater in Period 1 and 
smaller in the last period. 
Manufacturing 
firms. Size is 
measured 
according to 
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and ADL. GMM 
and within 
estimates 




growth and error 
term in ECM 
model
There is excess investment-cash 
flow sensitivity, but firm size is 
not a relevant issue. When the 
sample was split with respect to 
size, share of intangibles and the 
dividend payout ratio did not 
bring relevant results. Investment 
is more sensitive to cash flow for 
firms facing a high risk of 
bankruptcy, belonging to the 
equipment good sector and using 




authors say that 



















model – ADL 
specification by 
GMM and within 
estimates 
I/Kt-1 Several lags of I/
Kt-1; CF/Kt-1; 
UCC growth and 
sales growth
Investment is sensitive to cash 
flow movements in all countries. 











I/Kt-1 Several lags of 
I/Kt-1; CF/Kt-1; 
UCC growth and 
sales growth 
There is investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. The sample splits 
with respect to size, and payout 
ratios may not be relevant. A 
measure of creditworthiness 
could be used to sort firms. It 
can be concluded that financially 
constrained firms have greatly 




are small if 











OLS and GMM 
estimates 
I/Kt-1 Several lags of 
CF/Kt-1; UCC 





Investment cash flow sensitivity 
is higher for financially 
constrained firms (as indicated 
by firms’ creditworthiness). Use 
firms’ credit- worthiness to 






that firms are 













sales growth t-1 
and error term 
There are investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. Split the sample in 
terms of size, age, region, sector, 
ownership, exchange listing. 
Smaller, unquoted, domestic, 
younger, agricultural firms show 
more sensitivity. 
Firms with 









I/ Kt-1 CF/ Kt-1; “Q” = 
equity market-to 
book ratio; D/TA 
The least constrained firms are 
the ones that are more sensitive 
to internal funds. Split firms in 
terms of dividends. Those 
decreasing dividends are 
considered financially 
constrained. Do not study size. 










I/K QA or QM, CF/
K, (I/K)t-1
After controlling for 
fundamentals using the analyst-
based average q, investment is 
found to be insensitive to cash 
flow, even for firms typically 
thought to be liquidity 
constrained. The investment of 
unrated firms is more cash-flow 
sensitive.
Divide the 
sample in terms 
of bond rating. 139
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country and firm 
characteristics
The majority of firms grow more 
than they could have with only 
internal financing – this is true 
for AT, FI, FR, DE, NL and SP, 
but is not true for BE and IT. The 
relevant dimensions in terms of 
explaining results are associated 
with the country’s legal and 
financial system, more than on 
firm characteristics. Size may of 
course matter, depending on the 
degree of country development. 
In developing countries, it seems 
that smaller firms may face 
higher financing restrictions; in 
developed countries this may not 








Δ(I/K) First differences 
of (I/K)t-1, Q, 
Qt-1, CF/K, (CF/






Newer, larger firms seem to be 
more sensitive to cash flow. 
Listed, 
manufacturing 
firms. Size is 
measured in 


































There is investment cash flow 
sensitivity. Size and dividend 
payout do not appear relevant. 
New and highly leveraged firms 
are more financially constrained. 
Study size, age, leverage and 






measured by the 









GMM estimates of a debt-constraint-augmented 
Euler investment equation
 
Employ factor analysis to create 
sub-samples. Debt constraints 
are relevant for firms with low 
dividend payout and high 
leverage firms, but firm size 
does not appear to be relevant.
Manufacturing 
firms. There 
may not be 
enough small 
firms and there 
may be a 
selectivity bias 
towards healthy 
firms. Size is 
measured by 
the value of 
capital stock. 











I/ Kt-1 1) Q; CF/ Kt-1; 
lags of Q and 
CF/ Kt-1;
2) Q; CF/Kt-1; 
S/ Kt-1; lags of 
S/ Kt-1;
3) Q; CF/ Kt-1; 




The investment cash flow 
sensitivity is higher for firms 
paying fewer dividends. There is 
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sales growth t-1, 
CF/Kt-1, error 
term
2) size t-1; Bank 
debt/TA t-1; 
credit lines/TA 
t-1; CF/TA t-1; 
number of bank 
relationships 
The number of bank 
relationships does not affect the 
degree of financial constraints, 
either in normal times or in cases 
of adverse liquidity shocks. 






















UCC, and error 
term in the ECM
The impact of financial variables 
is stronger for smaller firms, i.e. 
firms with fewer tangible assets. 
The sample split based on 
dividends may not seem relevant. 
Firms are small 
if they have 
less than 200 
employees







Q and Euler 
equations 












Small firms are more sensitive to 















(based on Whited 
1992)
Estimates of an Euler 
investment equation including 
the effect of a debt constraint. 
Study the impact of the bank 
relationship on investment 
decisions. The limits to the 
borrowing capacity of firms in 
which a bank exercises a control 
over its shareholding are relaxed 



















ratio, user cost of 
capital, and 
uncertainty
Small firms, higher indebted 
firms, show more sensitivity.
Size is 
measured in 







VAR The VAR variables are I/K, 
marginal profit of capital, and 
CF/K 
Smaller firms, and firms with no 
bond rating, show more 
investment cash flow sensitivity. 
It does not seem relevant to split 





























t-1; error term 




Depending on methodologies, 
smaller firms’ investment is 
more sensitive to cash flow. Also 
survey evidence can be presented 
that smaller firms may be facing 
financing constraints
More large 
firms in the 
sample. Size is 
measured in 
terms of sales. 141
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I/K (I/K)t-1; sales 
growth; sales 
growth t-1, debt 





default t-1; error 
term;
Study the sensitivity of fixed 
investment to firm indicators on 
profitability, the financial burden 
and indebtedness. The financial 
position of a firm affects its real 
activity, and the impact is more 
intense when financial pressure 
exceeds a certain threshold. Use 
alternative indicators to proxy 
the degree of financial pressure 
(debt burden; indebtedness). Do 









Q model I/Kt-1 CF/K, STD/K, Q, 
Production/K
Independent firms are more 
sensitive to liquidity measures 
than firms belonging to a group. 
The results do not change when 



























Larger firms are more likely to 
belong to a class of firms with 
higher investment sensitivity to 
cash flow. This may be due to the 
fact that the ownership of small 
firms may be more concentrated, 
which could mitigate agency 
problems. Firms with more 
leverage, and unrated, are 




































10% of SMEs perceives 
themselves as financially 
constrained. Representative 
SMEs, however, do not seem to 
be financially constrained, 
although smaller, newer, more 
R&D-intensive and growth-
oriented SMEs may indeed be 
financially constrained. 
A SME is a 
small SME if it 
has les than 
20 employees 

















The growth of small firms is 



















if a firm 
reports that 










Surveys point to that roughly 
10% of SMEs are financially 
constrained. Conditioning to the 
firms that reported a need for 
external finance, this figure 
increases to 20%. The 
probability that a SME is 
financially constrained is more 
related to the problem of adverse 
selection than to moral hazard. 














Japan, the US 





ΔFA/FA CF/FA,  (cash/
FA)t-1, Qt-1 , 
(sales/FA)t-1
Internal financing affects 
investment, except in Japan. 
Larger firms display more 
investment cash flow sensitivity 
than smaller firms. Results are 
ensured by management agency 
issues and the greater flexibility 




apply for three 
definitions of 
size based on 
firm value, 
sales and total 
assets. 142
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Table 27 Short description of selected empirical studies on financing constraints 



















I/Kt-1 Several lags of 
I/Kt-1; CF/Kt-1; 
UCC growth and 
sales growth
Financially constrained firms 
(based on their rating) are more 
sensitive to internal funds. There 
is no small size effect. In one 











(“part” of the 
sample of 
Fazzari et al. 
1988)
Q model, fixed 
effects
I/Kt-1 CF/K t-1 ; Qt-1 Qualitative and quantitative 
information can be obtained from 
annual reports and used to rank 
firms in terms of the degree of 
financial constraint. There is a 
negative correlation between the 
degree of financing constraints 
and investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Investment CF 
sensitivities do not provide useful 
measures of financing constraints.
. 






I/K I/Kt-1; I/Kt+1; 




Financial development diminishes 
financing constraints. Small firms 
are disproportionately more 
disadvantaged in less financially 













I/Kt-1 It-1/Kt-2; Cash 
t-1/ K t-1; sales 
growth, UCC 
growth
Weak evidence that smaller firms 
are more sensitive to cash. 
Younger firms are more 
financially constrained. The 
results regarding sector and 














I/Kt-1 It-1/Kt-2; Sales 
growth; sales 
growtht-1; CF/
Kt-1; CFt-1/ K 
t-2; error term
The investment of UK firms is 
more sensitive to cash flow than 
the one of German firms. Study 
reasons such as financial system, 
firm size, industrial structure, 
creditworthiness. Size and 
differences in the financial 
system are not relevant. 
Creditworthiness (measured by 
sales growth and operating 
profits) is the main driving force. 
Size is 
measured by 


















Concludes on the importance of 
investment irreversibility and no 









by OLS with 
fixed effects







size (as a proxy 
for transaction 
costs) 
Study age, exchange listing, 
inside behaviour and equity 
ownership. Firms facing severe 
asymmetric information reveal 
more investment cash flow 
sensitivity (younger, unlisted 
firms and firms with a pattern of 
insider trading consistent with 
the existence of privately held 
information). Use firm size as a 
proxy for transaction costs. 
There is no size effect.
99 listed, 21 
unlisted. Size 
is measured by 
the replacement 
value of fixed 
capital stock. 143
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ANNEX 6
Table 27 Short description of selected empirical studies on financing constraints 























Market to book 
ratio, CF/A, 
net working 
capital / A, 
leverage, R&D/S
Firms with strong growth 
opportunities, with riskier 
activities, and small firms, hold 
more cash than others. Firms that 
have the greatest access to the 
capital markets, such as large 
firms and those with high credit 
ratings, tend to hold lower ratios 
of cash to total non-cash assets. 
Results are consistent with the 
view that firms hold liquid assets 
to ensure that they will be able to 
keep investing when cash flow is 
too low, relative to investment, 





































TAt-1; ΔSTD / 
TAt-1; (log TA = 
proxy for size)
The propensity to save cash out 
of cash flow is positive 
regardless of financing 
conditions. Small and unlisted 
firms do not have worse financial 
conditions. However, the results 
may be driven by the use of 
consolidated accounts. The 
significance of cash flow 
sensitivity of cash savings does 
not provide reliable evidence to 
distinguish euro area firms 





is measured by 






SMEs may be 















Questions whether industries that 
are relatively more in need of 
external finance develop 
disproportionately faster in 
countries with more developed 
financial markets. To do so, it 
takes US firms as a benchmark, 















1; liquid assets, 
liquidity ratio, 
error term
Firm characteristics that 
determine access to financial 
markets can be studied, such as 
size, age and relationship to 
another firm or a bank. Financial 
variables are significant 
determinants of investment 
demand, and there are differences 
across groups of firms. Age and 
size seem relevant but small 
firms are able to overcome 
liquidity constraints by using 
trade credit or having close 
relationships with a house bank.
Small firms 








Estimates non-parametric kernel densities of the 
difference between investment and cash flow. The 
direct observation of financial constraints avoids 
the controversy around the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity debate. 
It shows that a clustering of 
firms invests at a level below the 
level of cash flow. This indicates 
the presence of severe financing 
constraints for a fraction of firms 
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Table 27 Short description of selected empirical studies on financing constraints 















Euler equation  Estimates an Euler investment 
equation including the effect of 
a debt constraint. 
This studies the size, bond rating 
and two measures of financial 
distress (D/A, interest coverage). 
Size is important but not the 
dominant factor determining 
access to financial markets. Both 
small and large groups of firms 
contain constrained firms. The 
effect of financial constraints 
appears to be stronger for firms 
that do not have ratings
Manufacturing, 
listed large 












Hazard model Examine the effect of financing 
constraints on the timing of 
large investment projects. The 
model establishes the hypothesis 
that external finance constraints 
lower a firm’s investment hazard 
(the probability of undertaking a 
large project today as a function 
of the time since the last 
project). 
Small ﬁ  rms that distribute cash to 
shareholders face more of a hazard 
than small ﬁ  rms that do not; very 
small ﬁ  rms have lower hazards 
than small ﬁ  rms; small stand-alone 
ﬁ  rms have signiﬁ  cantly lower 
hazards than small segments of 
conglomerates. Cash ﬂ  ow 
sensitivities are not interesting 
measures of ﬁ  nance constraints 
(either they lack the power to 
detect ﬁ  nancial frictions, or suffer 
from misspeciﬁ  cation problems). 
Size measured 
by total assets. 
A Euler 












value / A)t-1; 
Size (logarithm 
of total assets) 
The sensitivity of company 
growth to cash flow rises as 
company size falls, which 
suggests that SMEs have indeed 
encountered finance constraints. 
Quoted firms tend to suffer less 









Notes: CF = cash flow; FA = fixed assets; I = investment; Inv = inventory; K = stock of capital; LTD = long-term debt; Q = market 
value/book value of assets; QA = a Q-type measure based on analysts forecasts; QM = a Q-type measure based on market value; 
S = sales; STD = short-term debt; TA = total assets; TD = total debt; UCC = user cost of capital 
1) Q is a function of market value, debt, liquid assets, K, tax rates and others. 145
ECB




METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
THE FINANCING OF SMES: A REGRESSION STUDY 112
This annex presents the methodology and the 
results of the regression analysis performed 
with unadjusted data from the BACH database. 
Several financing indicators over the period 
1999-2005 are regressed on country, sector, 
size and year dummies. The estimated equation 
is 
Y DumC DumS csdt c s , , , ,... ,... =+ + + == α 19 16
DumD DumT dt ,.. ,. + == 1 3 1 . ..6 +ε
where Y is the unadjusted financing indicator 
obtained from BACH, DumC is a dummy 
variable for country, DumS is a dummy variable 
for sector, DumD is a dummy variable for size 
and DumT is a dummy variable for year. The 
OLS estimation of this equation implies that 
one dummy per category needs to be dropped. 
In all estimations, the categories dropped are 
the ones for Country = Germany, Sector = 
Construction, Year = 1999 and Size = Large. 
A summary of results is presented in Table 28 
First, the table shows the estimated coefficients 
for the size dummy variables (* indicates a 1% 
significance level, ** indicates a 5% 
significance level, “ns” is reported otherwise). 
Table 28 Regression analysis of selected financing indicators
Gross operating profit 
to value added
Return on assets Return on equity Investment in tangible 
fixed assets to value 
added
Model with all dummies coef st dev coef st dev coef st dev coef st dev
  Schwarz medium-sized  -6.3 0.64 * -0.3 0.17 ** -0.9 0.55 ns 4.5 3.71 ns
  Small -9.2 0.64 * 0.0 0.17 ns 1.2 0.55 ** 10.6 3.70 *
 Adj R-squared 0.68 0.28 0.26 0.09
  Number of observations 1130 1130 1129 1128
Likelihood ratio test
  (Is size jointly significant?)
yes,* ns yes,* yes,**
Schwarz criteria









Bank loans to total 
debt
Bonds to total debt
Model with all dummies coef st dev coef st dev
  Schwarz medium-sized  10.8 0.80 * -4.0 0.39 *
  Small 14.3 0.84 * -5.1 0.39 *
 Adj R-squared 0.49 0.28
  Number of observations 1005 1130
Likelihood ratio test
  (Is size jointly significant?)
yes,* yes,*
Schwarz criteria







Debt to cash 
flow 
Cash to total 
assets
Short term 








Model with all dummies coef st dev coef st dev coef st dev coef st dev coef st dev coef st dev
  Schwarz medium-sized  -5.0 9.3 ns 67 59.1 ns 1.9 0.2 * 0.6 0.8 ns 5.7 0.8 * -10.3 0.7 *
  Small 42.6 9.3 * 125 59.0 ** 4.5 0.2 * -0.7 0.8 ns 3.9 0.8 * -9.1 0.7 *
 Adj R-squared 0.31 0.17 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.45
Number of observations 1130 1129 1130 1130 1130 1130
Likelihood ratio test
  (Is size jointly significant?) yes,* ns yes,* ns yes,* yes,*
Schwarz criteria
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The coefficients should be interpreted in 
comparison to the omitted categories. That is, 
the results report the difference between the 
value of the financing indicator for medium -
sized (and small firms, respectively) and the 
value of the financing indicator for large 
firms. 
In order to answer the question whether firm 
size is important, two different tests have been 
computed. The first is the likelihood ratio test 
of the joint significance of each dummy 
variable. Entries with “ns” mean that the size 
dummies are not jointly statistically significant. 
The second is Schwarz’s information criterion 
(SIC). This is used to identify the set of 
dummies which best fit the data. As can be 
seen, the results are generally in line with the 
ones presented in Chapter 3. 147
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RECENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS 
IN EURO AREA COUNTRIES 113
Table 29 The main characteristics of recent corporate governance reforms
(relating to enforcement and boards of directors)









2002 Code of Corporate Governance 
(amended 2005 and 2006)
  comply or explain for most rules X X
2005 Market Abuse Directive listed legal consequences     
BELGIUM  
2004 Code Lippens listed comply or explain X X
2005 Code Buysse non-listed recommendations X X 
2006 Royal Decree on Market Abuse listed    
FINLAND  
2003 Corporate Governance 
Recommendations for Listed Companies
listed comply or explain X X
2006 Improving Corporate Governance of 
Unlisted Companies
non-listed voluntary   
GERMANY  
2002 Corporate Governance Code 
(amended 2003, 2005 and 2006)




2002 Company Law     X X
2005 Prospectus Directive listed  
2005 Market Abuse Directive listed Administrative and penal sanctions X
2006 Takeover Bids listed sanctions    
IRELAND  
2001 Company Law Enforcement Act All Legally enforceable (the Office of 
the Director of Corporate 
Enforcement was set up under this 
Act) (see http://www.odce.ie/)
  
Decision Notices issued by the Office of 
the Director of Corporate Enforcement 
(see http://www.odce.ie/publications/
decision.asp)
X Notice on 
transactions 
with directors
2003 Companies (Auditing and 
Accounting) Act





2006 Revised Combined Code June   comply or Explain    
LUXEMBOURG  
2006 Ten Principle of Corporate 
Governance
listed comply or explain    
NETHERLANDS  
2003 Corporate Governance Code listed comply or explain X  
PORTUGAL  
1999 CMVM’s Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance (last updated in 
2005)
listed comply or explain X  
2006 Important changes to the 
Companies Code 





2003 Aldama Report listed comply or explain   X
2005 Conthe Code listed comply or explain X  
2002 Financial system reform measures listed legally binding  
2003 Transparency Law listed X   X
Sources: NCBs and authors’ own assessment.
Note: an “X” implies that the Law or Code in the first column addresses the issue.
113  Prepared by Angela Maddaloni.148
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Table 30 The main characteristics of recent corporate governance reforms








AUSTRIA      
2002 Code of Corporate Governance (amended 
in 2005 and 2006)
 X     
2005  Market  Abuse     X  X
BELGIUM      
2004 Code Lippens  X X X    X
2005 Code Buysse X     X X   
2006 Royal Decree on Market Abuse         X
FINLAND      
2003 Corporate Governance Recommendations 
for Listed Companies
 XXXX
2006 Improving Corporate Governance of 
Unlisted Companies
     
GERMANY      
2002 Corporate Governance Code (amended 
2003, 2005 and 2006)
XXXX 








   
2005 Act on corporate integrity and 
modernisation of the right to challenge 
resolutions of shareholders’ meetings (UMAG)
X    
2005 Act on disclosing the remuneration of 
executive board members of listed companies 
(VorstOG)
 X   
2005 Act on class action litigation for investors 
(KapMuG )
X    
GREECE      
2002 Company Law   X X    
2005  Prospectus   X    
2005  Market  Abuse  Directive      X
2006  Takeover  Bids X     
IRELAND      
2001 Company Law Enforcement Act   X      
Decision Notices issued by the Office of the 
Director of Corporate Enforcement.
     
http://www.odce.ie/publications/decision.asp
2003 Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Act      X X  
2006 Revised Combined Code, June X        149
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ANNEX 8
Table 30 The main characteristics of recent corporate governance reforms (cont’d)
(relating to shareholders’ rights and auditors)
Sources: NCBs and authors’ own assessment.








ITALY      
2003 Company Law Reform X X (disclosure 
at group level)
X  
2006 Code for Corporate Governance     X X  
















LUXEMBOURG      






NETHERLANDS      
2003 Corporate Governance Code     X (only for 
boards with 
more than four 
members)
  
PORTUGAL      
1999 CMVM’s recommendations on corporate 
governance (last updated in 2005)






2005 Transpositions of Market Abuse Directive         X
2006 Important changes to the Companies Code  XXXX 
SPAIN      
2003  Aldama  Report  X    
2005 Conthe Code   X 
(remuneration 
of directors)
   
2002 Financial system reform measures     X X  
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